Flint v. County of Kauai, 521 F.Supp.3d 978

Background

In April 2018 heavy rains and flooding on Kauai caused multiple landslides that rendered Kuhio Highway—the only road into the Lumahai–Wainiha–Haena area—impassible and isolated communities.
The Kauai mayor declared an emergency under HRS ch. 127 and issued Mayor’s Emergency Rule No. 1 (effective May 4, 2018), which barred visitors and prohibited operation of transient vacation rentals (TVRs) in the distressed area to protect safety and facilitate road repairs.
The Rule was extended and remained in effect until April 29, 2019 (just under one year); during the period the County taxed affected properties at the residential rate and eased TVR permitting requirements for the following year.
Plaintiffs Susan and Geoffrey Flint owned a nonconforming-use TVR in the area, lost rental income, canceled reservations, and sold the property in February 2019 (alleging a slight loss); they sued the County asserting takings, due process, equal protection, Contract Clause, HRS §127A-21, and equitable estoppel/vested-rights claims.
The County moved for summary judgment on all counts; the court granted the County’s motion and denied Plaintiffs’ partial summary judgment motion, rejecting each constitutional and statutory claim.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Takings (federal & state)	Emergency Rule deprived Plaintiffs of use of their TVR and effected a taking without just compensation.	The temporary, emergency regulation caused minimal diminution in value, did not destroy investment-backed expectations, and served a paramount public safety purpose.	Grant D.J.: No taking. Economic loss was minor (<10% even with claimed lost rents), expectations not unreasonably impaired, and governmental interest outweighed harm.
Procedural due process	Plaintiffs were deprived of property without notice or hearing.	The Rule was legislative/emergency in nature, affecting a class of properties; general notice suffices in that context.	Grant D.J.: No violation. Rule applied generally to ~80 TVRs; individual notice/hearing unnecessary.
Substantive due process	The Rule arbitrarily discriminated by allowing residents/workers but excluding vacationers.	The classification was rationally related to legitimate emergency objectives (safety, repairs, reducing at-risk individuals).	Grant D.J.: No violation. County action was rational and not arbitrary or abusive of power.
Equal protection	TVR owners were treated differently from other property users.	Differential treatment had a rational basis tied to public-safety and repair-efficiency needs.	Grant D.J.: No violation. Classification met rational-basis review.
Contract Clause	The Rule impaired Plaintiffs’ rental contracts with guests.	Even if impairment occurred, the Rule served a significant legitimate public purpose and was reasonably tailored.	Grant D.J.: No violation. Emergency public purpose justified the temporary restriction.
HRS §127A-21 (requisition)	County requisitioned property without compensation.	Mayor did not invoke §127A-21; County did not requisition or occupy Plaintiffs’ real property.	Grant D.J.: No violation. Statute inapplicable; no evidence of requisition or use.
Vested rights / zoning estoppel	Plaintiffs had vested nonconforming-TV R rights and relied on County conduct.	Doctrines typically do not permit damages for temporary emergency measures; rule was lifted and relief was available.	Grant D.J.: No relief. Doctrines do not support damages and equitable relief unnecessary after Rule’s termination.

Key Cases Cited

Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (determining regulatory‑takings framework for temporary restrictions)
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (establishing multi-factor regulatory takings test)
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (clarifying regulatory‑takings analysis and rejecting "substantially advances" as takings test)
Colony Cove Props., LLC v. City of Carson, 888 F.3d 445 (9th Cir.) (economic‑impact comparison in takings analysis)
Bridge Aina Leʻa, LLC v. Land Use Comm’n, 950 F.3d 610 (9th Cir.) (discussing Penn Central factors and investment‑backed expectations)
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (upholding regulation that served significant public welfare interest)
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (total regulatory takings doctrine)
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (physical permanent‑occupation takings)
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (temporary takings and just compensation principles)
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (plenary police‑power deference in land‑use regulation)
Spannaus v. Allied Structural Steel Co., 438 U.S. 234 (Contract Clause analysis and public‑purpose considerations)
Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400 (Contract Clause balancing and deference to legislative judgment)
Sveen v. Melin, 138 S. Ct. 1815 (modern two‑step Contract Clause framework)
Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (equal protection — arbitrary differential treatment)