Felicia Abram v. Von Maur Inc., 17-10966

Background

Felicia Abram, an African American former department manager at Von Maur, was terminated for alleged poor performance about three weeks after she complained that superiors asked her to discipline a Black employee but not a white employee for similar misconduct.
Abram received a 2013 annual performance review during that interval describing most of her performance as satisfactory but noting problems (e.g., morale, tardiness).
Abram sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII for race discrimination and retaliation, alleging (1) she was replaced by a white co-worker and (2) disparate treatment compared to a white floor manager (Aileen Read).
The District Court granted summary judgment for Von Maur, finding Abram failed to identify an appropriate comparator and that Von Maur’s proffered reason—poor performance—was legitimate and not shown to be pretextual.
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reviewed summary judgment de novo, agreed Abram’s comparators were not similarly situated, and concluded Abram did not create a genuine dispute of pretext for either claim.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Race discrimination under § 1981/Title VII	Abram: she was replaced by a white employee and treated less favorably than white manager Read, showing race motivated termination	Von Maur: Read was not a proper comparator (different position, duties, review criteria); Abram was fired for poor performance	Court: Abram failed to identify a nearly identical comparator; summary judgment affirmed
Retaliation under § 1981/Title VII	Abram: she was terminated shortly after complaining that disciplining a Black but not a white employee was discriminatory; termination was retaliatory	Von Maur: legitimate nondiscriminatory reason—poor performance; no evidence the reason was pretext for retaliation	Court: Abram failed to show pretext; summary judgment affirmed

Key Cases Cited

Rioux v. City of Atlanta, 520 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2008) (standard for reviewing summary judgment in employment cases)
Bald Mountain Park, Ltd. v. Oliver, 863 F.2d 1560 (11th Cir. 1989) (unsupported allegations insufficient to defeat summary judgment)
Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573 (11th Cir. 1990) (mere scintilla of evidence insufficient for a jury)
Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servs., Inc., 161 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 1998) (use same framework for § 1981 and Title VII employment claims)
Maynard v. Bd. of Regents, 342 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2003) (McDonnell Douglas framework for circumstantial evidence)
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (U.S. 1973) (burden-shifting framework for discrimination claims)
Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555 (11th Cir. 1997) ("similarly situated in all relevant respects" comparator standard)
Burke-Fowler v. Orange County, Fla., 447 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2006) (comparator misconduct must be nearly identical in discipline cases)
Flowers v. Troup Cty., Ga., Sch. Dist., 803 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2015) (deference to employer judgments about misconduct severity)
Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519 (11th Cir. 1997) (plaintiff must cast sufficient doubt on employer’s reasons to show pretext)
St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (U.S. 1993) (plaintiff must show employer’s reason is false and real reason discriminatory)
Mitchell v. USBI Co., 186 F.3d 1352 (11th Cir. 1999) (employer’s deviation from policy alone doesn’t prove discriminatory animus)
Andrews v. Lakeshore Rehab. Hosp., 140 F.3d 1405 (11th Cir. 1998) (§ 1981 protects against retaliation)
CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442 (U.S. 2008) (§ 1981 covers retaliation claims)
Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2009) (McDonnell Douglas governs § 1981 retaliation claims)