Ex Parte Julie Ann VonTungeln, 10-14-00329-CR

In 2009 Julie Ann Von Tungeln received deferred-adjudication community supervision for two counts of sexual assault of a child; she agreed to standard probation terms including Condition 3: “Avoid association with persons who have criminal records and those of disreputable or harmful character.”
In May and August 2013 Von Tungeln filed two informal-marriage registrations with Steven Alsobrook (also on felony supervision); the first was quickly annulled when they learned Alsobrook’s divorce was not final.
The State alleged Condition 3 was violated (marriage to Alsobrook, who had an extensive criminal history) and filed a motion to adjudicate; Von Tungeln agreed to two weeks in jail and the State withdrew the motion to adjudicate.
Von Tungeln sought modification of probation to permit association with Alsobrook; after denial she filed a habeas application claiming Condition 3 was unconstitutional as applied (privacy, due process, equal protection, and First Amendment association claims).
The trial court found the habeas application frivolous and denied relief; the appellate court reviewed the denial de novo and affirmed, concluding Condition 3 was reasonably related to probation purposes and Von Tungeln failed to meet her burden.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Condition 3 is unconstitutional as applied (privacy, due process, equal protection)	Condition 3 unlawfully restricts Von Tungeln’s privacy and other constitutional rights by forbidding association with her spouse	Condition 3 is a permissible probation condition reasonably related to rehabilitation and community protection; probationers have diminished rights	Condition 3 is constitutional as applied; denied habeas relief — plaintiff failed to prove entitlement to relief
Whether Condition 3 violates First Amendment right of association as applied	Condition 3 impermissibly infringes Von Tungeln’s right to associate with Alsobrook (spouse)	Probation limits are justified to reduce future criminality and protect the public; association with felons can be restricted	First Amendment claim rejected; condition reasonably related to probation goals and enforcement needs

Speth v. State, 6 S.W.3d 530 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (probation is a contractual privilege and trial court has broad discretion to set conditions)
Lacy v. State, 875 S.W.2d 3 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1994) (three-part test for invalid probation condition)
Lee v. State, 952 S.W.2d 894 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1997) (probation condition valid if reasonably related to purposes of probation despite affecting constitutional rights)
Macias v. State, 649 S.W.2d 150 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1983) (factors for assessing reasonable relation to probation: purposes of probation, diminished rights of probationers, law enforcement needs)
Briseño v. State, 293 S.W.3d 644 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2009) (upholding similar restrictive probation conditions)
Ex parte Alakayi, 102 S.W.3d 426 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003) (burden on probationer to prove entitlement to relief from probation condition)
Townes v. State, 293 S.W.3d 227 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2009) (reiterating probationers’ diminished liberties and community-protection goal)
Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (U.S. 1987) (probationers have diminished privacy rights)
Ex parte Skelton, 434 S.W.3d 709 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014) (standard of de novo review for habeas denial where application held frivolous)