Exodus Refugee Immigration, Inc. v. Pence
165 F. Supp. 3d 718
S.D. Ind.2016Background
- In 2015, Governor Pence directed Indiana agencies to stop paying federal grant funds to local refugee resettlement agencies like Exodus for Syrian refugees’ social services.
- Exodus sued Pence and the Indiana FSSA, alleging the directive was preempted by federal law and violated equal protection and Title VI.
- Federal resettlement funds flow through PRM/ORR to state plans; Indiana administers resettlement via a State Plan with FSSA and funds social services provided by local agencies.
- Exodus actively resettles Syrian refugees in Indiana and uses federal funds routed through FSSA to provide social, employment, and language services.
- Despite the directive, Exodus continued to resettle Syrians; the state clarified it would withhold only funds for social services to Syrians, not all federal services.
- The court granted a preliminary injunction, finding likely equal protection violation and that withholding funds harms Exodus and its refugee clients, outweighing public-interest concerns.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does the state action violate the Equal Protection Clause? | Exodus: national-origin discrimination; strict scrutiny applies; withholding funds harms refugees’ rights and Exodus’s mission. | Pence: classification is not national-origin based; supports public safety; may be narrowly tailored. | Exodus likely prevails; state action constitutes national-origin discrimination and fails strict scrutiny. |
| Does Exodus have standing to pursue the equal protection claim (Article III and third-party standing)? | Exodus suffers injury from lost funds and can represent Syrian refugees. | Only speculative future refugees; no direct injury or standing. | Exodus has both Article III and third-party standing to assert refugees’ equal protection rights. |
| Should the court resolve preemption and Title VI claims at this stage? | Preemption and Title VI should be addressed on the merits if standing exists. | Procedural barriers undermine private enforcement and standing. | Court did not resolve preemption/Title VI claims; reached merits on equal protection standing instead. |
Key Cases Cited
- Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008) (preliminary injunction standards and balancing factors require likelihood of success and irreparable harm)
- Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (nationality/origin classifications are inherently suspect and subject to strict scrutiny)
- Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) (country of origin classifications require compelling justification under strict scrutiny)
- Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976) (factors for third-party standing; close relationship and hindrances to third party sue)
- Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (vendors may assert third-party rights when enforcement affects their operations)
- Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (strict scrutiny framework for race-conscious classifications in education)