Florez v. Holder
779 F.3d 207
| 2d Cir. | 2015Background
- Petitioner Nilfor Yosel Florez, a lawful permanent resident from Honduras, was twice convicted under N.Y. Penal Law § 260.10(1) for endangering the welfare of a child; the 2010 conviction involved driving under the influence with his two young children in the car.
- DHS initiated removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), which makes removable any alien convicted of a “crime of child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment.”
- Florez admitted the factual allegations but contested that his convictions constituted a federal “crime of child abuse.”
- The Immigration Judge relied on BIA precedent (Matter of Velazquez-Herrera; Matter of Soram) and found Florez removable; the BIA affirmed, applying a broad BIA definition that includes endangerment crimes that do not require an actual injury.
- On review, Florez argued the BIA’s broad interpretation is unreasonable and not entitled to Chevron deference; the Second Circuit assumed Soram’s definition would include § 260.10(1) but evaluated whether the BIA’s interpretation is a permissible construction of an ambiguous statute.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the phrase “crime of child abuse” in 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) unambiguously excludes child-endangerment statutes that do not require actual injury | Florez: The BIA’s broad reading is unreasonable; Congress did not clearly adopt endangerment-only offenses without injury | Government/BIA: The term is ambiguous and the BIA’s inclusive construction (covering reckless/neglectful endangerment posing sufficient risk) is reasonable | The statute is ambiguous; the BIA’s broad definition is a permissible construction entitled to Chevron deference; petition denied |
Key Cases Cited
- Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (two-step test for judicial review of agency statutory constructions)
- Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005) (agency interpretations can override prior judicial constructions under Chevron)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (use of the majority rule among states to define a generic statutory term)
- Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (2007) (categorical approach: compare state statute to generic federal offense)
- Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678 (2013) (categorical approach and presumption that conviction rests on least culpable conduct)
