Estate of Leonard Tyner v. Sandra O'Bey, 351784

Background

Sandra O’Bey and Leonard Tyner were friends for ~30 years (including a ~15-year romantic relationship); O’Bey gave Tyner about $750,000 over that period which she claims were loans; Tyner said the transfers were gratuitous.
On August 9, 2018, while Tyner was hospitalized, O’Bey produced a quitclaim deed and a promissory note reciting repayment of $750,000 upon sale of 1130 West Grand (Grand Blvd.); Tyner later denied signing.
Lue Ease Tyner (Leonard’s wife) had held legal title; probate was opened and administratively closed, and the trial court later quieted title to the property in favor of Leonard’s estate.
In the circuit court, parties filed competing summary-disposition motions; the trial court quieted title, granted summary disposition to the estate on many of O’Bey’s claims (holding the promissory note lacked consideration, oral contracts were barred by the statute of frauds, and payments were presumptively gratuitous because of a meretricious relationship), but allowed limited unjust-enrichment recovery for recent property-tax payments.
On appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed the quiet-title order but reversed in part: it held genuine disputes of material fact precluded summary disposition on unjust-enrichment and innocent-misrepresentation claims premised on oral promises, while claims based on the written promissory note failed for lack of consideration; O’Bey abandoned her fraud-in-the-inducement challenge on appeal.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (O’Bey)	Defendant's Argument (Estate/Tyner)	Held
Unjust enrichment — were the payments loans or gratuitous?	Payments were loans made in reliance on Tyner’s promises to repay; equity requires restitution.	Payments were presumptively gratuitous because of a meretricious relationship; no enforceable contract exists.	Reversed trial court: meretricious-relationship finding improper at summary stage; factual disputes (existence/timing of promises) preclude summary disposition; statute of limitations may bar payments older than six years before filing.
Validity of the promissory note (consideration)	The written note memorialized a binding promise to repay upon sale; it supports contract/repayment claims.	The note recites only past advances as “consideration,” so it is past consideration and legally insufficient.	Affirmed for the note-based claims: promissory note unenforceable for lack of consideration; summary disposition proper as to claims premised on the written note.
Innocent misrepresentation based on oral promises	Tyner repeatedly told O’Bey he owned/controlled the property and promised repayment; she detrimentally relied on those oral assurances.	Oral promises are barred by statute of frauds and/or limitations; no privity or enforceable contract.	Partly reversed: genuine disputes of material fact about oral promises and accrual; statute of frauds does not bar these oral promises as framed; timeliness depends on when repayment was due within a “reasonable time.”
Fraud in the inducement (particularity and reasonableness of reliance)	O’Bey alleged inducement to loan money by Tyner’s representations.	Claims not pleaded with required particularity; reliance was unreasonable.	Affirmed: O’Bey abandoned the challenge on appeal (failed to contest the trial court’s particularity ruling), so dismissal stands.
Standing to challenge quiet-title / subject-matter jurisdiction	O’Bey contends the quiet-title order affected potential creditor rights and thus jurisdiction should be questioned.	O’Bey lacks a concrete legal interest in Lue Ease’s probate proceedings and thus lacks standing to challenge jurisdiction.	Affirmed: O’Bey lacks standing to challenge the quiet-title order; appellate court declines to address subject-matter-jurisdiction merits and affirms title transfer.

Key Cases Cited

Joseph v. Auto Club Ins. Ass’n, 491 Mich 200 (standard for de novo review of MCR 2.116(C)(10))
Jackson v. Estate of Green, 484 Mich 209 (loan with no fixed repayment time is payable on demand; reasonable-time rule)
M&D, Inc. v. W.B. McConkey, 231 Mich App 22 (elements of innocent misrepresentation; privity requirement)
Shirey v. Camden, 314 Mich 128 (past consideration insufficient to support a subsequent promise)
Riggs v. Riggs’ Estate, 232 Mich 579 (continuing consideration doctrine)
Featherston v. Steinhoff, 226 Mich App 584 (presumption that services during a meretricious relationship are gratuitous)
Bellevue Ventures, Inc. v. Morang-Kelly Inv., Inc., 302 Mich App 59 (elements of unjust enrichment)