859 F.3d 148
1st Cir.2017Background
- Filler was arrested in April 2007 on multiple sexual-assault and assault charges; after two trials and appeals he was ultimately convicted only of one misdemeanor assault charge, which he still challenges.
- Filler sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging, inter alia, malicious prosecution, suppression and tampering of exculpatory evidence, and that prosecutor Mary Kellett advised law enforcement not to comply with defense subpoenas.
- Kellett moved to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), arguing statute-of-limitations, the inapplicability of due‑process theories, failure to state a state-law malicious-prosecution claim, and absolute prosecutorial immunity for Fourth Amendment-based claims.
- The district court granted Kellett absolute immunity for core advocate functions (charging, presenting to grand jury, prosecutorial decisions) but denied dismissal as to other alleged conduct (advice to police on subpoenas; withholding/tampering with evidence).
- Kellett appealed interlocutorily the denial of absolute immunity. The First Circuit held it lacked jurisdiction to hear this interlocutory appeal to the extent the immunity question depended on factual development.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Kellett is entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity for advising police not to comply with defense subpoenas | Filler: advice may have been given in non‑advocate, administrative/investigative or civil‑context functions and thus not protected by absolute immunity | Kellett: legal advice given after prosecution began is within prosecutorial/advocate role and thus absolutely immune | Dismissed for lack of interlocutory jurisdiction because resolution depends on factual development about context and timing of advice |
| Whether Kellett has absolute immunity for withholding/tampering with exculpatory evidence | Filler: alleged acts occurred in investigative or pre‑probable‑cause period and so are not protected by absolute immunity | Kellett: suppression/withholding during judicial phase is protected by absolute immunity | Dismissed for lack of interlocutory jurisdiction because it is unclear when and in what role the conduct occurred; factual record required |
| Whether absolute immunity can be decided as a pure legal question at this stage | Filler: many claims are not clearly within advocate role on complaint face and thus require factual development | Kellett: immunity is largely a legal question and should be resolved now on pleadings | Court: absolute-immunity interlocutory review is limited to questions of law; here factual disputes preclude review, so no jurisdiction |
| Scope of interlocutory appeal from denial of immunity defense | Filler: appellate jurisdiction over immunity defenses is narrow and does not extend to collateral issues | Kellett: seeks broader review of denial of immunity | Court: jurisdiction limited to legal immunity questions; where immunity depends on facts, appeal must await discovery/trial |
Key Cases Cited
- Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (prosecutors absolutely immune for initiating prosecution and presenting state’s case)
- Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (no absolute immunity for out‑of‑court statements or functions outside advocate role)
- Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (absolute immunity protects judicial process; distinction between advocate and investigative/administrative roles)
- Guzman‑Rivera v. Rivera‑Cruz, 55 F.3d 26 (assume plaintiff’s allegations true on interlocutory review of immunity ruling)
- Reid v. New Hampshire, 56 F.3d 332 (prosecutorial suppression of exculpatory information may be insulated by absolute immunity when part of judicial phase)
- Lawson v. Abrams, 863 F.2d 260 (absolute immunity may turn on factual record; interlocutory appeal improper where facts unclear)
- Limone v. Condon, 372 F.3d 39 (limited scope of interlocutory review for immunity denials)
- Manuel v. City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911 (Fourth Amendment cognizable for claims involving unlawful pretrial detention)
- Goldstein v. Moatz, 364 F.3d 205 (prosecutors lack absolute immunity for acts committed prior to probable‑cause determination)
- Hill v. City of N.Y., 45 F.3d 653 (immunity issues raising factual disputes are not immediately appealable)