FLOWERS v. STATE
387 P.3d 947
| Okla. Crim. App. | 2016Background
- Petitioner Flowers was convicted in Comanche County (Case No. CRF-1993-241); direct appeal affirmed by this Court.
- The Postconviction DNA Act became effective Nov. 1, 2013 (22 O.S.Supp.2013, §1373 et seq.).
- Flowers filed a post-conviction application on Feb. 26, 2014 (not requesting DNA testing); that application was denied and the denial affirmed on appeal.
- On Dec. 5, 2014 Flowers filed a new post-conviction application requesting DNA testing — his first request for testing in this case.
- The district court denied the DNA request as procedurally barred under this Court’s Watson decision, which treated second/subsequent DNA requests as subject to Section 1086 procedural bars.
- This Court reversed, holding Flowers’ request was not procedurally barred because Watson only bars second or subsequent DNA requests and Flowers’ was his first DNA request under the Postconviction DNA Act; the matter was remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Flowers) | Defendant's Argument (State / District Court) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a postconviction DNA request filed after an earlier postconviction application (that did not request DNA testing) is procedurally barred under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act’s Section 1086. | Flowers argued the Postconviction DNA Act is a separate statutory regime not subject to the Uniform Post-Conviction Act’s procedural bars; his Dec. 2014 filing was his first DNA request. | The State and district court relied on Watson: procedural bar applies when a petitioner could have raised DNA testing in an earlier postconviction filing after the DNA Act’s enactment. | Reversed district court: Watson bars only second/subsequent DNA requests; because this was Flowers’ first request for DNA testing under the Act, it is not procedurally barred. |
| Whether the Postconviction DNA Act must be read as incorporated into or governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act. | Flowers: the DNA Act contains language "notwithstanding any other provision of law concerning post-conviction relief," indicating it is independent and creates a distinct procedure/remedy. | State: DNA motions proceed through the existing postconviction framework and its verification, filing, and waiver rules; thus Section 1086’s waiver/bar rules apply. | Court held the Act is a distinct statutory scheme for DNA testing and should not be read to import Section 1086 procedural bars except as applied in Watson to second/subsequent DNA requests. |
Key Cases Cited
- Watson v. State, 343 P.3d 1282 (Okla. Crim. App. 2015) (held Section 1086 procedural bar may apply to second or subsequent DNA requests under the Postconviction DNA Act)
- State ex rel. Smith v. Neuwirth, 337 P.3d 763 (Okla. Crim. App. 2014) (recognized appellate procedure for DNA Act appeals follows Uniform Post-Conviction Act procedure)
- Newlun v. State, 348 P.3d 209 (Okla. Crim. App. 2015) (statutory-construction principles and legislative intent guide interpretation of postconviction statutes)
- Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (U.S. 1991) (legislature may devise new procedures and remedies to meet perceived needs)
- Dist. Att’y’s Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52 (U.S. 2009) (discusses government interests and the role of DNA testing reform in the criminal justice system)