Feris v. Club Country of Fort Walton Beach, Inc.
138 So. 3d 531
Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2014Background
- Plaintiff John R. Feris slipped and fell on a wet/slippery substance on Club Country’s dance floor and sued for negligence under Florida premises-liability law (transitory foreign substance claim).
- Feris alleged patrons routinely had drinks on the dance floor, Club Country’s no-drinks policy (if any) was unenforced, and Club Country staff were present when the fall occurred; his jeans smelled of alcohol after the fall.
- Depositions from Feris and two witnesses (Sandy and Parker) described frequent drinks/spills on the dance floor, a wet spot where he fell, employees wiping the area after the fall, but no direct evidence of how long the spill had existed.
- Club Country moved for summary judgment, arguing the plaintiff failed to prove actual or constructive knowledge of the hazardous condition per section 768.0755 (2010).
- The trial court granted summary judgment for Club Country, reasoning Feris produced no evidence of negligent maintenance/inspection; Feris appealed.
- The appellate court reversed, holding the witness testimony created circumstantial issues of material fact about foreseeability, notice, and breach sufficient to survive summary judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether plaintiff presented evidence of breach/notice under §768.0710 (2009) or §768.0755 (2010) to survive summary judgment | Feris: testimony that patrons routinely had drinks on the dance floor, spills occurred regularly, policy unenforced, and the spot was wet/soaked his jeans supports inference of breach/constructive knowledge | Club Country: no evidence of how long the substance was on the floor; insufficient proof of actual or constructive knowledge to show breach | Held: Testimony provided sufficient circumstantial evidence for a jury to infer breach and constructive knowledge; summary judgment reversed and remanded |
| Whether constructive knowledge requires proof of the duration of the dangerous condition | Feris: duration can be inferred from evidence of routine spills and lack of enforcement; direct timing proof not required | Club Country: absence of evidence about how long the spill existed defeats constructive-knowledge inference | Held: Duration need not be shown directly; regularity and foreseeability of spills permit reasonable inference of constructive knowledge |
| Applicability of newer statute §768.0755 to plaintiff’s claim (retroactivity) | Feris: §768.0710 applies to claims accrued earlier; §768.0755 need not be applied retroactively | Club Country: §768.0755 requires notice proof and should govern because of enactment timing | Held: Court did not decide retroactivity as decisive; noted no clear legislative intent for retroactive application of §768.0755 and reversal is warranted regardless |
| Whether summary judgment standard was correctly applied | Feris: any genuine issue of material fact precludes summary judgment | Club Country: plaintiff failed to raise genuine factual dispute on breach/notice | Held: De novo review; slightest doubt precludes summary judgment — here genuine factual disputes exist, so summary judgment improper |
Key Cases Cited
- Ramsey v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 124 So.3d 415 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (standard for reviewing summary judgment)
- Laidlaw v. Krystal Co., 53 So.3d 1128 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (summary judgment entered only when no genuine issue of material fact)
- Food Lion, LLC v. Monument/Julington Assoc. Ltd. Partnership, 939 So.2d 1106 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (landowner duty to inspect and warn invitees)
- Old Port Cove Holdings, Inc. v. Old Port Cove Condo. Ass’n One, 986 So.2d 1279 (Fla. 2008) (retroactivity test discussion)
- Fla. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, Inc. v. Devon Neighborhood Ass’n, Inc., 67 So.3d 187 (Fla. 2011) (analysis of legislative intent and effective date in retroactivity inquiries)
- Presmy v. Smith, 69 So.3d 383 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (two-pronged retroactivity test cited)
- Fitchner v. Lifesouth Cmty. Blood Ctrs., Inc., 88 So.3d 269 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (retroactivity must pass both prongs)
- Kenz v. Miami-Dade County, 116 So.3d 461 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (discussion of applying §768.0755 and retroactivity considerations)
- Smiley v. State, 966 So.2d 330 (Fla. 2007) (procedural vs. substantive retroactivity distinction)