Fight Against Brownsburg Annexation v. Town of Brownsburg, Indiana
32 N.E.3d 798
Ind. Ct. App.2015Background
- Brownsburg adopted an annexation ordinance (introduced Mar. 7, 2013; adopted July 11, 2013) proposing annexation of 1,193 parcels (~4,461 acres). A group of affected landowners formed Fight Against Brownsburg Annexation (FABA) and collected remonstrance signatures.
- FABA filed a remonstrance and declaratory judgment action on Oct. 7, attaching signatures of owners of 808 parcels (~67% of parcels). The petition asserted compliance with I.C. § 36-4-3-11(a) (65% owners required), was filed within 90 days of publication, included the ordinance copy, and stated reasons opposing annexation.
- Brownsburg moved to dismiss under Ind. Trial Rule 12(B)(1) (lack of subject-matter jurisdiction) and 12(B)(6), arguing many signatures were invalid because (1) some signatures were dated before ordinance adoption, (2) some parcels had multiple owners and not all co-owners signed, and (3) earlier versions of the ordinance made some remonstrances moot.
- The trial court granted dismissal under 12(B)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. FABA appealed, and the Court of Appeals reviewed statutory interpretation and prior case law concerning jurisdictional challenges to remonstrances.
- The Court of Appeals reversed: it held courts have subject-matter jurisdiction to determine facial sufficiency of remonstrances under I.C. § 36-4-3-11 and that a 12(B)(1) motion is not the proper vehicle to challenge the sufficiency of a remonstrance under that statute. The remonstrance was facially sufficient and the case was remanded for a merits hearing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (FABA) | Defendant's Argument (Brownsburg) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a Trial Rule 12(B)(1) motion may be used to challenge sufficiency of a remonstrance under I.C. § 36-4-3-11 | 12(B)(1) is improper; the court has jurisdiction to determine facial sufficiency and should proceed to merits | Statutory "jurisdictional" requirements can be raised by 12(B)(1); remonstrance lacking required signatures deprives court of jurisdiction | 12(B)(1) is not proper here; the trial court erred in dismissing for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (remonstrance facially sufficient) |
| Whether signatures obtained before adoption/publication of the ordinance are invalid | Signatures need not be dated or obtained after adoption; statute only requires petition (with signatures and a copy of ordinance) be filed within 90 days after publication | Signatures before adoption are premature/speculative and should not count; statute implies petition must accompany a copy of the (adopted) ordinance when signed | Signatures obtained before adoption/publication are valid so long as they are included in the filed petition that meets § 36-4-3-11(a)’s filing requirements; timing of signing is not specified by statute |
| How to count parcels with multiple owners (one-parcel-one-vote issue) | Only one owner need sign per parcel; statute treats only one person per parcel (as shown on the tax duplicate) as the landowner for purposes of the statute | All co-owners must sign or the parcel should not be counted | Held that only one owner’s signature per parcel is required; FABA’s signatures satisfied the 65% threshold |
| Whether remonstrance is moot because many signatures were directed to an earlier/ amended version of the ordinance | Petition remains live because adopted ordinance was not substantively different and statute does not bar pre-adoption signatures | Remonstrances aimed at prior/changed ordinances are moot and should be disregarded | Remonstrance not moot here; amendments were not substantive and statute does not render pre-adoption signatures invalid |
Key Cases Cited
- K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538 (Ind. 2006) (clarifies meaning of subject-matter jurisdiction vs. procedural prerequisites)
- Packard v. Shoopman, 852 N.E.2d 927 (Ind. 2006) (statutory filing requirements in Tax Court construed as docketing prerequisites; explains when such requirements affect jurisdiction)
- City of Carmel v. Certain Sw. Clay Twp. Annexation Territory Landowners, 868 N.E.2d 793 (Ind. 2007) (addresses proof at remonstrance merits hearing and testing of landowner sentiment after process runs its course)
- Arnold v. City of Terre Haute, 725 N.E.2d 869 (Ind. 2000) (adopts one-parcel-one-vote construction for annexation statute)
- Herdt v. City of Jeffersonville (In re Petition to Annex Approximately 7,806 Acres), 891 N.E.2d 1157 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (previously treated procedural remonstrance defects as jurisdictional prerequisites; court here declines to follow Herdt)
- GKN Co. v. Magness, 744 N.E.2d 397 (Ind. 2001) (standard of review for Trial Rule 12(B)(1) when facts are undisputed)