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36 Misc. 3d 404
N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2012
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Background

  • Married in 1989, they separated in 2007 and entered a 2008 separation agreement.
  • The separation agreement bars either party from filing for divorce until the marital apartment is sold.
  • The apartment, a West 23rd St. Manhattan condo, remains unsold four-plus years later.
  • Husband resides with a new partner and seeks divorce and declaratory relief invalidating the no-divorce clause.
  • Wife argues the clause is a valid condition precedent and, if void, that the entire agreement should fail or be substantially modified.
  • Court proceedings include husband's cross-claims for divorce grounds and declaratory relief, wife’s affirmative defenses and counterclaims, and wife’s cross-motion for various relief.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument Defendant's Argument Held
Does the no-divorce clause violate public policy? Filstein contends it defeats the public policy favoring divorce. Bromberg argues it is a valid condition precedent and not a public-policy violation. No; the clause violates public policy and is unenforceable.
Is the clause enforceable as a condition precedent or independent contract term? Clause may be a permissible condition precedent. Clause should be enforced as a contractual condition. Enforceability as a condition precedent does not save it from public-policy invalidation.
Should the no-divorce clause lead to voiding the entire separation agreement? Severability should preserve the rest of the agreement. If void, the entire agreement may be invalid. Severability applies; rest of the agreement remains valid.
What is the appropriate disposition of the remaining defenses and counterclaims? Some defenses/counterclaims survive despite invalidation of the clause. Many defenses/counterclaims lack merit after invalidation of the clause. Most defenses dismissed; some counterclaims survive; cross-motion denied.

Key Cases Cited

  • Gleason v Gleason, 26 N.Y.2d 28 (N.Y. 1970) (public policy favoring dissolution of dead marriages; marriage not protected if dead)
  • Covington v. Walker, 3 N.Y.3d 287 (N.Y. 2004) (historical development of divorce grounds)
  • Christian v. Christian, 42 N.Y.2d 63 (N.Y. 1977) (courts protect separation agreements when inequity is not present)
  • McKeon v. McKeon, 78 A.D.3d 667 (2d Dept. 2010) ( postnuptial agreements not violative of public policy if wife can still divorce)
  • Gleason v. Gleason, 26 N.Y.2d 28 (N.Y. 1970) (public policy on dead marriages; justify allowing dissolution)
  • Strong v. Dubin, 48 A.D.3d 232 (1st Dept. 2008) (maintenance waiver enforceable if no undue influence)
  • Doukas v. Doukas, 47 A.D.3d 753 (2d Dept. 2008) (unconscionability standard for separation agreements)
  • Jessup v. LaBonte, 289 A.D.2d 295 (2d Dept. 2001) (severability of void clauses in separation agreements)
  • Taft v. Taft, 156 A.D.2d 444 (2d Dept. 1989) (severability and enforceability of separation agreements)
Read the full case

Case Details

Case Name: Filstein v. Bromberg
Court Name: New York Supreme Court
Date Published: Apr 9, 2012
Citation: 36 Misc. 3d 404
Court Abbreviation: N.Y. Sup. Ct.
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    Filstein v. Bromberg, 36 Misc. 3d 404