Ernest Jones v. Ron Davis, 806 F.3d 538

Background

Ernest DeWayne Jones was sentenced to death in 1995; his conviction became final in 2003 after direct review and certiorari denial.
On direct appeal Jones raised a Lackey-style claim (delay between sentence and execution violates the Eighth Amendment); California Supreme Court rejected it.
In federal habeas (filed 2010, amended after district-court prompting), Jones alleged a systemic Eighth Amendment challenge: California’s post-conviction system causes excessive, arbitrary delay such that only a small, unpredictable subset of death-sentenced prisoners are executed.
The district court granted relief, invalidating Jones’s death sentence, concluding systemic delay produced an unconstitutional arbitrary application of capital punishment.
The State appealed; the Ninth Circuit majority reversed, holding Jones’s systemic claim seeks to apply a novel constitutional rule and is therefore barred under Teague v. Lane.
Judge Watford concurred in the judgment but would have reversed on failure to exhaust state remedies rather than on Teague grounds.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether federal court may adjudicate unexhausted systemic Lackey claim	Jones: exhaustion excused because returning to state court would compound delay and render state corrective process ineffective	State: Jones failed to exhaust; state process is available and not ineffective; exhaustion required	Majority: did not decide exhaustion; exercised discretion to decide Teague first and deny relief as barred; Concurrence: would reverse for failure to exhaust
Whether claim announces a "new rule" barred by Teague on collateral review	Jones: Furman/Gregg principles forbid arbitrary infliction of death; systemic delay is arbitrary and not dictated by precedent	State: Existing precedent does not compel the novel rule; Teague prohibits new rules on collateral review	Held: Claim is a new rule—Teague bars its application; denial affirmed on Teague grounds
Whether Furman/Gregg already dictated rule Jones seeks (i.e., arbitrariness from systemic post-sentencing delay)	Jones: Furman’s prohibition on arbitrary death-penalty infliction encompasses systemic delay that makes executions rare and unpredictable	State: Furman addressed arbitrary sentencing discretion, not post-sentencing delay; reasonable jurists would not be compelled to adopt Jones’s rule in 2003	Held: Furman/Gregg too general; reasonable jurists in 2003 would not be compelled to adopt Jones’s specific rule; claim is novel
Whether either Teague exception applies (substantive-rule or watershed procedural)	Jones: Rule is substantive because it places a class beyond execution (status of those with transformed sentences)	State: Rule is neither a recognized substantive category nor a watershed procedural rule	Held: Exceptions do not apply; petitioner’s expansion of substantive exception rejected

Key Cases Cited

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam holding that death sentences under certain statutes were unconstitutional because of arbitrary imposition)
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (death penalty constitutionally permissible where sentencing procedures sufficiently limit arbitrariness)
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (federal collateral review generally may not announce new constitutional rules)
Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227 (1990) (Teague principle protects finality; define rule specificity for Teague analysis)
Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004) (distinguishing new procedural rules from substantive rules for Teague exceptions)
Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406 (2007) (defines when a rule is "new"—not dictated by precedent at conviction’s finality)
Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383 (1994) (federal courts must apply Teague where defense not waived)
Smith v. Mahoney, 611 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2010) (Ninth Circuit previously held lengthy delay-based Lackey claim was Teague-barred)