Ernest Cadet v. State of Florida Department of Corrections
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 3402
| 11th Cir. | 2017Background
- Ernest Cadet was convicted in Florida in 2000; his conviction became final on December 23, 2002, and the one-year AEDPA limitations period began to run that day.
- Cadet filed state collateral petitions that tolled the federal period for part of the year, leaving only five days remaining after the Florida appellate mandate issued on August 25, 2006.
- Cadet’s appellate counsel, Michael Goodman, repeatedly (and mistakenly) told Cadet that the federal limitations period did not begin to run until after the conclusion of the state post-conviction appeal, based on a misreading of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Goodman did no meaningful research.
- Goodman reassured and discouraged Cadet from relying on jailhouse lawyers; Cadet insisted multiple times that the petition be filed immediately. Goodman filed the § 2254 petition nearly a year late (August 23, 2007).
- The district court found Cadet diligent but concluded Goodman's conduct—though negligent or even grossly negligent—did not constitute the extraordinary circumstances required for equitable tolling; the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether attorney error (miscalculation/misunderstanding of AEDPA deadline) can alone justify equitable tolling of § 2244(d) | Cadet: Goodman’s repeated assurances, failure to research after being warned, and discouraging other advice amounted to extraordinary circumstances (abandonment or equivalent) that warrant tolling. | State: Goodman’s conduct was negligent but not abandonment or other extraordinary misconduct; petitioner remains bound by counsel’s mistakes. | Attorney negligence—even gross negligence or misunderstanding of the law—does not, by itself, qualify as an extraordinary circumstance for equitable tolling; more (e.g., abandonment or other serious misconduct) is required. |
| Standard for when attorney conduct qualifies as extraordinary circumstance | Cadet: adopt a flexible, case-by-case inquiry as urged by Holland; consider gross negligence beyond garden-variety neglect. | State: adhere to precedent limiting tolling to more than mere negligence; require evidence of abandonment or similar severe misconduct. | Court: follows Supreme Court precedents (Lawrence, Holland, Maples) and holds that abandonment or comparable professional misconduct is required beyond attorney miscalculation. |
| Role of agency/adverse-interest principles in imputing attorney acts to client | Cadet: agency principles and adverse-interest exception apply because Goodman acted adversely by misleading and discouraging independent advice—so his knowledge is not imputed to Cadet. | State: under agency law, clients ordinarily bear their attorneys’ mistakes unless the attorney abandoned the client or acted solely for an adverse interest. | Court: agency law supports imputing attorney mistakes to client unless the attorney abandoned the client or committed a serious breach of loyalty (must intend to act for own/third-party interests). Gross negligence alone does not trigger the adverse-interest exception. |
| Whether district court erred in denying equitable tolling to Cadet | Cadet: trial court should have tolled because Goodman’s conduct was extraordinary and Cadet was diligent. | State: district court correctly found no extraordinary circumstance; dismissal as time-barred appropriate. | Held: district court correct; Cadet showed at most negligence/gross negligence, not abandonment or other extraordinary misconduct sufficient to toll AEDPA. |
Key Cases Cited
- Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010) (equitable tolling requires diligence and an extraordinary circumstance; professional misconduct can qualify but courts must apply a flexible, case-by-case inquiry)
- Maples v. Thomas, 565 U.S. 266 (2012) (attorney abandonment severs the agency relationship so counsel’s acts are not imputed to client; distinguishes negligence from abandonment)
- Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327 (2007) (simple attorney miscalculation or failure to do basic research does not justify equitable tolling)
- Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 750 (2016) (reaffirming requirement that circumstances causing delay be extraordinary and beyond litigant’s control)
- Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (attorney error is generally imputed to client under agency principles)
- Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005) (framework for AEDPA tolling disputes and distinction between statutory tolling and equitable tolling)
- Downs v. McNeil, 520 F.3d 1311 (11th Cir. 2008) (examples of attorney misconduct that can support equitable tolling when contrasted with petitioner’s diligence)
- Nyland v. Moore, 216 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir. 2000) (Florida post-conviction motion remains pending until appellate mandate issues for tolling purposes)
- McCloud v. Hooks, 560 F.3d 1223 (11th Cir. 2009) (clarifies when conviction is "final" for AEDPA timing)