Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n v. Buhl
186 Conn. App. 743
Conn. App. Ct.2018Background
- Plaintiff (Federal National Mortgage Association) acquired title by strict foreclosure in 2016; defendants Paul and Luce Buhl remained in possession at 12 Casner Road, East Haddam.
- Plaintiff filed a summary process (eviction) complaint March 29, 2017 alleging a quitclaim deed from Liberty Bank recorded September 28, 2016.
- Defendants denied the complaint, asserted special defenses and claimed they had commenced federal litigation challenging title (that suit was later dismissed as lacking jurisdiction and frivolous on appeal).
- Defendants later alleged the deed was invalid for notarial defects (undated acknowledgment and undated instrument) and claimed those defects were timely challenged under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 47-36aa (the validating act).
- Trial occurred June 5, June 26 and July 3, 2017; judgment for plaintiff entered against Paul Buhl on the merits and a default was entered against Luce Buhl for failure to appear.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether defendants "commenced an action" under § 47-36aa(a) to toll the two-year challenge period | Buhl did not commence a separate civil action; special defenses/denials do not satisfy commencement requirements | Denial in summary process and assertion of special defense amounted to commencement under § 47-36aa(a) | Court: No; commencement requires legal process (writ/summons) under § 52-45a; special defenses are not independent actions |
| Whether deed is void for lack of acknowledgment date or execution date | Deed valid: § 47-36aa cures defects if no timely commenced action; execution date omission is an insubstantial defect under § 47-36aa(b) | Deed void because acknowledgment and deed lack dates, depriving plaintiff of title | Court: No error; defendants failed to commence § 47-36aa(a) action so defective acknowledgment cured; missing execution date is an insubstantial defect under § 47-36aa(b) |
| Whether trial court abused discretion by allowing plaintiff's counsel to give unsworn testimony about deed | Any unsworn remarks did not affect outcome; court did not rely on them and deed was in evidence | Counsel’s unsworn statements were testimony/hearsay and prejudicial | Court: No abuse; defendants did not preserve error or show prejudice; court’s ruling shows it did not rely on counsel’s remarks |
| Whether default against Luce Buhl for failure to appear was erroneous | Default valid: court acted within discretion; notice was given and no excuse shown | Luce excused because identical position to Paul and no facts/testimony would differ | Court: No abuse; repeated nonappearance warranted default and no evidence of proper excuse |
Key Cases Cited
- Commissioner of Emergency Services & Public Protection v. Freedom of Information Commission, 330 Conn. 372 (2018) (statutory interpretation principles; plain-meaning rule)
- ARS Investors II 2012-1 HBV, LLC v. Crystal, LLC, 324 Conn. 680 (2017) (§ 47-36aa(b) insubstantial defects do not invalidate instruments)
- Constantine v. Schneider, 49 Conn. App. 378 (1998) (unsworn representations of counsel are not evidence)
- Cologne v. Westfarms Associates, 197 Conn. 141 (1985) (court may not rely solely on unsworn counsel statements without risking due process concerns)
- Sovereign Bank v. Harrison, 184 Conn. App. 436 (2018) (special defense is a shield, not an independent counterclaim)
- Chase Home Finance, LLC v. Morneau, 156 Conn. App. 101 (2015) (§ 47-36aa(a) validates defective conveyances if not timely challenged)
- Housing Authority v. Weitz, 163 Conn. App. 778 (2016) (default for failure to appear is within trial court's discretion)