Flathead-Lolo-Bitterroot Citizen Task Force v. State of Montana, 98 F.4th 1180

Plaintiffs (Flathead-Lolo-Bitterroot Citizen Task Force & WildEarth Guardians) challenged Montana’s wolf trapping and snaring regulations, arguing they cause unlawful takings of grizzly bears, a threatened species under the Endangered Species Act (ESA).
The district court granted a preliminary injunction restricting wolf trapping and snaring to January 1–February 15, 2024 in specified Montana areas—when most grizzlies would be denned.
Defendants (State of Montana, Fish & Wildlife Commission Chair, and Governor Gianforte) appealed, arguing the injunction was based on improper evidence, used the wrong standard, and was overbroad.
The Ninth Circuit reviewed the grant of the preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion, a highly deferential standard.
The court affirmed the issuance of injunctive relief in part but found the injunction overbroad geographically (covering more area than necessary) and as it applied to the state’s research activities. The injunction’s geographic scope was remanded for reconsideration, and the exclusion for research was ordered.
Judge Tallman dissented in part, finding the evidence of harm too speculative to justify a preliminary injunction.

Issue	Plaintiff’s Argument	Defendant’s Argument	Held
Was consideration of new arguments/evidence in reply brief proper?	All parties had notice & opportunity to respond, and rules for injunctions are relaxed.	Raising new arguments/evidence in the reply was improper and prejudicial.	Consideration was proper; no abuse of discretion.
Was the appropriate preliminary injunction standard applied?	Serious questions standard applies in ESA cases.	Only likelihood of success & higher standard for mandatory injunctions would suffice.	"Serious questions" test is valid and was properly applied.
Was there a reasonably certain threat of imminent/irreparable harm to grizzlies?	Trap timing and placement creates a likely risk to active grizzlies; much expert evidence supports this.	Evidence of harm is speculative/contradicted; no bycatch since regulations changed.	The finding was not clearly erroneous given a deferential review.
Was the injunction’s scope (temporal/geographic/government research) overbroad?	Broad relief was needed for effective protection; research activities should be excluded if needed.	Geographical coverage was too wide; injunction also bars necessary research.	Injunction was geographically overbroad and improperly barred research; remanded for modifications, but temporal scope affirmed.

Or. Nat. Res. Council v. Allen, 476 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2007) (discusses scope and operation of the Endangered Species Act and preliminary injunction factors)
All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2011) (confirmed the validity of the "serious questions" sliding scale test for preliminary injunctions post-Winter)
Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Burlington N. R.R. Inc., 23 F.3d 1508 (9th Cir. 1994) (sets standard of "reasonably certain threat of imminent harm" under ESA for issuance of preliminary injunction)
Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 1996) (application of preliminary injunction standard under ESA based on threat of harm)
GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2000) (defining status quo for purposes of preliminary injunction)