Fitzpatrick v. U.S. Bank National Assn., 164 A.3d 832

In 2007 Fitzpatrick executed a $580,000 note secured by a mortgage with a stated maturity date of September 1, 2037.
Fitzpatrick defaulted and stopped payments on May 1, 2009, remained in undisturbed possession of the property, and a prior foreclosure was dismissed for dormancy.
In May 2015 Fitzpatrick sued under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 49-13 seeking discharge of the mortgage, claiming six years of undisturbed possession measured from the defendants’ acceleration date (May 1, 2009).
Defendants moved to strike, arguing the relevant six-year period runs from the mortgage’s express maturity date (Sept. 1, 2037), not the acceleration date.
The trial court granted the motion to strike and entered judgment after Fitzpatrick failed to plead over; the plaintiff appealed.
The Appellate Court reviewed statutory construction of § 49-13 and affirmed, holding the statute’s phrase "time limited in the mortgage for the full performance of the conditions thereof" refers to the mortgage’s stated maturity date.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
When does the six-year period in § 49-13 begin?	Six years runs from the date of acceleration (May 1, 2009), which effectively advanced the maturity date.	Six years runs from the mortgage's express maturity date (Sept. 1, 2037); acceleration does not change the "time limited in the mortgage."	The phrase refers to the mortgage's stated maturity date (Sept. 1, 2037); plaintiff not eligible yet.

Jodlowski v. Stanley Works, 169 Conn. App. 103 (Conn. App. 2016) (principles of statutory construction and plenary review)
Marchesi v. Board of Selectmen, 309 Conn. 608 (Conn. 2013) (use of ordinary dictionary meaning when statute does not define a term)
McCoy v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 300 Conn. 144 (Conn. 2011) (legislature presumed to draft statutes with deliberate language)
Campbell v. Plymouth, 74 Conn. App. 67 (Conn. App. 2002) (procedural rule on judgment after failure to plead over)