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779 F.3d 207
2d Cir.
2015

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Background

  • Petitioner Nilfor Yosel Florez, a lawful permanent resident from Honduras, was twice convicted under N.Y. Penal Law § 260.10(1) for endangering the welfare of a child; the 2010 conviction involved driving under the influence with his two young children in the car.
  • DHS initiated removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), which makes removable any alien convicted of a “crime of child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment.”
  • Florez admitted the factual allegations but contested that his convictions constituted a federal “crime of child abuse.”
  • The Immigration Judge relied on BIA precedent (Matter of Velazquez-Herrera; Matter of Soram) and found Florez removable; the BIA affirmed, applying a broad BIA definition that includes endangerment crimes that do not require an actual injury.
  • On review, Florez argued the BIA’s broad interpretation is unreasonable and not entitled to Chevron deference; the Second Circuit assumed Soram’s definition would include § 260.10(1) but evaluated whether the BIA’s interpretation is a permissible construction of an ambiguous statute.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument Defendant's Argument Held
Whether the phrase “crime of child abuse” in 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) unambiguously excludes child-endangerment statutes that do not require actual injury Florez: The BIA’s broad reading is unreasonable; Congress did not clearly adopt endangerment-only offenses without injury Government/BIA: The term is ambiguous and the BIA’s inclusive construction (covering reckless/neglectful endangerment posing sufficient risk) is reasonable The statute is ambiguous; the BIA’s broad definition is a permissible construction entitled to Chevron deference; petition denied

Key Cases Cited

  • Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (two-step test for judicial review of agency statutory constructions)
  • Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005) (agency interpretations can override prior judicial constructions under Chevron)
  • Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (use of the majority rule among states to define a generic statutory term)
  • Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (2007) (categorical approach: compare state statute to generic federal offense)
  • Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678 (2013) (categorical approach and presumption that conviction rests on least culpable conduct)
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Case Details

Case Name: Florez v. Holder
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Date Published: Mar 4, 2015
Citations: 779 F.3d 207; 2015 WL 895628; 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 3755; Docket No. 14-874
Docket Number: Docket No. 14-874
Court Abbreviation: 2d Cir.
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