200 F. Supp. 3d 964
N.D. Cal.2016Background
- In Nov. 2015, two U.S. contractor law‑enforcement instructors (Fields and Creach) were fatally shot at a U.S. training center in Amman by a Jordanian police officer; ISIS later claimed responsibility and called the attacker a "lone wolf."
- Plaintiffs (survivors/widows/children) sued Twitter under the Anti‑Terrorism Act (18 U.S.C. § 2333) alleging Twitter knowingly provided material support to ISIS (via accounts, content dissemination, Direct Messaging) that proximately caused the attack.
- Plaintiffs alleged ISIS used Twitter to post propaganda, recruit (claiming tens of thousands), raise funds, and disseminate violent media (e.g., the al‑Kassasbeh execution video).
- Plaintiffs did not allege ISIS recruited or communicated with the shooter via Twitter, that the shooter viewed ISIS content on Twitter, or that the shooter had a Twitter account. The only tie alleged was the shooter’s reported reaction to ISIS content generally.
- Twitter moved to dismiss principally on Communications Decency Act (CDA) § 230(c)(1) grounds, arguing plaintiffs’ claims treat Twitter as a publisher/speaker of third‑party content and therefore are barred; the court granted dismissal with leave to amend.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether CDA § 230(c)(1) bars ATA/material‑support claims based on Twitter allowing ISIS to use its platform | Twitter provided material support by permitting ISIS accounts and features (accounts/Direct Messaging) that enabled recruitment/propaganda/funding; liability rests on provision of accounts and services (not just content) | § 230 protects interactive service providers from being treated as the publisher or speaker of third‑party content; plaintiffs’ theory seeks to hold Twitter liable as publisher for content dissemination and site design/policies | Claims treated as seeking publisher‑based liability and barred by § 230(c)(1); dismissal with leave to amend |
| Whether a ‘‘provision of accounts’’ theory avoids § 230 because it targets account provision antecedent to publication | Provision of accounts is a distinct, non‑publishing act that can constitute material support under the ATA | Decisions to permit accounts and site structure are publisher functions covered by § 230; prior cases hold site design/policies fall within publisher immunity | Court: allegations actually target content dissemination; even if provision theory pleaded, it would be barred by § 230; dismissed with leave to amend |
| Whether Direct Messaging (private communications) falls outside § 230’s publisher protection | Private Direct Messages are non‑public communications, so claims based on their use are not publisher‑based and not barred by § 230 | § 230’s protection extends to traditional notions of publication, which include transmission to another person; private DMs still involve publication for § 230 purposes | Court: § 230 covers transmission of nonpublic messages too; Direct Messaging theory also barred; dismissed with leave to amend |
| Whether plaintiffs plausibly alleged proximate causation between Twitter’s conduct and the murders | Twitter’s facilitation of ISIS’s online propaganda/recruitment/funding was a substantial factor in ISIS’s capacity to carry out attacks, satisfying ATA causation | Allegations fail to link Twitter’s account provision or content hosting to the shooter; the causal chain is speculative/attenuated | Court: proximate causation not plausibly alleged (and provision theory particularly fails causal pleading); dismissal with leave to amend |
Key Cases Cited
- Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008) (§ 230 immunity covers a broad range of publisher functions but is not absolute)
- Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009) (§ 230 bars liability that would treat a service as publisher or speaker of third‑party content)
- Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2016) (negligent‑failure‑to‑warn claim did not necessarily treat defendant as publisher because it could be satisfied via defendant‑created content/warnings)
- Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003) (analysis of what it means for content to be provided by a third party)
- Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2016) (§ 230 extends to website design and operational choices that affect what content appears and how)
- Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997) (§ 230 protects interactive service providers from defamation liability for third‑party postings)
- In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 714 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2013) (ATA claims require proximate causation; speculative causal links are insufficient)
- Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2013) (affirming proximate causation standard for ATA civil claims)