Fisher v. State
309 Ga. 814
Ga.2020Background
- On May 26, 2009 Derrick Cullins was shot and killed outside an apartment; two residents (Terrell and Madden) saw a taller, lighter-complexioned man shoot him and heard the shooter use a Creole/Cajun accent and say “that’s what you get” and “woahdie.”
- David Lewis (dreadlocks, black jacket, white shirt) testified at retrial that he drove Appellant Ronald Fisher and Cullins to the apartment, witnessed Fisher take pills from Cullins, saw Fisher pull a revolver and shoot Cullins, then drove Fisher away; Lewis initially lied to police but later admitted involvement and identified Fisher from a photo.
- Lewis was the only witness to identify Fisher as the shooter; Fisher’s defense asserted Lewis was an accomplice and the actual shooter or was otherwise implicated.
- Fisher’s first trial convictions were reversed by this Court for ineffective assistance; at the 2018 retrial Fisher was convicted again of malice murder and related charges and sentenced to life without parole (firearm sentence consecutive); he appealed.
- The trial court instructed the jury on accomplice corroboration and party-to-a-crime principles; other circumstantial evidence included eyewitness descriptions matching Fisher (complexion, accent), Fisher’s post-shooting flight/move to Detroit, and Lewis’s post-event conduct.
Issues
| Issue | Fisher's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether convictions were supported by sufficient evidence because Lewis was an accomplice and the sole identificatory witness | Lewis was an accomplice; his uncorroborated testimony alone is legally insufficient | Jury was properly instructed; Lewis’s testimony could be credited as non-accomplice or, if an accomplice, was slightly corroborated by independent circumstantial evidence | Evidence was legally and constitutionally sufficient; jury permissibly found Lewis not an accomplice or found slight corroboration adequate |
| Whether the lead detective’s testimony that Lewis “most likely believed he had no choice” invaded the jury’s province by addressing the accomplice issue | Detective’s comment improperly opined on the ultimate issue (accomplice status), which is for the jury | OCGA § 24-7-704(a) allows lay opinion on ultimate issues; the detective did not directly decide accomplice status | No error; current Evidence Code permits such lay-opinion testimony and the admission was proper |
| Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to a prosecutor closing remark suggesting Clark didn’t tell law enforcement about seeing Lewis | Failure to object was deficient and prejudicial; prosecutor improperly attacked Clark for not telling prior defense counsel (not authorities) | The prosecutor’s argument fairly focused on Clark’s failure to tell law enforcement; objection would have been meritless, so no ineffective assistance | No ineffective assistance; the comment was supported by the testimony and an objection would have been meritless |
| Whether federal due-process sufficiency standard was met (Jackson v. Virginia) | Same as sufficiency claim above | Same as State’s sufficiency defense | Constitutional sufficiency satisfied; a rational juror could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt |
Key Cases Cited
- Fisher v. State, 299 Ga. 478 (2016) (prior reversal on ineffective assistance; discussed accomplice-corroboration issues)
- Raines v. State, 304 Ga. 582 (2018) (only slight, independent corroboration required when accomplice is sole identificatory witness)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (constitutional standard for sufficiency of the evidence)
- Mack v. State, 306 Ga. 607 (2019) (OCGA § 24-7-704(a) allows lay opinion on ultimate issues)
- Mattox v. State, 308 Ga. 302 (2020) (failure to object to a closing argument is not ineffective assistance when objection would be meritless)
- Kelly v. State, 270 Ga. 523 (1999) (jury may determine whether a witness is an accomplice based on testimony of fear/compulsion)
- Vega v. State, 285 Ga. 32 (2009) (credibility and resolving conflicts in evidence are jury functions)
- Medlock v. State, 263 Ga. 246 (1993) (old Evidence Code precedent on lay opinion and ultimate issues; distinguished by court due to evidentiary code change)