Flythe Ex Rel. Estate of Flythe v. District of Columbia
416 U.S. App. D.C. 190
| D.C. Cir. | 2015Background
- On Dec. 26, 2009 Officers Angel Vazquez and Travis Eagan responded to reports of vandalism and encountered Tremayne Flythe; Vazquez confronted Flythe first, then Flythe fled.
- Vazquez fired at Flythe (claiming Flythe tried to stab him); Flythe ran and was later confronted by Eagan, who shot and mortally wounded Flythe.
- Betty Flythe sued both officers and the District under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (excessive force) and D.C. common-law claims (assault, battery, wrongful death, survival, negligent supervision).
- District court denied summary judgment for Vazquez but granted summary judgment to Eagan (qualified immunity and battery privilege) and to the District on negligent supervision; jury trial found Vazquez and the District liable (vicarious assault/battery) and awarded compensatory damages, later reduced for Medicaid payments.
- On appeal, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the jury verdicts but reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Eagan, finding genuine factual disputes about what happened when Flythe turned to face Eagan.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Eagan was entitled to qualified immunity for deadly force | Flythe: disputed facts show Eagan’s account is not the only plausible version; a jury could find deadly force unreasonable | Eagan: radio report that Flythe tried to stab Vazquez and Eagan’s perception of an armed, advancing suspect made his use of force objectively reasonable | Reversed: summary judgment for Eagan vacated—material factual disputes (credibility, physical evidence) meant jury must decide reasonableness |
| Standard for summary judgment when officer is sole surviving eyewitness | Flythe: court must scrutinize officer’s account against other evidence and circumstantial contradictions | Defendants: officer’s account can be accepted where radio report and some evidence support it | Held for Flythe: courts cannot simply accept a possibly self-serving officer account; must test internal consistency and circumstantial evidence |
| Exclusion of expert testimony and cross-examination about Eagan’s fitness/drug use | Flythe: Lt. concerns, later positive methamphetamine test, and fitness-for-duty history were relevant to credibility and perception/recollection | Defendants/District Ct.: prior concerns and post-shooting drug test were irrelevant to objective-reasonableness and Eagan’s actions | Court: district court erred to the extent it excluded this evidence as irrelevant to credibility, but error was harmless as to the jury verdict in plaintiff’s favor against Vazquez and District |
| District’s right to set off medical payments from damages | Flythe: challenged reduction of jury award by Medicaid-paid final medical bills | District: D.C. Code permits setoff for medical payments made when District is a defendant | Held: setoff proper under D.C. law; reduction affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (§ 1983 municipal liability framework)
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (use-of-force claims judged by objective-reasonableness)
- Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (deadly force as a Fourth Amendment seizure)
- Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) (summary judgment review requires viewing facts in light most favorable to nonmovant)
- Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) (qualified immunity protects officers from suit absent clearly established violation)
- Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012 (2014) (deadly force justified to end an ongoing severe threat)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (credibility determinations and weighing evidence are jury functions at summary judgment stage)
- Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912 (9th Cir. 1994) (when officer is sole surviving witness, courts must carefully examine consistency and circumstantial evidence)
- Etheredge v. District of Columbia, 635 A.2d 908 (D.C. 1993) (D.C. law recognizes qualified privilege for officers using reasonable force)
- Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396 (2009) (appellant must show how erroneous evidentiary rulings caused harm)