MICHIGAN v. DORAN
No. 77-1202
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued October 4, 1978—Decided December 18, 1978
439 U.S. 282
Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General of Michigan, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, and John A. Wilson and Jann Ryan Baugh, Assistant Attorneys General.
Kathleen M. Cummins argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari to determine whether the courts of an asylum state may nullify the executive grant of extradition on the ground that the demanding state failed to show a factual basis for its charge supported by probable cause. 435 U. S. 967 (1978).
(1)
On December 18, 1975, Doran was arrested in Michigan and charged with receiving and concealing stolen property.
While the Michigan charges were pending, Doran was arraigned in Michigan on January 12 as a fugitive. A magistrate extended Doran‘s detention as a fugitive to provide time to receive the expected request for extradition from Arizona.1 On February 11 the Governor of Arizona issued a requisition for extradition. Attached to the requisition were the arrest warrant, two supporting affidavits, and the original complaint on which the charge was based. The Governor of Michigan issued a warrant for Doran‘s arrest and his extradition was ordered.
Doran was arraigned on the Michigan warrant on March 29. He then petitioned the arraigning court for a writ of habeas corpus, contending that the extradition warrant was invalid because it did not comply with the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act.
(2)
The Michigan Supreme Court reasoned that because a significant impairment of liberty occurred whenever a person was arrested in one state and extradited to another that impairment must be preceded by a showing of probable cause to believe that the fugitive had committed a crime. In addition to relying on Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103 (1975),3 the court found support for its conclusion in § 3 of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act,
“In the case at bar, there is no indictment or document reflecting a prior judicial determination of probable cause. The Arizona complaint and arrest warrant are both phrased in conclusory language which simply mirrors the language of the pertinent Arizona statutes. More importantly, the two supporting affidavits fail to set out facts which could justify a Fourth Amendment finding of probable cause for charging [Doran] with a crime.” 401 Mich., at 240-242, 258 N. W. 2d, at 408-409 (footnote omitted).
The Michigan court assumed that arrest warrants could be issued in Arizona without a preliminary showing of probable cause since this was said to happen often in Michigan. In that court‘s view, neither the complaint which generated the Arizona charge, the affidavits in support of the Arizona arrest warrant, nor the recitals of the Arizona judicial officer set out sufficient facts to show probable cause. We disagree and we reverse.
(3)
We turn to the question of the power of the courts of an asylum state to review the finding of probable cause made by a judicial officer in the demanding state.
“A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive Au-
thority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.”
To implement this provision of the Constitution, see Innes v. Tobin, 240 U. S. 127, 131 (1916); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 539, 617 (1842), Congress has provided:
“Whenever the executive authority of any State or Territory demands any person as a fugitive from justice, of the executive authority of any State, District or Territory to which such person has fled, and produces a copy of an indictment found or an affidavit made before a magistrate of any State or Territory, charging the person demanded with having committed treason, felony, or other crime, certified as authentic by the governor or chief magistrate of the State or Territory from whence the person so charged has fled, the executive authority of the State, District or Territory to which such person has fled shall cause him to be arrested and secured, and notify the executive authority making such demand, or the agent of such authority appointed to receive the fugitive, and shall cause the fugitive to be delivered to such agent when he shall appear.”
18 U. S. C. § 3182 (emphasis added).6
The Extradition Clause was intended to enable each state to bring offenders to trial as swiftly as possible in the state where the alleged offense was committed. Biddinger v. Commissioner of Police, 245 U. S. 128, 132-133 (1917); Appleyard v. Massachusetts, 203 U. S. 222, 227 (1906). The purpose of the Clause was to preclude any state from becoming a sanctuary for fugitives from justice of another state and thus “balkanize” the administration of criminal justice among the several states. It articulated, in mandatory language, the
Interstate extradition was intended to be a summary and mandatory executive proceeding derived from the language of
Near the turn of the century this Court, after acknowledging the possibility that persons may give false information to the police or prosecutors and that a prosecuting attorney may act “either wantonly or ignorantly,” concluded:
“While courts will always endeavor to see that no such attempted wrong is successful, on the other hand, care must be taken that the process of extradition be not so burdened as to make it practically valueless. It is but one step in securing the presence of the defendant in the court in which he may be tried, and in no manner determines the question of guilt.” In re Strauss, supra, at 332-333.
Whatever the scope of discretion vested in the governor of an asylum state, cf. Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66, 107 (1861), the courts of an asylum state are bound by
Under Arizona law, felony prosecutions may be commenced either by an indictment or by filing a complaint before a judicial officer.
The Supreme Court of Michigan, however, held that the conclusion was deficient because it did not recite the factual basis for the determination made by the Arizona judicial officer. This holding finds no support in the record read in
Under
We hold that once the governor of an asylum state has acted on a requisition for extradition based on the demanding state‘s judicial determination that probable cause existed, no further judicial inquiry may be had on that issue in the asylum state.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Michigan Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL join, concurring in the result.
