Estate of De'Angelo Brown v. West, 3:20-cv-00099

On January 16, 2019, West Memphis officers engaged in a ~12-minute high‑speed pursuit of a Toyota Camry whose driver (Megan Rivera) failed to stop; the vehicle repeatedly endangered officers and the public, struck patrol cars, and ran over Officer Presley’s legs during a reversal.
Officers deployed PIT/box‑in maneuvers and stop sticks; the fleeing vehicle ultimately was approached by multiple officers who drew weapons and gave commands.
As the vehicle reversed and then accelerated toward officers, several officers fired at the driver; Rivera was struck 14 times and died; three bullets struck passenger De’Angelo Brown, who also died.
Arkansas State Police conducted an extensive criminal investigation; a grand jury returned no true bill and the State Police closed the probe; WMPD internal review found officers acted within policy.
The Estate sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Arkansas Civil Rights Act (ACRA), and state tort law (battery, outrage) against the officers and Chief West (individual and official capacities).
The Court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment: it held (1) no Fourth Amendment seizure of Brown because he was an unintended target under controlling Eighth Circuit precedent; (2) Fourteenth Amendment theories (state‑created danger, substantive due process) fail; (3) Monell/official‑capacity claims fail; (4) state battery is time‑barred and outrage fails on the merits.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Fourth Amendment seizure/excessive force (passenger shot)	Estate: bullets that struck Brown constituted an unreasonable seizure/excessive force.	Defendants: officers aimed at driver; Brown was an unintended bystander; bystander rule bars Fourth‑Am claim.	Held: No Fourth‑Am seizure; under Eighth Circuit law bystanders/passengers unintentionally shot are not seized. Qualified immunity granted.
Fourteenth Amendment (state‑created danger / substantive due process)	Estate: officers’ conduct placed Brown in danger or was conscience‑shocking.	Defendants: driver’s conduct, not officers’, created the danger; officers acted to stop a dangerous flight.	Held: Rejected state‑created danger and substantive due process claims; qualified immunity applies.
Official‑capacity / Monell (policy, training, supervision)	Estate: Chief West and City liable for policies, customs, or failures to train/supervise.	Defendants: no underlying constitutional violation; no evidence a policy/custom or training failure caused the incident.	Held: Official‑capacity claims fail (no constitutional violation shown; no Monell evidence).
State torts (battery; outrage)	Estate: state battery and outrage based on the shootings.	Defendants: battery is time‑barred under Arkansas one‑year statute; outrage fails under Arkansas’s exacting standard.	Held: Battery claim dismissed as time‑barred; outrage claim fails on merits.

Moore v. Indehar, 514 F.3d 756 (8th Cir. 2008) (bystanders/passengers unintentionally shot by police are not "seized" under the Fourth Amendment).
Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989) (a seizure requires restraint resulting from means intentionally applied).
Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765 (2014) (pursuit context: driver’s dangerous flight can justify force used to terminate pursuit).
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) (use of force in high‑speed pursuit assessed objectively under the Fourth Amendment).
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998) (substantive due process requires conscience‑shocking conduct to establish liability).
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (qualified immunity two‑step framework).
Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability requires a policy or custom that caused the constitutional violation).
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (summary judgment standards).
Childress v. City of Arapaho, 210 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir. 2000) (passenger/hostage shot in police discharge cannot recover under § 1983 when officers intended to target driver).