985 F.3d 742
9th Cir.2021Background
- FMLA entitles eligible employees to "a total of 12 workweeks of leave during any 12-month period" (29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)).
- Alaska Marine Highway System (AMHS) employs traditional (≈5 days/week) and rotational (7 days on/7 days off) employees who earn similar annual hours/pay.
- Secretary of Labor sued Alaska, alleging Alaska unlawfully counted rotational employees’ "off" weeks toward continuous FMLA leave; district court granted summary judgment for the Secretary and enjoined Alaska.
- Alaska argued a "workweek" is a fixed, seven-consecutive-day period (the employer’s established workweek), so both on- and off-weeks count toward 12 workweeks; Secretary argued only weeks the employee was scheduled to work count.
- Ninth Circuit majority reversed: held "workweek" in §2612(a)(1) adopts the FLSA/Federal definition (a fixed seven-day employer-designated period), so continuous leave consumes consecutive seven-day workweeks (off-weeks may count).
- Dissent would have affirmed the district court, favoring the Secretary’s position and Skidmore deference to the Department of Labor’s longstanding interpretations that "workweek" means the employee’s regular schedule (weeks the employee would otherwise be scheduled to work).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Meaning of "workweek" in FMLA §2612(a)(1) for rotational employees taking continuous leave | "Workweek" means weeks the employee is scheduled to work; off-weeks are not leave | "Workweek" is a fixed, 7-consecutive-day period designated by the employer (FLSA meaning); both on- and off-weeks can count | Majority: "workweek" adopts FLSA-style fixed 7-day period; both on/off weeks count toward 12 consecutive workweeks (reversed district court) |
| Deference to DOL interpretations (Chevron/Skidmore) | Secretary: DOL interpretations/regulatory preamble and opinion letters are persuasive and entitled to Skidmore deference | Alaska: No controlling DOL regulation defines "workweek" for this context; Chevron not triggered | Court: No Chevron (no definitional regulation); declined to give Skidmore weight to Secretary’s interpretations here and rejected that those materials overcome textual+structural reading |
Key Cases Cited
- Hall v. Hall, 138 S. Ct. 1118 (2018) (canon: transplanted statutory terms carry prior meaning)
- Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) (informal agency interpretations get weight for their persuasiveness)
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (framework for deference to agency regulations)
- Sanford v. Weinberger, 752 F.2d 636 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("administrative workweek" definition and its equivalence to FLSA concept)
- BedRoc., Ltd. v. United States, 541 U.S. 176 (2004) (textualist interpretive approach)
- FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994) (use of ordinary meaning when statute is silent)
- Price v. Stevedoring Servs. of Am., Inc., 697 F.3d 820 (9th Cir. 2012) (agency rulemaking rigor bears on deference)