Felkins v. City of Lakewood
774 F.3d 647
10th Cir.2014Background
- Felkins claims avascular necrosis is a disability under the ADA and that the City failed to accommodate her.
- She worked for Lakewood, Colorado, starting 2007, left, then was rehired in 2008; she fractured her femur in 2008.
- After surgery, the City allowed a gradual return to work with reduced hours; Felkins did not request a formal accommodation for reduced hours.
- Between Jan–Apr 2009 Felkins missed many hours; she was terminated April 8, 2009 for excessive leave and failure to consistently report for shifts.
- District court granted summary judgment to the City, concluding Felkins offered no admissible medical evidence of a disability or substantial limitation.
- On appeal, Felkins argued she had a disability and the City failed to accommodate; the court affirmed the district court.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Felkins is a disabled person under the ADA | Felkins asserts avascular necrosis substantially limits major life activities. | No admissible medical evidence shows avascular necrosis; no substantial limitation proven. | Felkins failed to prove a disability with admissible evidence. |
| Whether lay declarations can establish disability without expert testimony | Felkins’s declarations show impairment and effects on major life activities. | Lay testimony cannot prove medical condition; requires expert evidence. | Lay evidence insufficient; expert testimony required to prove avascular necrosis. |
Key Cases Cited
- EEOC v. C.R. England, Inc., 644 F.3d 1028 (10th Cir. 2011) (ADA prima facie framework for disability discrimination)
- Carter v. Pathfinder Energy Servs., Inc., 662 F.3d 1134 (10th Cir. 2011) (defines disability elements and major life activities)
- Franklin v. Shelton, 250 F.2d 92 (10th Cir. 1957) (limits lay testimony on medical causation; expert needed for medical issues)
- United States v. Monger, 70 F.2d 361 (10th Cir. 1934) (lay testimony admissible for observable injuries, not for medical causation)
- United States v. McShane, 70 F.2d 991 (10th Cir. 1934) (medical condition causation requires expert testimony)
- James River Ins. Co. v. Rapid Funding, LLC, 658 F.3d 1207 (10th Cir. 2011) (evidentiary standards for admissibility and expert testimony in civil cases)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (U.S. 1986) (summary judgment burden shifting and lack of evidence standard)
- Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664 (10th Cir. 1998) (what a movant must show to shift burden at summary judgment)