Andy Mohr WEST d/b/a Andy Mohr Toyota, Butler Motors, Inc. d/b/a Butler Toyota, and TW Toy, Inc. d/b/a Tom Wood Toyota, Appellants (Petitioners below), v. OFFICE OF the INDIANA SECRETARY OF STATE, Auto Dealer Services Division, and Carol Mihalik, in her Representative Capacity as Securities Commissioner of the Auto Dealer Services Division, and Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., Appellees (Respondents below).
No. 49S02-1511-PL-668
Supreme Court of Indiana
June 2, 2016
43 N.E.3d 243
We also note that married parents have no legal obligation to pay for their children‘s educational expenses beyond high school, let alone graduate school expenses. Thus, while this Court certainly understands and values the amount of discretion we give our trial judges, particularly in family law matters, we do not believe that it is the court‘s province to order a divorced parent to pay for a child‘s graduate or professional school under the statutory language as written, without clear instruction and guidance from the Legislature that it intends to confer this significant authority and discretion on the courts. Of course, even though we interpret the statute to exclude graduate and professional school expenses, this does not leave children seeking to have their divorcing or divorced parents assist them with their graduate and professional school expenses without a remedy. Parents are still free to agree to pay all, or a portion of, their children‘s graduate or professional school expenses in their settlement agreements. The courts can enforce such agreements.
Conclusion
We hold that the term “postsecondary,” as used in
RUSH, C.J., RUCKER, and MASSA, JJ., concur.
RUSH, C.J., RUCKER, and MASSA, JJ., concur.
No. 49S02-1511-PL-668.
Supreme Court of Indiana.
June 2, 2016.
Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Kyle Hunter, Kenneth Biggins, Deputy Attorneys General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee, Office of the Indiana Secretary of State.
John C. Trimble, Brett Y. Hoy, Lewis Wagner LLP, Indianapolis, IN, Steven A. McKelvey, Jr., Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP, Columbia, SC, Attorneys for Appellee, Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.
MASSA, Justice.
Three central Indiana Toyota dealerships protested the relocation of a fourth Toyota dealership. The Auto Dealer Services Division dismissed their action for lack of standing—affirmed by the trial court—concluding the dealerships were outside the “relevant market area,” as defined by the Indiana Dealer Services Act,
Facts and Procedural History
In an apparent effort to benefit from a growing customer base in Hamilton County, Ed Martin Toyota requested—and Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. planned to approve—that Ed Martin relocate from its Anderson, Madison County location, where it operated for several years, to the Fishers area. Prior to the move, Toyota informed its other new motor vehicle dealerships in the region, including Andy Mohr Toyota, Butler Toyota, and Tom Wood Toyota (“Dealers“), and it filed the relocation plan with the Auto Dealer Services Division of the Office of the Indiana Secretary of State (“Division“).
The Dealers protested, seeking declaratory judgment and asking the Division to determine whether good cause existed for the move. See
The Division determined the Dealers failed to show they were entitled to protest because it was undisputed “the anticipated relocation is in excess of a six-mile radius into a county of more than 100,000 people and therefore not a violation of the RMA of the closest dealer as defined by [the Statute].” App. at 44, 70, 94. In other words, because Toyota sought to relocate an existing dealership into a county with more than 100,000 people, the Division found Ed Martin fit the language of Subsection 20(1), with the relevant market area limited to a six-mile radius. Each Dealer was located outside that radius, so the Division dismissed their declaratory judgment actions for lack of standing.1
The Dealers appealed, and a divided panel of our Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, finding the Division‘s interpretation of the Statute was not reasonable. Andy Mohr W., Inc. v. Office of Ind. Sec‘y of State, 41 N.E.3d 704, 712-13 (Ind. Ct.App.2015). It determined “proposed new motor vehicle dealer” in Subsection 20(2)(A) could not be limited to newly created dealerships since another statutory section contemplates a proposed dealer‘s move: “the franchisor may not establish or relocate the proposed [new motor vehicle] dealer until the division has rendered a decision on the matter.” Id. at 708 (emphasis altered) (quoting
The decision drew a dissent, which would have deferred to the Division‘s interpretation of the Statute, finding it to be reasonable. Id. at 713 (Friedlander, J., dissenting). Moreover, the dissent deemed the majority‘s interpretation of “proposed new motor vehicle dealer” in 20(2)(A) inconsistent with the plain language of the Statute, which uses two distinct terms: “‘proposed’ dealers and ‘relocated’ dealers, clearly implying that the former is a planned/projected dealer while the latter is an established/existing dealer.” Id. at 714.
Toyota and the Division sought transfer, which we granted, thereby vacating the opinion below. Andy Mohr W. v. Ind. Sec‘y of State, 43 N.E.3d 243 (Ind.2015) (table); Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).
Standard of Review
The Dealers here appeal the trial court‘s judgment affirming the Division‘s dismissal of their administrative action. As the trial court reviewed a paper record only, we are in just as good of a position as the trial court was to resolve the case, and thus need not defer to its ruling. Equicor Dev., Inc. v. Westfield-Washington Twp. Plan Comm‘n, 758 N.E.2d 34, 37 (Ind. 2001); see also Walczak v. Labor Works-Ft. Wayne LLC, 983 N.E.2d 1146, 1152 (Ind.2013). To navigate our analysis, we thus follow the same guideposts relied upon by the reviewing courts below. Amoco Oil Co., Whiting Refinery v. Comm‘r of Labor, 726 N.E.2d 869, 872 (Ind.Ct.App. 2000).
