Estate of Manuel Diaz v. City of Anaheim, 840 F.3d 592

Background

Officer Bennallack shot and killed Manuel Diaz during a foot pursuit in an alley in Anaheim in July 2012; no gun was recovered at the scene.
Plaintiffs (Diaz’s estate and mother) sued Bennallack and the City under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (excessive force) and state battery; the jury found for Defendants after a six-day trial.
Before trial the district court severed punitive damages but refused to bifurcate compensatory damages from liability; the court allowed some evidence relevant only to damages to be heard during liability.
At trial the defense introduced extensive evidence and expert testimony about Diaz’s gang membership (tattoo and photo evidence, expert narrative) and methamphetamine use; much of this evidence was inflammatory and, per earlier pretrial rulings, had limited or no relevance to liability.
Plaintiffs repeatedly objected; the court often struck portions of testimony, gave limiting instructions, but permitted a substantial amount of the contested evidence to remain before the liability jury.
On appeal the Ninth Circuit held the district court abused its discretion by failing to bifurcate liability from compensatory damages because the prejudicial gang/drug evidence improperly tainted the liability phase; the denial of JMOL on excessive force was affirmed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the court abused discretion by refusing to bifurcate liability from compensatory damages	Bifurcation required because inflammatory gang/drug evidence had little or no relevance to liability and risked unfair prejudice	Limiting instructions suffice; evidence had at least marginal relevance to damages and some relevance to liability under Boyd	Reversed: abuse of discretion — court should have bifurcated to avoid prejudice from gang/drug evidence
Admissibility of gang-related photos and expert testimony at liability phase	Photos and broad expert testimony were irrelevant to whether Bennallack perceived a threat; highly prejudicial	Evidence bore on credibility, propensity to be armed, and could support defense theory (e.g., gang gun)	Much of the gang evidence was unduly prejudicial and should not have been heard in liability phase; admission tied to bifurcation error
Admissibility of toxicology evidence about methamphetamine use	Drug evidence focused improperly on Diaz’s condition at the moment of shooting and was irrelevant to compensatory damages; prejudicial	Toxicology relevant to damages and possibly to comparative fault/liability defenses	The form and focus of drug evidence was unduly prejudicial when combined with liability; this supported reversal for failure to bifurcate
Whether judgment as a matter of law on excessive force should have been entered	Evidence established force was unreasonable as a matter of law	Record contained facts a reasonable jury could find supported Bennallack’s perception of threat	Affirmed: denial of JMOL correct — reasonable jury could accept Defendants’ account; excessive-force question properly for jury

Key Cases Cited

Boyd v. City & County of San Francisco, 576 F.3d 938 (9th Cir.) (evidence supporting one version of events may be admissible when perceptions just prior to force are disputed)
Zivkovic v. Southern California Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2002) (trial judges have broad latitude in managing trials)
De Anda v. City of Long Beach, 7 F.3d 1418 (9th Cir. 1993) (Rule 42(b) permits separate trials of liability and damages)
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (Fourth Amendment excessive-force standard: objective reasonableness)
Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433 (9th Cir. 2011) (Graham factors and multi-factor reasonableness analysis)
Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272 (9th Cir. 2001) (need for specific factual support for an officer’s claimed fear)
Miller v. City of Los Angeles, 661 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2011) (limiting instructions may be insufficient when evidence is highly prejudicial)