18 F.4th 686
11th Cir.2021Background:
- After a traffic stop on July 8, 2016, Deputy Thacker discovered an outstanding warrant for Ethan Charles; Charles resisted arrest for several minutes.
- A civilian bystander, Ryan Leckie, and Deputy Brantley assisted Thacker; Thacker allegedly tackled Charles and Brantley used a taser in drive‑stun mode for about five seconds.
- Charles was handcuffed (initially in front), later recuffed behind his back, then transported; he sustained self‑inflicted head injuries while in the patrol car and pleaded guilty to felony obstruction.
- Charles filed § 1983 claims for excessive force against Thacker, Brantley, and Leckie, and sued the sheriff under the Rehabilitation Act for failing to accommodate his claimed bipolar disorder and panic attacks.
- The district court granted summary judgment to defendants on all federal claims and declined supplemental jurisdiction over state claims; the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether civilian Leckie acted under color of state law (§ 1983) | Leckie joined deputies in restraining Charles and thus was a state actor under joint‑action/nexus theories | Leckie merely provided brief, ad hoc assistance and was not a state actor; no conspiracy or symbiotic relationship with police | Civilian assistance absent evidence of conspiracy or other joint action is not state action; judgment for Leckie affirmed |
| Whether Deputy Thacker’s tackle was excessive force (Fourth Amendment) / qualified immunity | Charles argues the tackle was an unreasonable use of force causing injury | Thacker argues Charles actively resisted, posed a safety risk, and tackle was a reasonable method to effect arrest | Under Graham factors and viewing facts favorably to Charles, the tackle was reasonable; Thacker entitled to qualified immunity |
| Whether Deputy Brantley’s taser use was excessive force / qualified immunity | Charles contends taser deployment violated Graham reasonableness and departmental policy | Brantley argues Charles repeatedly and actively resisted, was warned, and taser was briefly used in drive‑stun mode to gain control | Use of taser once for ~5 seconds against an actively resisting arrestee was not clearly excessive; Brantley entitled to qualified immunity |
| Whether Sheriff violated the Rehabilitation Act by failing to accommodate Charles’s disabilities | Charles claims bipolar disorder and panic attacks required accommodation during arrest | Sheriff argues Charles failed to prove he is disabled under Rehabilitation Act or that any specific accommodation was requested | Charles did not identify a major life activity substantially limited or any requested accommodation; claim fails |
Key Cases Cited
- Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (establishes "under color of state law" / state action test)
- United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (private‑party liability where conspiracy with state actors exists)
- Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (public‑function/symbiotic relationship state‑action analysis)
- Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (state entanglement and joint participation principles)
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (Fourth Amendment excessive‑force reasonableness/Graham factors)
- Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (qualified immunity—clearly established law standard)
- Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (qualified immunity framework)
- Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (video evidence can preclude factual disputes at summary judgment)
- Mercado v. City of Orlando, 407 F.3d 1152 (department policy can inform whether conduct gave fair warning of unlawfulness)
- Proffitt v. Ridgway, 279 F.3d 503 (brief, ad hoc civilian assistance to police does not ordinarily create state‑action liability)