Finest Meridor v. U.S. Attorney General
891 F.3d 1302
11th Cir.2018Background
- Finest Meridor, a Haitian national, was ordered removable based on lack of documents and prior criminal convictions; he sought relief via a U visa (for crime victims) which requires admissibility or a waiver of inadmissibility.
- Meridor applied to USCIS for a U visa and an inadmissibility waiver; USCIS denied both, concluding he was inadmissible and would not exercise discretion to grant a waiver.
- An Immigration Judge (IJ) reopened proceedings, found she had authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3)(A) to grant waivers as the Attorney General’s delegate, and announced she would grant Meridor a waiver based on hardship and diminished risk of harm.
- The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) reversed, holding IJs lacked authority (only DHS/USCIS can grant waivers for U visas under § 1182(d)(14)) and alternatively found Meridor did not merit a waiver; the BIA reviewed the IJ’s factual finding de novo.
- The Eleventh Circuit granted review, concluded the BIA erred both in jurisdictional analysis (ignoring § 1182(d)(3)(A)’s plain language) and in improperly reweighing IJ factfinding instead of applying the clear-error standard, vacated and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Meridor's Argument | DHS/BIA's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether an IJ (as AG delegate) may grant inadmissibility waivers to U-visa applicants under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3)(A) | § 1182(d)(3)(A) plainly authorizes the Attorney General (and delegates) to waive inadmissibility, including for U-visa applicants | § 1182(d)(14) (and USCIS authority over U visas) means only DHS/USCIS may grant these waivers | IJs have authority under § 1182(d)(3)(A); (d)(14) coexists and does not preclude (d)(3) grants by AG delegates |
| Whether the BIA properly reversed on the merits (denial of waiver) | IJ properly found risk diminished and exercised discretion to grant a waiver; factual findings reviewed for clear error | BIA concluded Meridor did not merit a waiver and reweighed the IJ’s factual findings | BIA erred: it reviewed IJ’s factual finding de novo rather than for clear error, so alternative merits holding fails |
| Whether the court could reach IJ-jurisdiction issue given discretionary-review limits | Meridor urged review of BIA’s legal error on jurisdiction so merits would be reconsidered | DHS contended merits-denial is committed to agency discretion and not judicially reviewable | Because BIA committed legal error in its merits review, court could address (and did) the jurisdictional question; remand required for reconsideration |
Key Cases Cited
- L.D.G. v. Holder, 744 F.3d 1022 (7th Cir. 2014) (holding § 1182(d)(3)(A) permits AG or delegates to waive inadmissibility for U-visa applicants)
- Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009) (statutes must be applied according to their plain terms)
- Arias v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 482 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2007) (limits on judicial review of discretionary immigration decisions)
- Zhu v. Att’y Gen., 703 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2013) (risk of future harm is a factual finding subject to clear-error review)
- Baez-Sanchez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 854 (7th Cir. 2017) (declining to follow BIA’s Matter of Khan; supports concurrent IJ authority under § 1182(d)(3)(A))