Estate of Glenda Rhoades
502 S.W.3d 406
| Tex. App. | 2016Background
- Testatrix Glenda Rhoades executed a will (Oct. 4, 2007) giving (A) her residential homestead to her father Glen Rhoades, (B) all personal property to Glen, (C) “all of the rest of [her] estate … to Glen” with a provision that if Glen predeceased her, “his portion” would go to Elise Kinler (then to Michael Kinler if Elise predeceased), and (D) any property not disposed of by other provisions to her heirs at law.
- Glen predeceased Glenda. Kinler sought probate and was initially appointed independent executor; that appointment was later revoked temporarily but the will had been offered for probate and briefly admitted.
- Competing declaratory-judgment suits and cross-motions for summary judgment were filed: appellants (heirs at law) argued the gifts in A and B lapsed and passed to them under the residuary clause (D); Kinler argued that the phrase “his portion” in C meant Glen’s entire estate (A–C) and therefore the whole estate passed to her as contingent taker.
- The trial court granted Kinler’s summary judgment and denied appellants’; on appeal the court considered (1) whether the declaratory action was ripe given the will’s temporary removal from probate and (2) proper construction of Article III.
- The court held the UDJA could be invoked although the will had been briefly set aside from probate (the controversy was justiciable), reversed the trial court’s grant to Kinler, and remanded for entry of a declaratory judgment consistent with the appellate construction.
Issues
| Issue | Appellants' Argument | Kinler's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the declaratory-judgment action was ripe when the will was not (temporarily) admitted to probate | Probate must be in place (Cowan); without probate the court lacked jurisdiction and the summary judgment was advisory | UDJA allows construction of wills before/after probate if a justiciable controversy exists; parties waived ripeness by litigating | Court: UDJA may be invoked; temporary setting aside of will from probate did not render the action nonjusticiable here (ripeness satisfied) |
| Proper construction of Article III: does “his portion” in ¶C mean only the property described in ¶C, or Glen’s entire estate under A–C? | A and B lapsed when Glen predeceased; lapsed gifts fall into residuary ¶D under Tex. Est. Code §255.152, so heirs at law take homestead and personal property; ¶C therefore covers the remaining non‑homestead real property, which passed to Kinler per ¶C | The will names Glen as primary beneficiary of the testatrix’s entire estate; Article V uses the same phrase “his portion” to define Glen’s entire estate — thus, if Glen predeceased, Kinler (first contingent) takes the entire estate (A–C) | Court: Harmonizing all paragraphs without editing requires treating A and B as lapsed into the residuary (D) and ¶C’s “his portion” as referring to the remainder described in ¶C (non‑homestead real property) which passed to Kinler; reversed trial court’s judgment for Kinler and remanded for declaration consistent with that construction |
Key Cases Cited
- Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. 1993) (subject-matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time)
- Bonham State Bank v. Beadle, 907 S.W.2d 465 (Tex. 1995) (UDJA is remedial and should be liberally construed)
- Harkins v. Crews, 907 S.W.2d 51 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1995) (court may decide validity/construction of wills under UDJA even if not finally probated)
- Steger v. Muenster Drilling Co., 134 S.W.3d 359 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003) (cardinal will‑construction rules: ascertain intent from four corners; harmonize provisions; avoid rendering language meaningless)
- San Antonio Area Found. v. Lang, 35 S.W.3d 636 (Tex. 2000) (distinction between real and personal property relevant to will construction)
- Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844 (Tex. 2009) (summary-judgment standard and reviewing competing motions)