Felicia Dean v. Stephen McKinney, 976 F.3d 407

On Oct. 19, 2016 Deputy Brent McKinney activated emergency lights/siren (Code 3) to assist another deputy; the supervisor canceled the Code 3 shortly thereafter.
McKinney acknowledged the cancellation, deactivated lights/siren, and said he was "backing down" to a non‑emergency response, but continued at very high speed.
McKinney lost control on a dark, curved road and collided nearly head‑on with Janel Harkness, who suffered severe injuries; reconstruction estimated McKinney at ~83 mph.
Plaintiff (Harkness’s guardian) sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process (conscience‑shocking deliberate indifference) and asserted state tort claims; McKinney sought summary judgment based on qualified immunity.
The district court denied qualified immunity (finding a jury could find deliberate indifference and the right was clearly established); the Fourth Circuit affirmed and held Parratt‑Hudson inapplicable to substantive due process.
Timing between Code‑3 cancellation and crash was disputed (district court accepted ~2:15; McKinney argued ~41 seconds), but the court viewed facts in plaintiff’s favor for summary‑judgment review.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
1. Proper culpability standard for a driving‑based substantive due process claim	McKinney was not responding to an emergency; deliberate‑indifference (middle‑range) applies	Because he was responding to a call that began as emergency, the higher "intent to harm" standard applies	Deliberate indifference is the appropriate standard here (given deactivation of lights/siren and time to deliberate)
2. Whether McKinney’s conduct violated substantive due process	Driving ~83 mph on an unlit curve without lights after acknowledging non‑emergency shows conscious disregard for life	At worst negligence; not conscience‑shocking; no intent to harm	A reasonable jury could find deliberate indifference and thus a substantive‑due‑process violation
3. Whether the right was clearly established for qualified immunity	Prior decisions and core principles gave fair warning that such conduct could violate substantive due process	No controlling precedent on these facts; law not clearly established	The Fourth Circuit held the right was clearly established as of Oct. 2016; qualified immunity denied
4. Whether Parratt‑Hudson doctrine bars the §1983 claim	Substantive due process claim is not a procedural deprivation and is not barred	The state tort remedy (S.C. Tort Claims Act) provides post‑deprivation relief, so Parratt‑Hudson should apply	Parratt‑Hudson applies only to procedural claims; it does not bar a substantive due process §1983 claim

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (qualified immunity framework)
Ashcroft v. al‑Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011) (clearly established right standard)
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998) ("shocks the conscience" test; culpability spectrum)
Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990) (Parratt‑Hudson limited to procedural due process)
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981) (post‑deprivation remedy doctrine)
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) (Parratt‑Hudson doctrine application)
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) (qualified immunity analysis)
Terrell v. Larson, 396 F.3d 975 (8th Cir.) (applying intent‑to‑harm standard in high‑speed emergency contexts)
Temkin v. Frederick Cty. Commissioners, 945 F.2d 716 (4th Cir.) (refusing due‑process liability in high‑speed pursuit context)
Browder v. City of Albuquerque, 787 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir.) (deliberate‑indifference applied to off‑duty speeding officer)
Sauers v. Borough of Nesquehoning, 905 F.3d 711 (3d Cir.) (conscious‑disregard standard; post‑2016—discussed for guidance)
Green v. Post, 574 F.3d 1294 (10th Cir.) (deliberate‑indifference analysis in non‑emergency/high‑speed response)
Williams v. Strickland, 917 F.3d 763 (4th Cir.) (qualified immunity summary‑judgment standards)
Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225 (4th Cir.) (de novo review of qualified immunity denials)