Flock v. United States Department of Transportation
840 F.3d 49
| 1st Cir. | 2016Background
- FMCSA maintains the Motor Carrier Management Information System (MCMIS) with crash and inspection data; access by prospective motor-carrier employers is governed by 49 U.S.C. § 31150 and the Privacy Act (driver consent required).
- § 31150 requires the Secretary to provide access to: (1) accident reports; (2) inspection reports with no driver-related violations; and (3) inspection reports with serious driver-related violations; it defines “serious” violations but is silent about non-serious driver-related violations.
- FMCSA created a Pre-Employment Screening Program (PSP) and SORNs describing disclosure of five years of crash data and three years of inspection history; PSP did not expressly exclude non-serious violations; access required a $10 fee and driver consent form.
- A class of commercial drivers sued, alleging disclosure of non-serious driver-related safety violations exceeds FMCSA’s authority under § 31150 and that consent forms were ambiguous or coercive in violation of the Privacy Act.
- District court dismissed, holding § 31150 ambiguous as to non-serious violations and that FMCSA’s interpretation warranted Chevron deference; the First Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 31150 unambiguously prohibits disclosure of non-serious driver-related violations | § 31150 lists specific report categories, so Congress intended a ceiling — non-serious violations are excluded | Statute sets minimum disclosure (a floor); silence about non-serious violations leaves discretion to agency | Court: statute ambiguous; FMCSA's floor interpretation permissible under Chevron |
| Whether FMCSA’s interpretation merits Chevron deference | N/A (challenging agency scope) | FMCSA argues its interpretation resolves statutory ambiguity and should get deference | Court: Chevron applies; agency interpretation not arbitrary or contrary to statute; defer and affirm |
| Validity of consent form language under the Privacy Act (ambiguity) | Consent language is ambiguous and should be read to permit only categories in § 31150 | Consent plainly authorizes release of five years crash and three years inspection history, which can include non-serious violations | Court: consent language is not ambiguous in the way plaintiffs claim; agency interpretation controls; consent valid |
| Whether consent was coercive / involuntary | Drivers had no practical choice but to sign to seek employment; consent therefore coerced and invalid | Use of PSP is optional under § 31150(c); no showing employers mandate PSP or that employment prospects are doomed | Court: consent not coercive; PSP use optional; plaintiffs failed to show coercion or doom to employment |
Key Cases Cited
- Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (agency deference where statute ambiguous)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (standing requirements: injury-in-fact, causation, redressability)
- Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (future injury must be certainly impending for Article III standing)
- United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (scope of deference to agency interpretations)
- City of Arlington v. F.C.C., 569 U.S. 290 (interpretive deference and statutory construction principles)
- F.A.A. v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 284 (Privacy Act described as comprehensive scheme for agency records)