Indiana‘s Administrative Order and Procedures Act sets forth those guideposts: we may set aside an agency action only if it is “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (3) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; (4) without observance of procedure required by law; or (5) unsupported by substantial evidence.”
Our review of agency action is intentionally limited, as we recognize an agency has expertise in its field and the
The Trial Court Properly Deferred to the Division‘s Reasonable Construction of the Statute.
In light of the standard of review, the issue facing us is a narrow one: whether the Division‘s interpretation of the Statute is reasonable.
The goal of statutory interpretation is to discern and further the intent of the legislature. Moryl v. Ransone, 4 N.E.3d 1133, 1137 (Ind.2014). To do so, we start with the plain language of the statute, giving its words their ordinary meaning and considering the structure of the statute as a whole. Tyson v. State, 51 N.E.3d 88, 90-91 (Ind. 2016). No word or part should be rendered meaningless if it can be reconciled with rest. Siwinski v. Town of Ogden Dunes, 949 N.E.2d 825, 828 (Ind.2011). And when confronted with more than one statute on the same subject, we must try to harmonize any inconsistencies. Moryl, 4 N.E.3d at 1137. But we exercise caution so as not to add words or restrictions where none exist. Kitchell v. Franklin, 997 N.E.2d 1020, 1026 (Ind.2013).
Balancing changing market dynamics with the need for fair competition, our General Assembly has provided auto dealers who may be affected by another dealer‘s presence—whether a new establishment or the relocation of an existing one—with the right to formally protest.
(1) With respect to a new motor vehicle dealer who plans to relocate the dealer‘s place of business in a county having a population of more than one hundred thousand (100,000), the area within a radius of six (6) miles of the intended site of the relocated dealer. The six (6) mile distance shall be determined by measuring the distance between the nearest surveyed boundary of the existing new motor vehicle dealer‘s principal place of business and the nearest surveyed boundary line of the relocated new motor vehicle dealer‘s place of business.
(2) With respect to a:
(A) proposed new motor vehicle dealer; or
(B) new motor vehicle dealer who plans to relocate the dealer‘s place of business in a county having a population of not more than one hundred thousand (100,000);
the area within a radius of ten (10) miles of the intended site of the proposed or relocated dealer. The ten (10) mile distance shall be determined by measuring the distance between the nearest surveyed boundary line of the existing new motor vehicle dealer‘s principal place of
business and the nearest surveyed boundary line of the proposed or relocated new motor vehicle dealer‘s principal place of business.
Proper construction of a statute is best driven by the plain language and structure of the specific statute at issue. Here, the word “relocate” appears only in the first and last category of the Statute; its absence in the middle category‘s language indicates Subsection 20(2)(A) does not contemplate relocating dealers. Moreover, all relocating dealers fit one of those relocating categories—their new location is either “in” a large county (more than 100,000) or “in” a small one (not more than 100,000)—so there is no need for their inclusion in the middle subsection.3
What does distinguish Subsection 20(2)(A) from the other two categories of market disruptions is the word “proposed.” That word is again used at the end of Subsection 20(2), indicating proposed dealers are distinct from relocated dealers, as the radius should be measured from “the nearest surveyed boundary line of the proposed or relocated new motor vehicle dealer‘s principal place of business.”
This construction makes sense in light of the legislature‘s decision to provide the right to protest with reasonable restrictions. The narrower, six-mile radius is appropriate for an already existing dealer that moves its operation in (within or into, see supra note 3) a large county under Subsection 20(1). Because the dealer already sells cars to customers, the threat of competition is not nearly as great as a wholly new dealership, and because it is moving in a large—and likely more densely populated—county, there are more prospective customers to support multiple operations. The wider, ten-mile radius is appropriate for the latter two categories: a proposed dealer opening up for the first time poses a potentially far-reaching disruption to the market; and a dealer that relocates in a small county may necessarily draw its customers from a wider geographic area due to a more dispersed population.
The Dealers urge us to take a different route, turning to another statute‘s use of the word “proposed” and insisting
In short, we are faced with two imperfect constructions of an inartfully drafted statute.4 Considering these circumstances, we find the Division‘s interpretation—which gives meaning to the words and structure of the Statute and furthers its underlying purpose—to be eminently reasonable. The Statute reflects a legislative determination that relocating more than six miles away from another dealership in a densely populated area will not have such a negative effect on the market to allow incumbent dealers to stifle competition through the protest procedure. Of course, if the legislature meant something different, it is free to more precisely reflect its intention by revising the Statute.
Conclusion
Because we find the Division‘s interpretation of the Statute reasonable, we affirm the trial court‘s order that deferred to the Division‘s exercise of its subject matter expertise in dismissing the action for lack of standing.
RUSH, C.J., and RUCKER and DAVID, JJ., concur.
MASSA, Justice.
Thomas L. HALE, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
No. 35S02-1601-CR-37
Supreme Court of Indiana
June 16, 2016