Felix Sandoval v. State
409 S.W.3d 259
| Tex. App. | 2013Background
- Felix Sandoval, step-uncle of victim C.E., was convicted by a jury of sexual assault of a child and sentenced to 80 years after pleading true to a prior felony enhancement; conviction reversed and remanded.
- The complainant (born July 1995) reported an assault occurring summer 2010; police took oral and written statements, conducted a forensic interview, and recorded an interview of Sandoval.
- Prior to trial, the prosecution sought to admit: (a) law‑enforcement testimony and written reports repeating C.E.’s statements, (b) a recorded interview of Sandoval (unredacted), (c) expert opinions about C.E.’s credibility, and (d) testimony by C.E.’s sister describing a prior inappropriate touching.
- During deliberations a juror (Brooks) told the bailiff and judge he doubted the evidence and was uncomfortable issuing a guilty verdict; the judge removed him and seated an alternate over defense objection.
- The court admitted multiple out‑of‑court statements recounting the assault (officer testimony, written statements, cousin’s testimony), allowed a detective and forensic interviewer to testify about absence of “red flags,” and admitted limited extraneous‑conduct testimony by C.E.’s sister.
- On appeal the Third Court of Appeals found reversible error in (1) improper removal of Juror Brooks, (2) admission of multiple inadmissible hearsay statements (including excited‑utterance ruling reversed), and (3) admission of extraneous‑conduct evidence under Rule 404(b); some opinion testimony errors were considered harmless in context.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Sandoval) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Removal of juror during deliberations | Juror spoke to bailiff, was disqualified/disabled and replacement under art. 33.011 was proper | Brooks only expressed reasonable doubt and reluctance; removal was improper and extreme | Removal was an abuse of discretion; error affected substantial right and warranted reversal |
| Admission of officers’ and written reports repeating C.E.’s statements (hearsay) | Statements were "information acted upon" by police, not offered for truth; admissible for that purpose | Testimony and documents conveyed detailed substantive allegations and were hearsay | Admission was error: officer testimony and written statements went beyond permissible general info‑acted‑on and constituted inadmissible hearsay; harm was not harmless |
| Admission of C.E.’s statements to cousin as excited utterance | Cousin’s testimony qualified as excited utterance exception | Delay, seeking permission to speak, and reflective narrative show capacity to fabricate; not spontaneous | Not an excited utterance; admission was error and prejudicial |
| Admission of extraneous‑conduct evidence (J.A.’s testimony) | Evidence showed pattern/propensity or rebutted fabrication and the defendant’s “I’m not a molester” claim | Prior touching was factually dissimilar, not admitted for non‑propensity purpose, and highly prejudicial | Admission violated Rule 404(b); probative value did not outweigh prejudice and error was harmful |
Key Cases Cited
- Scales v. State, 380 S.W.3d 780 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (trial court’s discretion and standard for replacing a juror; definition of disability)
- Ocon v. State, 284 S.W.3d 880 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (unauthorized communications with juror and rebuttable presumption of harm)
- Dinkins v. State, 894 S.W.2d 330 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (distinguishing hearsay offered as "information acted on")
- Yount v. State, 872 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (expert testimony about a witness’s truthfulness is inadmissible)
- Schutz v. State, 957 S.W.2d 52 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (experts may not opine on truthfulness of specific allegations)
- De La Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (Rule 404(b) inclusionary rule and tests for admissibility of extraneous offenses)
- Barshaw v. State, 342 S.W.3d 91 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (harmless‑error review for nonconstitutional errors)
- Coble v. State, 330 S.W.3d 253 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (definition of substantial right and factors in harm analysis)