I am not willing, as the Court appears to me to be, to bypass so readily, and almost to ignore, the presence and significance of the Fourth Amendment in the extradition
I
The petition for certiorari in this case presented one, and only one, issue:
“Did the Michigan Supreme Court misconstrue the Fourth Amendment and the Extradition clause of the United States Constitution when it held that a fugitive may challenge a demanding state‘s extradition documents on the basis of lack of probable cause under the Fourth Amendment, in a collateral proceeding in the asylum state‘s courts?” Pet. for Cert. 2.1
On this question the state and federal courts are deeply divided.2 Despite the obvious importance of the issue, the
If, on the facts of this case, there could be no question whatsoever that the Fourth Amendment was satisfied, then one would have to agree that it would be unnecessary, strictly
II
The Court‘s analysis, I fear, rests on cases that preceded the application of Fourth Amendment standards to state criminal proceedings. The basic assumption of these early cases—that the Constitution left the States with virtually complete control over their procedures4—has not been tenable since the Court in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 27-28 (1949), held that the Fourth Amendment applies to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, and in subsequent cases held that state criminal procedures must conform to the same Fourth Amendment standards that apply to federal proceedings. See, e. g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961); Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23 (1963); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89 (1964). Whatever may have been the law of extradition as propounded by this Court “[n]ear the turn of the century,” ante, at 288, the Extradition Clause and its implementing statute,
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable . . . seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing . . . the persons . . . to be seized.”
The words of the Amendment provide no grounds for a distinction between “seizures” of persons for extradition and seizures of persons for any other purpose. Neither do they distinguish between an extradition warrant and the usual arrest warrant. Indeed, the “security of one‘s privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police—which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment,” Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S., at 27, applies with undiminished force to the intrusion that occurs in the process of extradition.
The requirements of the Fourth Amendment in the context of pretrial arrest and detention were spelled out in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103 (1975). The Amendment, it was said, “requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following arrest.”6
The extradition process involves an “extended restraint of liberty following arrest” even more severe than that accompanying detention within a single State. Extradition involves, at a minimum, administrative processing in both the asylum State and the demanding State, and forced transportation in between. It surely is a “significant restraint on liberty.” For me, therefore, the Amendment‘s language and the holding in Gerstein mean that, even in the extradition context, where the demanding State‘s “charge” rests upon something less than an indictment, there must be a determination of probable cause by a detached and neutral magistrate, and that the asylum State need not grant extradition unless that determination has been made. The demanding State, of course, has the burden of so demonstrating.
Having said this, however, I recognize that it is the purpose of the Extradition Clause to secure the prompt rendition of interstate fugitives with a minimum of friction between States. See Appleyard v. Massachusetts, 203 U. S. 222, 227-228 (1906). The Constitution‘s concern for efficiency and comity in extradition could be seriously jeopardized if the courts of the asylum State could examine the factual basis for a probable-cause determination already made by a magistrate in the demanding State.7 I therefore would not go so far as to
III
Here the Arizona papers were facially sufficient. An arrest warrant had been issued by an Arizona Justice of the Peace, and that warrant stated specifically: “I have found reasonable cause to believe that such offense(s) were committed and that the accused [Doran] committed them.” App. 26a. I equate that recital of “reasonable cause” with the “probable cause” of Fourth Amendment parlance. To be sure, the phraseology is conclusory, but this still was a judicial determination of
I therefore concur only in the result.
Notes
The respondent submitted a counterstatement of the question:
“The Michigan Supreme Court did not misconstrue the Fourth Amendment and the Extradition Clause by holding that the scope of a habeas corpus challenge to extradition legitimately encompasses a scrutiny by the asylum jurisdiction of the charging documents supporting the demanding State‘s requisition to determine whether such documents facially reflect probable cause and hence substantially charge the accused fugitive with crime.” Brief for Respondent 1-2.
See also Brief in Opposition 1.
It is obvious that each side regards the Fourth Amendment to be of significance.
I nevertheless find the implications of certain passages in the Court‘s opinion to be troublesome. The Court says, ante, at 290, that “once the governor of the asylum state has acted on a requisition for extradition based on the demanding state‘s judicial determination that probable cause existed, no further judicial inquiry may be had on that issue in the asylum state.” This seems to imply that it is only the governor who is to review the charging papers, and that the habeas court has no role whatsoever in the matter. A like implication appears in the Court‘s language, ibid., that “the courts of the asylum state are without power to review the determination.” On the other hand, in an earlier passage, ante, at 289, the Court says that the grant of extradition by the governor of an asylum State “is prima facie evidence that the constitutional and statutory requirements have been met.” This, for me, is a suggestion that the governor‘s review and determination effect only a rebuttable presumption that there has been a judicial determination in the demanding State. I also note that some passages in the Court‘s opinion seem to disregard the proposition that “the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require that sister States
