Facebook Inc. v. Daron Wint, 199 A.3d 625

Background

Daron Wint, criminal defendant in D.C. Superior Court, obtained ex parte court authorization for defense counsel to serve subpoenas duces tecum on Facebook for account records and message contents.
Facebook refused, citing the Stored Communications Act (SCA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712, which generally prohibits providers from divulging contents of electronic communications.
The trial court ordered compliance and held Facebook in civil contempt for refusing to produce the materials.
On emergency appeal, Facebook challenged the contempt order; the appellate panel considered whether the SCA bars compliance with criminal-defense subpoenas to service providers.
Wint argued in the trial court that an SCA construction barring defendant subpoenas would be unconstitutional; he did not renew that constitutional argument on appeal.
The appellate court reviewed statutory interpretation de novo and focused on whether § 2702’s nondisclosure rule permits compelled disclosure to criminal defendants.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Wint)	Defendant's Argument (Facebook)	Held
Whether the SCA’s § 2702 prohibition on disclosing contents bars service providers from complying with criminal defendants’ subpoenas	§ 2702 should be read as addressing only voluntary disclosures (title "Voluntary disclosure...") and thus does not bar court-ordered disclosures to defendants	§ 2702’s plain text and structure broadly prohibit disclosure of contents except as enumerated; § 2703 supplies the limited means for compelled disclosure, and defendant subpoenas are not among them	The SCA bars providers from disclosing the contents of covered communications in response to criminal defendants’ subpoenas absent an applicable statutory exception
Whether the SCA’s titles, use of "may divulge," and legislative history support a limited (voluntary-only) reading of § 2702	Titles and permissive language indicate § 2702 addresses voluntary disclosures; silence on defendant subpoenas means statute shouldn’t be read to curtail compulsory process	Titles cannot overcome plain text; § 2702’s exceptions include compelled disclosures; legislative history shows a comprehensive nondisclosure scheme with enumerated exceptions, supporting the plain reading	Court rejects Wint’s textual and historical arguments; titles/permissive verbs do not narrow § 2702 to voluntary disclosures
Whether silence in the SCA about defendant subpoenas requires a clear statement before limiting compulsory process	Constitutional right to compulsory process favors reading statute not to foreclose defendant subpoenas absent express statutory text	Congress addressed court-ordered disclosures in multiple SCA provisions and enumerated exceptions; omission of defendant subpoenas implies Congress did not authorize them	Court finds SCA sufficiently clear to limit disclosure to statutory exceptions; no clear-statement rule requires more specific text to bar defendant subpoenas
Whether the doctrine of constitutional avoidance requires reading the SCA to allow defendant subpoenas	Avoidance should apply to prevent serious constitutional doubts about defendants’ ability to obtain evidence for trial	The statute is unambiguous as to nondisclosure; defendants have alternative means (e.g., subpoenas to senders/recipients); no serious constitutional doubt shown	Court declines to apply avoidance; defendant did not demonstrate a serious constitutional problem warranting construing the SCA to permit provider compliance

Key Cases Cited

Richardson v. United States, 927 A.2d 1137 (D.C. 2007) (standard: statutory interpretation reviewed de novo and plain-meaning rule applies)
Frey v. United States, 137 A.3d 1000 (D.C. 2016) (consideration of statutory structure in interpretation)
United States v. Pierce, 785 F.3d 832 (2d Cir. 2015) (SCA does not permit criminal defendants to obtain contents from providers)
Baldrige v. Shapiro, 455 U.S. 345 (1982) (broad statutory nondisclosure can preclude civil discovery despite lack of explicit discovery exception)
United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53 (2000) (when Congress lists exceptions, courts should not create others)
United States v. Nix, 251 F. Supp. 3d 555 (W.D.N.Y. 2017) (SCA does not permit defendants to subpoena contents from social-media providers)
Suzlon Energy Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp., 671 F.3d 726 (9th Cir. 2011) (SCA bars civil subpoenas to providers for contents)
Nixon v. United States, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (principles on compulsory process and exceptions to production of evidence)
Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 138 S. Ct. 1134 (2018) (legislative silence cannot overcome clear statutory text)