Floyd Richardson v. Michael Lemke
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 4544
| 7th Cir. | 2014Background
- Floyd Richardson was convicted in 1984 of armed robbery and murder; sentenced to death (later commuted to life without parole). Ballistics and eyewitness ID linked him to April 1980 shootings.
- During voir dire the prosecution used 16 peremptory strikes; Richardson did not contemporaneously object at trial and raised a Batson claim only in state postconviction proceedings years later.
- Illinois courts found Richardson waived the Batson claim (failure to object at trial) and denied ineffective-assistance claims regarding trial/appellate counsel; federal habeas followed.
- The district court granted habeas relief on Batson grounds after expanding the record and finding an all-black pattern of strikes and insufficient nondiscriminatory explanations; it denied relief on other-crimes and sentencing ineffective-assistance claims.
- The Seventh Circuit majority reversed the Batson-based grant (procedural default; no cause to excuse default), and affirmed denial of habeas relief on the other-crimes (due process) and sentencing ineffective-assistance claims under AEDPA.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Richardson’s Batson claim is reviewable on federal habeas | Richardson: Batson claim should be considered; trial/appellate counsel were ineffective, or Batson was a new rule excusing default | State: Illinois Supreme Court’s waiver finding (failure to object) is independent and adequate, so federal review is barred | Waiver was an independent and adequate state ground; Richardson failed to show cause to excuse default, so Batson claim is not reviewable on the merits (reversed district court) |
| Whether prosecution’s admission of other-crimes evidence violated due process | Richardson: Introduction of April 5, 1980 and May 4, 1982 incidents was so prejudicial it violated fundamental fairness | State: Evidence was relevant (April 5 ballistics/ID link); May 4 evidence was harmless; state evidentiary rulings do not implicate federal due process absent extreme unfairness | AEDPA deference: Illinois Supreme Court’s ruling was not an unreasonable application of due process; habeas relief denied (affirmed) |
| Whether trial counsel was ineffective at sentencing for failing to investigate/introduce mitigation | Richardson: Counsel failed to investigate childhood, social history, and diminished mental capacity; prejudice likely would have changed sentence | State: Trial strategy rational given Richardson’s insistence on innocence; even with mitigation, aggravating record made death likely | Under AEDPA and Strickland prejudice standard, state court’s conclusion was reasonable; no relief (affirmed) |
| Whether appellate counsel’s failure to raise Batson on direct appeal constitutes cause to excuse default | Richardson: Appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising Batson while direct appeal was pending (Batson decided while appeal pending) | State: Appellate counsel not ineffective because the claim was waived under state law for failure to object at trial; even after Batson, the legal basis existed pre-Batson | Appellate-counsel ineffective-assistance argument fails; it cannot excuse the procedural default |
Key Cases Cited
- Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (establishes burden-shifting framework for race-based peremptory strikes)
- Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965) (prior rule requiring systemic proof to show discriminatory peremptory use)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-part test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1 (1984) (framework for when a legal change may excuse procedural default)
- Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (independent and adequate state ground doctrine bars federal habeas review)
- Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (limits on retroactive application of new rules in habeas proceedings)
- Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255 (1986) (Batson not retroactively applicable on collateral review for convictions already final)
- Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005) (Batson principles applied; a single case’s facts can support a Batson claim)
- Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008) (reaffirming Batson and reversing where prosecutor’s race-based strike occurred)