ESPINOSA GUILLOT, 25 I. & N. Dec. 653

Respondent Javier Jesus Espinosa Guillot is a Cuban national paroled in 1995 and adjusted to lawful permanent resident status in 1997 under the Cuban Adjustment Act.
In 2009, respondent was convicted of cannabis trafficking under Florida Statutes § 893.135(1)(a).
DHS charged respondent with removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) and (B)(i) as an aggravated felon and controlled substance violator based on the conviction.
An Immigration Judge terminated removal proceedings, ruling respondent was not admitted to the United States and thus not removable under § 237(a).
DHS appealed, arguing adjustment of status is an admission for purposes of § 237(a); the Board reviewed de novo and held respondent was admitted and removal proper.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether adjustment of status counts as an admission under § 237(a).	Espinosa Guillot relies on prior I.N. decisions that adjustment is an admission.	DHS argues Lanier wrongly labors to restrict admission; adjustment can be admission given Cuban Adjustment Act language.	Yes; adjustment is admission, and respondent was properly charged.

Matter of Rosas, 22 I&N Dec. 616 (BIA 1999) (adjustment of status constitutes an admission for § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii))
Matter of Alyazji, 25 I&N Dec. 397 (BIA 2011) (date of admission for post-entry adjustments; extends scope of 'admission')
Matter of Carrillo, 25 I&N Dec. 99 (BIA 2009) (roll-back provision for Cuban Adjustment Act timing in removable-crime context)
Matter of Rodarte, 23 I&N Dec. 905 (BIA 2006) (adjustment is an admission for § 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II))
Matter of Shanu, 23 I&N Dec. 754 (BIA 2005) (adjustment considered admission for § 237(a)(2)(A)(i); later partly overruled by Alyazji)
Lanier v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 631 F.3d 1363 (11th Cir. 2011) (Lanier limits § 212(h) interpretation; distinguishes 'admitted' vs. post-entry adjustment)
Martinez v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 532 (5th Cir. 2008) (defined 'admission' terms in related context)