Ex Parte Leonard Barker, 03-15-00284-CR

Leonard Ray Barker was in Travis County custody on a Texas state sentence; Virginia had lodged a detainer and later sought extradition.
On May 20, 2014 Barker signed an Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) "request for final disposition" and related TDCJ forms indicating he consented to production of his body in Virginia.
Barker completed his Texas state-jail sentence on December 1, 2014; Virginia never purportedly took him into custody within the periods Barker contends applied.
Virginia requested extradition; Texas Governor Abbott issued a governor’s warrant on February 6, 2015, and Barker was held for extradition.
Barker filed a state habeas application arguing (1) he was not a "fugitive" when the governor’s warrant issued because he had consented under the IAD, and (2) he was entitled to release after statutory deadlines (90 days after magistration on Oct. 21, 2014, or 180 days under the IAD).
The magistrate held a hearing, admitted exhibits (including a Virginia records cover letter denying receipt of Barker’s request), recommended denial, and the trial court adopted the recommendation; Barker appealed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Barker)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Whether Barker was a "fugitive" when the governor's warrant issued	Barker: His May 20, 2014 IAD request constituted consent to production and a waiver of extradition under Art. III(e), so he was not a fugitive when the February 6, 2015 warrant issued	State: The asylum court may rely on the governor's warrant prima facie; whether Virginia actually received the IAD request is controlling and was contested; the warrant was regular on its face	Magistrate/trial court: Denied habeas and found Barker remained within the definition of a fugitive (magistrate recommendation adopted)
Whether Barker was entitled to release under Texas statutes (90-day rule)	Barker: After in-person notification on Oct. 21, 2014, the 90-day statutory deadline ran (by Jan. 19, 2015) and continued detention was illegal	State: The 90-day period does not run until the defendant is free in the asylum state (i.e., after completion of the Texas sentence); Barker was serving his Texas sentence on Oct. 21, 2014	Magistrate/trial court: Rejected Barker’s statutory 90-day discharge argument and denied relief

Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282 (1989) (limits asylum court inquiry in extradition to four narrow questions)
Fex v. Michigan, 507 U.S. 43 (1993) (IAD 180-day period begins when requesting state receives the prisoner’s request)
New Mexico ex rel. Ortiz v. Reed, 524 U.S. 151 (1998) (scope of asylum-state inquiry into extradition documents)
Ex parte Sanchez, 642 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (habeas is proper vehicle to challenge a governor’s extradition warrant)
Kniatt v. State, 206 S.W.3d 657 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (standard of review and burden in extradition habeas)
Ex parte Potter, 21 S.W.3d 290 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (procedural law on extradition and IAD interaction)
Lanz v. State, 815 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1991) (discharge under statutory deadlines related to interstate detainers)