FLOWERS v. STATE
2016 OK CR 22
| Okla. Crim. App. | 2016Background
- David Earl Flowers challenged his 1993 conviction; direct appeal affirmed. He filed post-conviction applications after the Postconviction DNA Act took effect (Nov. 1, 2013).
- Flowers' first post-conviction application (filed Feb. 26, 2014) did not request DNA testing; that application was denied and the denial affirmed on appeal.
- Flowers filed a second post-conviction application (Dec. 5, 2014) requesting DNA testing under the Postconviction DNA Act, which the district court (Judge Neuwirth) denied as procedurally barred.
- The district court relied on this Court’s decision in Watson v. State, holding that a second request for DNA testing could be subject to the procedural bar in 22 O.S. § 1086 of the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act.
- The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals reversed: because Flowers’ second application was his first request for DNA testing under the Postconviction DNA Act, the procedural bar from § 1086 did not apply; the case was remanded for consideration of the DNA testing request.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Flowers) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a request for DNA testing under the Postconviction DNA Act is barred when omitted from an earlier post-conviction application filed after the Act's effective date | Flowers argued his December 2014 application is his first request for DNA testing under the Act and thus not procedurally barred | State argued the Uniform Post-Conviction Act's procedural bar (§ 1086) applies to postconviction DNA requests and Flowers waived the issue by not raising it in his February 2014 application | Court held the procedural bar of § 1086 does not bar a person’s first request for testing under the Postconviction DNA Act; reversed and remanded |
| Whether the Postconviction DNA Act is procedurally integrated into the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act | Flowers (majority) argued the DNA Act is a separate statutory regime and expressly states it applies "notwithstanding any other provision of law concerning post-conviction relief" | State (and dissent) argued the DNA Act operates through the post-conviction procedural framework and thus is subject to the Uniform Act’s timing/bar rules | Court held the DNA Act creates a distinct statutory regime for DNA testing and is not automatically subject to the Uniform Post-Conviction Act’s procedural bar for first-time DNA requests |
Key Cases Cited
- Watson v. State, 343 P.3d 1282 (2015) (held that a second or subsequent DNA Act request may be subject to § 1086 procedural bars)
- State ex rel. Smith v. Neuwirth, 337 P.3d 763 (2014) (discussed relationship between DNA Act appeals and Uniform Post-Conviction Act procedure)
- State v. Iven, 335 P.3d 264 (2014) (statutory construction principles; give effect to legislative intent)
- District Attorney's Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52 (2009) (context on national movement to ensure fair, effective DNA testing)
- Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) (legislative authority to devise new procedures and remedies)