Farrain Joseph Comeaux A/K/A Farrain J. Comeaux v. State
413 S.W.3d 176
| Tex. App. | 2013Background
- Comeaux was convicted of burglary of a habitation by a jury in Jefferson County, Texas; the State’s proofs showed entry without consent intending to commit theft.
- PJ23 indicated substantial bias against Comeaux; defense moved to strike for cause, which the trial court denied.
- Comeaux exhausted his ten peremptory challenges and sought an extra strike; the court denied the request.
- A second juror (PJ27) ultimately seated as the twelfth juror after multiple strikes.
- The State introduced evidence of an attempted burglary at a nearby garage the same evening; J.S. and B.P. identified Comeaux by clothing and other non-facial cues.
- Comeaux appealed, challenging juror for-cause ruling, opening statement, sufficiency of evidence, identification procedure, and speedy-trial denial, all rejected by the appellate court.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Juror for-cause dismissal abuse of discretion | Comeaux argues PJ23 was biased and should have been excused. | State contends PJ23 could be fair and follow the law. | Abuse of discretion; PJ23 bias required denial of for-cause strike. |
| Opening statement mentioning extraneous crime | Prosecutor improperly referenced extraneous burglary. | Evidence of extraneous burglary later admitted; opening remark permissible. | Not error; opening statement allowed when related evidence was admitted. |
| Sufficiency of evidence to support attempted burglary identity | Identity lacked due to facial unreliability of witnesses. | Evidence, including clothing and location, supports identity beyond reasonable doubt. | Sufficient evidence; rational jury could find guilt. |
| Suggestiveness of showup identification | Showup procedure tainted J.S. and influenced identification. | Showup was necessary and not impermissibly suggestive; identification credible. | Showup not unnecessarily or impermissibly suggestive; admissible. |
| Speedy trial violation | Delay of approximately two years prejudicial to Comeaux. | Delays due to docket and multiple resets; no bad faith established. | No violation; Barker factors weigh against prejudicial delay. |
Key Cases Cited
- Sadler v. State, 977 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (bias against the law can support a challenge for cause)
- Gardner v. State, 306 S.W.3d 274 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (deference to trial judge on voir dire; abuse of discretion standard)
- Feldman v. State, 71 S.W.3d 738 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (test for bias precludes juror from following law)
- Sosa v. State, 769 S.W.2d 909 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (predecessor rule on for-cause reversal when bias shown and not cured)
- Vaughn v. State, 833 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992) (unequivocal inability to be fair supports reversal for cause)
- Banks v. State, 643 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (opening statements may reference admitted evidence)
- Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S.Ct. 716 (U.S. 2012) (showups can be permissible; fallibility of eyewitness not per se due process issue)
- Jackson v. State, 628 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (burden to show tainted identification pretrial procedure)
- Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (effective standard for reviewing identity/evidence sufficiency)
- Lane v. State, 933 S.W.2d 504 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (extraneous-offense evidence admissible to show identity if sufficiently similar)
- Ransom v. State, 920 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (consciousness of guilt evidence may be admissible)
- Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (evidence of implausible police explanations as probative)
- Shaw v. State, 117 S.W.3d 883 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (speedy trial standard timeline guidance)
- Munoz, 991 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) ( Barker factor framework for speedy trial)
- Zamorano v. State, 84 S.W.3d 643 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (balancing Barker factors; presumptively prejudicial delays)
- Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1982) (presumptively prejudicial delay standard)
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (U.S. 1972) (four-factor speedy-trial balancing test)
