Federal National Mortgage Ass'n v. Taylor
455 S.W.3d 811
Ark.2015Background
- In Sept. 2011 a Carroll County circuit court entered a foreclosure decree awarding Holiday Island Suburban Improvement District No. 1 (HISID) a lien and directing sale if unpaid; the decree cited a two-year redemption statute (Ark. Code § 14-121-432).
- Commissioner’s sale occurred; HISID received title and conveyed to Jolynn Taylor, whose deed referenced a redemption statute (with an incorrect cite). The sale contract noted redemption rights under § 14-121-432 and disclaimed title warranty.
- Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) paid delinquent assessments and filed a petition to redeem on Dec. 14, 2012 (after ~13 months). HISID did not oppose redemption; Taylor contested.
- Statutory confusion: § 14-121-432 (two-year redemption) applies to drainage improvement districts; suburban improvement districts are governed by statutes that incorporate a 30‑day redemption period (§§ 14-92-232 and 14-94-122(j)).
- Taylor moved for summary judgment arguing Fannie Mae’s redemption was untimely under the 30-day suburban-district rule; the trial court granted summary judgment for Taylor and dismissed Fannie Mae’s petition with prejudice. Fannie Mae appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Fannie Mae) | Defendant's Argument (Taylor) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the foreclosure decree’s two-year redemption language is binding | Decree is a final, unappealed judgment; Fannie Mae relied on it and timely redeemed under its terms | Redemption period governed by statutory scheme for suburban improvement districts (30 days); decree cited wrong statute | Court: decree is binding; collateral attack not permitted absent fraud or lack of jurisdiction — reversal of summary judgment and remand |
| Whether Taylor’s challenge to the decree is a permissible collateral attack | Argued below that decree should control; did not frame issue as collateral attack | Contended redemption period should be statutory, not decree-based; argued untimeliness | Court: Taylor’s position necessarily sought to disregard plain language of decree and thus amounted to collateral attack, which fails because no fraud or jurisdictional defect was alleged |
| Whether equitable estoppel prevents enforcement of the shorter statutory redemption period | Fannie Mae argued estoppel because it relied on decree language and Taylor knew of the two‑year language before purchase | Taylor argued statutory period governs and did not concede estoppel applies | Court: did not reach estoppel because collateral‑attack ruling was dispositive |
| Whether summary judgment for Taylor was appropriate | Fannie Mae argued genuine legal issue exists about effect of decree vs statute | Taylor argued undisputed facts show untimely redemption under applicable statute | Court: summary judgment improperly granted to Taylor because the decree cannot be collaterally attacked; material legal issue resolved for Fannie Mae on that ground |
Key Cases Cited
- Repking v. Lokey, 377 S.W.3d 211 (Ark. 2010) (summary-judgment standard and appellate review described)
- Powers v. Bryant, 832 S.W.2d 232 (Ark. 1992) (final judgments carry presumptive verity and cannot be collaterally attacked absent fraud or lack of jurisdiction)
- Brasch v. Mumey, 138 S.W. 458 (Ark. 1911) (right of redemption is statutory and must be exercised according to the statute creating it)
- Goodman v. Storey, 254 S.W.2d 63 (Ark. 1953) (erroneous judgments are voidable, not void, when court had jurisdiction)
- Ex Parte O’Neal, 87 S.W.2d 401 (Ark. 1935) (jurisdictional predicate for void/voidable judgments)
- Beverly Enterprises-Ark., Inc. v. Thomas, 259 S.W.3d 445 (Ark. 2007) (issues not raised or developed below are generally not considered on appeal)
- Kelly v. State, 85 S.W.3d 893 (Ark. 2002) (court will not consider undeveloped arguments lacking authority)
- Ark. Wildlife Fed’n v. Ark. Soil & Water Conservation Comm’n, 233 S.W.3d 615 (Ark. 2007) (preservation principle: issue must be ruled on below to be reviewable)