ESPN, Inc. and Paula Lavigne v. University of Notre Dame Police Department
62 N.E.3d 1192
| Ind. | 2016Background
- Notre Dame Security Police Department (NDSPD) is a campus police force created by the University trustees under Indiana Code chapter 21-17; officers have arrest and other police powers but serve at the trustees’ pleasure and also enforce university rules (student code, parietals) and provide campus-specific services.
- In 2014 an ESPN reporter (Paula Lavigne) requested incident reports and daily logs for 275 student-athletes; NDSPD denied the requests, citing prior Public Access Counselor (PAC) advisory opinions concluding private university police are not APRA “law enforcement agencies.”
- ESPN filed complaints with the PAC; the PAC later concluded NDSPD acted under color of law such that some records must be disclosed (daily logs; some incident reports subject to investigatory exemptions), but NDSPD again refused and ESPN sued under the Access to Public Records Act (APRA).
- NDSPD moved for judgment on the pleadings arguing it is not a “law enforcement agency” or a “public agency” under APRA definitions and that the legislature had acquiesced to PAC opinions; ESPN argued NDSPD fit several APRA definitions (2(n)(6), 2(n)(1), 2(n)(2)(C)).
- Trial court granted NDSPD’s motion; the Court of Appeals reversed, holding NDSPD was a “law enforcement agency” under 2(n)(6); the Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer to resolve statutory interpretation.
- The Supreme Court considered statutory text, structure, canons of construction, and legislative context and concluded NDSPD is not a “public agency” under APRA, affirming the trial court.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (ESPN) | Defendant's Argument (NDSPD) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether NDSPD is a “law enforcement agency” under APRA §5-14-3-2(n)(6) | Functions (investigation, arrest) satisfy the definition; functional test should control | Subsection requires an agency “of any level of government”; NDSPD is an agency of a private university, not government | Held: No — NDSPD is not “of any level of government,” so not a law enforcement agency under 2(n)(6) |
| Whether NDSPD is a “public agency” because it exercises the executive power of the State under §5-14-3-2(n)(1) | Exercise of police powers is state-executive power regardless of appointing authority | Powers are granted to and controlled by trustees, not the State executive; NDSPD acts under university control | Held: No — NDSPD does not exercise the executive power of the State under 2(n)(1) |
| Whether NDSPD is a “public agency” as an entity exercising delegated executive power in a limited area under §5-14-3-2(n)(2)(C) | Campus policing is delegated governmental power in a limited geographic area (campus) | Trustees—not the State—exercise the delegated authority; reading would swallow other specific definitions and produce absurd results | Held: No — NDSPD is not covered by 2(n)(2)(C) |
| Whether prior PAC advisory opinions and legislative inaction amount to legislative acquiescence | ESPN: PAC’s later contrary opinion controls; legislative silence is not dispositive | NDSPD: multiple long-standing PAC opinions supported exclusion and legislature did not act, supporting acquiescence | Held: Court acknowledged PAC opinions but decided statutory text controls; did not rely on legislative acquiescence to decide in NDSPD’s favor |
Key Cases Cited
- Evansville Courier & Press v. Vanderburgh Cty. Health Dept., 17 N.E.3d 922 (Ind. 2014) (APRA’s purpose is broad public access to government records)
- West v. Office of Indiana Sec’y of State, 54 N.E.3d 349 (Ind. 2016) (statutory interpretation gives words their plain meaning and considers statute as a whole)
- Shepherd Properties Co. v. Int’l Union of Painters & Allied Trades, Dist. Council 91, 972 N.E.2d 845 (Ind. 2012) (legislative intent and statute application should be logical and consistent with statute’s purpose)
- Siwinski v. Town of Ogden Dunes, 949 N.E.2d 825 (Ind. 2011) (canon that every statutory provision should be given effect; avoid rendering provisions meaningless)
- Wright v. State, 949 N.E.2d 411 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (specific statutory provisions take priority over general ones)