Erin Dindinger v. Allsteel, Inc.
853 F.3d 414
8th Cir.2017Background
- Three female Allsteel managers (Dindinger, Loring, Freund) sued for sex-based wage discrimination under the Equal Pay Act, Title VII, and Iowa Civil Rights Act; jury found for plaintiffs and awarded back pay, emotional distress, and punitive damages; district court entered judgments totaling roughly $60–83k per plaintiff.
- Allsteel defended on grounds that comparators’ work was not equal and by asserting affirmative defenses including seniority, merit, education, outside experience, and economic conditions (recession-related layoffs, restructuring, and merit-freeze).
- District court excluded OFCCP audit results but allowed Allsteel to describe the audit process and internal conclusions; it also refused to allow economic conditions as a permissible "factor other than sex" in jury instructions.
- Plaintiffs introduced "me‑too" evidence (other female employees paid less than male counterparts) and testimony about internal complaints and a leaked salary email; the jury found the violations willful.
- Post-trial, district court denied Allsteel’s new-trial motion, awarded plaintiffs attorneys’ fees (~$269,877.67) and costs (including RealTime feed, both printed and video depositions, and Westlaw research); Eighth Circuit affirmed except remanded the Westlaw-costs issue for further factual inquiry.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jury instruction: economic conditions as affirmative defense | Not directly argued by plaintiffs; urged correct instruction that economic conditions can’t justify sex-based pay differences if sex played any role | Economic conditions (recession, layoffs, restructuring, pay‑freeze) can be a "factor other than sex" justifying pay differentials | No abuse of discretion: court properly excluded economic‑conditions defense here because Allsteel presented no evidence linking those conditions to the specific pay differentials at issue and Corning Glass controls where market‑forces perpetuate lower female pay |
| Admission of me‑too evidence | Me‑too evidence is probative of pretext and willfulness | Much of the me‑too testimony was dissimilar and prejudicial | No abuse: district court reasonably admitted me‑too testimony as relevant to pretext and willfulness under Sprint/United and Eighth Circuit precedent |
| Exclusion of OFCCP audit results | Audit results probative of non‑willfulness and whether sex motivated pay decisions | Excluding audit results was prejudicial; results would show no violation | No abuse: district court properly excluded audit findings under Rule 403 as unduly prejudicial and cumulative while allowing testimony about the audit process and internal conclusions |
| Admission of testimony suggesting retaliation (Loring) | Testimony used to rebut Allsteel’s performance-based explanations for denial of promotion | Evidence was irrelevant because no retaliation claim was pled | No abuse: testimony was relevant to rebut Allsteel’s performance justification and thus admissible |
| Attorney’s fees — reduction for limited Iowa CRA success | Fees should reflect related claims and results; plaintiffs obtained core relief | Plaintiffs argue claims were related and success justifies fee award | No abuse: district court applied lodestar and Hensley factors; relatedness and results supported award |
| Taxable costs — Westlaw/CLR research | Plaintiffs sought Westlaw fees as costs | Defendant argued CLR costs are part of attorney’s fees and non-taxable; court taxed them | Remand: Eighth Circuit remanded to determine whether separate billing for CLR is the prevailing practice in Iowa (per Hernandez/Missouri v. Jenkins standard) |
Key Cases Cited
- Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (Sup. Ct.) (market‑forces defense cannot justify paying women less than men)
- Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379 (Sup. Ct.) (me‑too evidence admissibility depends on context and relevance)
- Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (Sup. Ct.) (lodestar and results‑obtained guide fee awards)
- Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274 (Sup. Ct.) (prevailing practice may justify separate billing of certain costs)
- Leftwich v. Harris–Stowe State College, 702 F.2d 686 (8th Cir.) (CLR costs historically treated as part of attorneys’ fees)
- Johnson v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 734 F.2d 1304 (8th Cir.) (trial court discretion over admission of administrative findings in jury trials)
- Stanley v. Cottrell, Inc., 784 F.3d 454 (8th Cir.) (both printed and electronically recorded deposition transcripts may be taxed if necessarily obtained)