Erie Ins., Aplt. v. Moore, T., 228 A.3d 258

Erie insured Harold E. McCutcheon, Jr. under a Homeowner’s Policy and a Personal Catastrophe Liability Policy; both cover bodily injury from an “occurrence” defined as an "accident" and exclude injury "expected or intended."
Richard Carly sued McCutcheon’s estate alleging McCutcheon broke into his ex-wife Terry’s home, shot and killed her, then in a struggle with Carly (after pulling him into the home) the firearm discharged and Carly was injured. Carly pleaded negligent, careless and reckless conduct as the proximate cause of his injury.
Erie refused to defend the estate; the duty-to-defend issue was framed by the four-corners rule (compare the complaint to the policy language).
The opinion excerpt is a dissent (Justice Mundy) arguing the complaint, read as a whole, does not allege an "occurrence" (accident) and that policy exclusions for expected/intended injury bar coverage.
The dissent emphasizes precedents defining "accident" as "unexpected" and requiring fortuity; it treats the alleged facts (breaking in, pulling Carly in, struggle while holding a gun) as intentional/foreseeable, not accidental.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the complaint alleges an "occurrence" (an "accident") triggering Erie’s duty to defend	Carly: the gun discharged negligently/recklessly during a struggle, so injury was accidental and covered	Erie/Mundy dissent: the factual allegations show intentional, foreseeable violent conduct; the shooting was not unexpected or fortuitous	Dissent: No occurrence; complaint does not plausibly allege an accident
Whether the policy exclusion for "expected or intended" injury bars coverage	Carly: even if McCutcheon acted intentionally, the specific injury to Carly was unintended and thus may be covered	Erie/Mundy dissent: the context (breaking in, pulling Carly into struggle while armed) shows the injury was expected/foreseeable; exclusion applies	Dissent: Exclusion applies; coverage barred
Standard for determining duty to defend (four-corners / pleadings)	Carly: liberal reading of complaint supports potential coverage	Erie/Mundy dissent: must read the complaint as a whole; labels ("negligent") do not control when facts show intentional violent conduct	Dissent: Four-corners comparison yields no duty to defend

Kvaerner Metals Div. of Kvaerner U.S., Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 908 A.2d 888 (Pa. 2006) (defines "accident"/"occurrence" as unexpected; fortuity requirement)
Donegal Mut. Ins. Co. v. Baumhammers, 938 A.2d 286 (Pa. 2007) (reiterates that "accident" means unexpected/unintended event)
Wilson v. Maryland Casualty Co., 105 A.2d 304 (Pa. 1954) (insurer’s duty to defend is determined solely by the complaint’s allegations)
American & Foreign Ins. Co. v. Jerry’s Sport Center, Inc., 2 A.3d 526 (Pa. 2010) (compare four corners of policy and complaint to assess potential coverage)
Mutual Ben. Ins. Co. v. Haver, 725 A.2d 743 (Pa. 1999) (legal characterizations in pleadings are not dispositive; examine factual allegations)
Gene’s Restaurant, Inc. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 548 A.2d 246 (Pa. 1988) (willful and malicious assault is intentional, not an accident, and not covered)
United Servs. Auto. Ass’n v. Elitzky, 517 A.2d 982 (Pa. Super. 1986) (coverage excluded only if insured intended the resultant damage)
American Nat'l Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Hearn, 93 A.3d 880 (Pa. Super. 2014) (exclusion can bar coverage for intentional acts even when the actual harm is greater or different than intended)