Ex parte Speckman, 537 S.W.3d 49

Applicant Steve Herbert Speckman pleaded guilty (2004) to aggravated sexual assault of a child, received deferred adjudication, later adjudicated guilty and sentenced to 30 years after revocation (2013); the court of appeals affirmed.
Applicant filed an Article 11.07 post-conviction habeas application raising actual innocence, Brady, trial error, and ineffective-assistance claims.
The habeas court obtained trial counsel’s affidavit, made findings of fact and conclusions of law, and recommended denial; no live evidentiary hearing was held.
After the case was forwarded to this Court but before adjudication, applicant filed a late motion to dismiss his habeas application without prejudice, claiming improper pleading and underdevelopment of issues.
This Court treated the question as one of first impression, solicited briefing, and set rules for resolving late-stage motions to dismiss without prejudice.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether applicants may voluntarily dismiss an Article 11.07 application at late stage without prejudice	Speckman: as master of his complaint, he can dismiss and refile to correct pleading defects	State: finality and judicial-resource preservation require restricting late-stage dismissals	Denied as a general rule; late-stage dismissals are disfavored absent good cause
Whether a rebuttable presumption of unreasonableness should apply to late-stage dismissal motions	Speckman: not applicable (implicitly)	State: propose presumption that applicant must overcome	Court refused to adopt a formal rebuttable presumption; prefers flexible, case-by-case good-cause standard
What constitutes good cause for late-stage dismissal	Speckman: (insufficiently pleaded) asserts pleadings were improper and issues misconstrued	State: no good cause shown; allowing dismissal fosters abuse and wastes resources	Good cause required; must explain why alternatives (supplementing, additional evidence, stay) are inadequate
Availability of alternatives to dismissal	Speckman sought dismissal rather than using alternatives	State: alternatives exist and should be used (e.g., supplements, evidence, stays)	Court: alternatives often adequate — filing supplemental/amended pleadings, submitting additional evidence under Rule 73.7, or moving for a stay — and may preclude finding good cause for dismissal

Ex parte Sledge, 391 S.W.3d 104 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (statutory protection of finality under art. 11.07 §4)
Ex parte Torres, 943 S.W.2d 469 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (initial application should present all possible claims after full research)
Ex parte Smith, 444 S.W.3d 661 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (habeas is primarily criminal; civil rules do not ordinarily apply)
Ex parte Rieck, 144 S.W.3d 510 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (same principle re: civil rules and habeas)
Ex parte Whisenant, 443 S.W.3d 930 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (procedures for submitting additional evidence after forwarding)
Ex parte Pena, 484 S.W.3d 428 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (procedures when case filed and set for submission)
Ex parte Saenz, 491 S.W.3d 819 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (permitting amended/supplemental claims before final disposition)
Ex parte Perez, 398 S.W.3d 206 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (laches and case-by-case prejudice analysis)
State v. Johnson, 821 S.W.2d 609 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (court’s inherent procedural powers)
Epps v. Fowler, 351 S.W.3d 862 (Tex. 2011) (civil nonsuit limitations at late stages)