Flake v. Arpaio, 2:15-cv-01132

Background

In June 2014 Austin Flake and Logan (then Flake) were housesitting a Gilbert, AZ home where a small kennel held ~15–30 dogs; by morning ~20 dogs were dead or dying. The Flakes had checked the dogs the prior night and assert the kennel A/C failed overnight.
Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office (Arpaio led) investigated, issued press releases, and convened a grand jury; two deputies/experts (veterinarian and electrical engineer) assisted.
On September 9, 2014 Arpaio held a press conference recommending felony and misdemeanor animal-cruelty charges against the Flakes and others; a grand jury later indicted them.
In December 2014 the Flakes moved to return the case to the grand jury based on alleged misrepresentations; prosecutors voluntarily dismissed the case after reviewing defense evidence suggesting the A/C may have failed.
The Flakes sued Arpaio, Deputy Marie Trombi, and Maricopa County asserting malicious prosecution, defamation, false light, and First Amendment retaliation; defendants moved for summary judgment.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Malicious prosecution — probable cause (state law)	No probable cause existed to charge Flakes with felony "knowingly/intentionally" causing cruel neglect; expert observations show at most negligence.	Probable cause existed based on investigative reports and expert opinions about overcrowding, lack of water, and inadequate ventilation.	Court grants Flakes partial summary judgment: as a matter of law prosecutors lacked probable cause for the felony charges.
Malicious prosecution — independent-judgment presumption	Prosecutor acted under Arpaio’s pressure and reliance on Trombi’s characterizations; presumption rebutted by Arpaio’s public pressure and factual disputes.	Prosecutor independently reviewed the full file and exercised independent judgment; presumption should bar officer liability.	Presumption not resolved on summary judgment — factual dispute exists whether Arpaio pressured prosecutors; Tro mbi entitled to summary judgment on federal §1983 malicious-prosecution claim.
Malicious prosecution — malice (improper purpose)	Arpaio pursued charges to gain publicity and bolster his image (press releases, conferences), not solely to obtain justice.	Actions were legitimate investigative and public-information measures, not motivated by improper purpose.	Triable issue as to Arpaio’s state-law malice; federal malicious-prosecution claims against Arpaio and Trombi fail (no evidence of intent to deprive constitutional right). State claim against Arpaio survives.
Defamation and related privacy claims	Press release and press conference statements falsely implied Flakes lied or were guilty and injured reputation (and under §1983 amounted to defamation-plus).	Statements were opinion, ambiguous, and/or referenced pending prosecutorial review; not provably false assertions of fact.	Summary judgment for defendants on state and federal defamation claims; false-light and First Amendment retaliation claims abandoned by plaintiffs.
Qualified immunity (state & federal)	Plaintiffs argue officers are not immune because actions violated established law and were malicious.	Defendants assert qualified immunity for federal claims; Arizona qualified-immunity-like standard shields officers unless they knew or recklessly disregarded the law.	Federal claims fail on the merits, so qualified-immunity inquiry unnecessary. For state malicious-prosecution claim against Arpaio, factual disputes preclude summary judgment on whether he knew or should have known his conduct violated law.

Key Cases Cited

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (summary judgment standard)
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (summary judgment burden shifting)
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133 (view evidence in favor of nonmoving party)
Newman v. County of Orange, 457 F.3d 991 (9th Cir.) (independent-judgment presumption in malicious-prosecution cases)
Smiddy v. Varney, 665 F.2d 261 (9th Cir.) (presumption can be rebutted by showing prosecutor pressured or misled)
Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir.) (§1983 malicious-prosecution requires showing prosecution for purpose of denying specific constitutional right)
Slade v. City of Phoenix, 112 Ariz. 298 (state law elements of malicious prosecution)
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (opinion vs. provably false fact in defamation law)
Turner v. Devlin, 174 Ariz. 201 (state-law analysis of opinion and defamation)
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (qualified immunity framework)
Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896 (9th Cir.) (clearly established right standard under §1983)