Evans-Garcia v. United States
744 F.3d 235
| 1st Cir. | 2014Background
- Petitioners Harold Evans-García and Eric Joel Carrión-Cruz are serving life without parole for juvenile carjacking-homicides committed when each was under 18.
- Both previously exhausted direct appeal and initial §2255 habeas relief; they seek to file second or successive §2255 motions invoking Miller v. Alabama.
- Miller held that the Eighth Amendment forbids sentencing schemes that mandate life without parole for juvenile offenders.
- Under AEDPA, second or successive §2255 motions require court-of-appeals certification that the application makes a prima facie showing of a new constitutional rule made retroactive by the Supreme Court.
- Government conceded (for certification-stage purposes) that Miller announced a new rule and that Miller is retroactive; the court accepted that concession for Evans-García.
- Court certified Evans-García to proceed to district court, but denied certification for Carrión-Cruz because his life sentence was an upward discretionary departure, not a mandatory life sentence under statute or guidelines.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Miller qualifies as a "new rule" and is retroactive for second-or-successive §2255 certification | Miller announced a new Eighth Amendment rule forbidding mandatory juvenile LWOP; it should be treated as retroactive | Government conceded Miller is new and retroactive for prima facie purposes (while acknowledging broader circuit disagreement) | Court accepted the government concession and treated Miller as a new, retroactive rule for certification of Evans-García |
| Whether the court may rely on a government concession on retroactivity at certification stage | Evans-García urges acceptance to allow district court review | Government conceded; court considered such concessions permissible at the prima facie certification stage | Court accepted the concession as sufficient to certify Evans-García to file his §2255 motion |
| Standard for certification of second-or-successive habeas petitions under §2244(b)(3)(C) | Petitioners argue prima facie showing suffices to reach district court | Government urged differing treatments depending on circumstances; circuits vary on how merits are considered at authorization stage | Court applied a prima facie standard: certification requires a showing that it is reasonably likely the strict requirements are met, not a full merits determination |
| Whether Miller applies to Carrión-Cruz (i.e., was he subject to a mandatory LWOP?) | Carrión-Cruz argues Miller should allow relief because he was a juvenile sentenced to LWOP | Government and court note his life sentence resulted from an upward discretionary guidelines departure (plea reduced guideline range to 292–365 months), not a mandatory scheme | Court denied certification for Carrión-Cruz because as a matter of law he was not sentenced under a mandatory LWOP scheme and Miller therefore did not plainly apply |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (Eighth Amendment forbids mandatory juvenile life-without-parole sentences)
- United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (sentencing guidelines are advisory)
- Rodriguez v. Superintendent, Bay State Corr. Ctr., 139 F.3d 270 (1st Cir. 1998) (prima facie standard for certification warrants fuller district-court exploration)
- Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (limits on retroactivity of new criminal procedural rules)
- Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461 (1993) (Teague framework for new rules)
- Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656 (2001) (court-of-appeals role in determining prima facie compliance with §2244)
- Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641 (2012) (jurisdictional considerations in successive habeas filings)
- United States v. Evans-García, 322 F.3d 110 (1st Cir. 2003) (background on Evans-García’s conviction)
- United States v. Carrión-Cruz, 92 F.3d 5 (1st Cir. 1996) (background and appellate disposition for Carrión-Cruz)