OPINION
In this insurance coverage dispute, Appellant National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania (“National Union”) appeals from the Superior Court’s April 16, 2003 order, which reversed the trial court’s order granting National Union’s motion for summary judgment and remanded the case for additional proceedings to determine whether National Union was responsible for defending and indemnifying Appellee Kvaerner Metals Division of U.S., Inc., and other related companies (collectively, “Kvaerner”) in an action brought by Bethlehem Steel Corporation (“Bethlehem”). Because we find that National Union has no duty under its policies to defend or indemnify Kvaerner in this casе, the order of the Superior Court is reversed.
In June 1997, Bethlehem brought an action against Kvaerner asserting claims of breach of contract and breach of warranty. In its complaint, Bethlehem alleged that it entered into a contract with Kvaerner (the “Contract”) pursuant to which Kvaerner agreed to design and construct a coke oven battery (the “Battery”) for Bethlehem. According to Bethle *322 hem, under the contract Kvaerner (1) agreed to build the Battery according to certain “plans and specifications that were made a part of the [Contract],” (2) warranted that its materials, equipment, and work would be free from defect, and (3) agreed to repair or replace any defective work or materials.
Bethlehem then contended that based on these facts, Kvaerner breached the above Contract terms because the Battery built by Kvaerner was “damaged” and “did not meet the contract specifications and warranties, or the applicable industry standards for construction ...” Bethlehem further alleged that although it sent Kvaerner a “non-performance list” detailing the Battery’s “damages and breaches,” Kvaerner had failed to remedy the Battery’s problems. Moreover, Bethlehem incorporated by reference the “damages and breaches” listed in the non-pеrformance list, which enumerated numerous problems with the Battery, including the following:
(1) “100% of the ovens have cracked paver bricks”; (2) “[s]hifting brickwork has caused maximum deviation of centerlines of flue inspection ports”; (3) “[t]he larry car rails are introducing eccentric loads on the oven walls”; (4) “[d]ue to displacement of oven top brick and appurtenances (e.g. larry car rail chairs) the chairs are not directly above the centerline of the heating walls”; (5) “[t]he non-uniform shifting of brickwork in the oven roof resulted in a tilted configuration of the flue inspection ports”; (6) “[s]heared/open joints are present in the horizontal plane of roof brick and thеre are open joints in the vertical plane of roof brick,” causing the migration of gas; (7) “[s]ections of seven lintel blocks [have subsided] and the outer blocks of two ovens are completely broken or shattered”; (8) the centerlines of the Battery’s ovens are displaced, causing multiple door jams; (9) there are sheared/open joints between the silica and fireclay in the Battery; (10) the oven walls are not plumb and are distorted, causing them to experience compressive stress orders of a magnitude greater than design; (11) the oven walls are spalling; (12) certain braces deviate from the Contract design specifications; (13) *323 the spring adjustmеnts are inadequate; (14) the tie rod housings are bowed; (15) the buckstays do not comply with the erection tolerances; and (16) water is penetrating the coke side bench.
Bethlehem’s Non-Performance List, attached to May 15, 1997 Letter of Final Notification of Contract Non-Performance (“Non-Performance List”), Exh. 3 to Kvaerner’s Motion for Reconsideration, at 1-14 (incorporated by reference in Bethlehem Complaint, Exh. A to Kvaerner Complaint, at 8-9). As a result of these damages to the Battery, Bethlehem asserted that Kvaerner was liable to it for either “the amount that it will cost to replace the Coke Oven Battery, or the difference in value betwеen the defective Coke Oven Battery that it received and the Coke Oven Battery that [Kvaerner] warranted that it would deliver.” Id. at 10.
After being served with Bethlehem’s complaint, Kvaerner notified its insurer, National Union, of the suit, seeking defense and indemnity pursuant to two commercial general liability (“CGL”) policies (collectively, the “Policies”). The first policy was a “claims made” policy for the period of September 30, 1995 to September 30, 1996 (the “1996 Policy”) whereas the second policy was an “occurrence” policy for the period of April 1, 1997 to December 31, 1997 (the “1997 Policy”). 1 National Union subsequently notified Kvaerner that it was disclaiming “coverage, defense, and indemnity for all allegations contained in [the] complaint” based on its conclusion that Bethlehem’s claims did not fall within the *324 coverage provisions of the Policies. August 29, 1997 Letter from AIG Claim Services, Inc. to National Union, Exh. H of Index of Exhibits in Support of National Union’s Motion for Summary Judgment, at 6.
Due to National Union’s refusal to provide coverage, Kvaerner commenced the instant action in the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County against National Union, seeking, inter alia, a declaratory judgment that National Union has a duty to defend and indemnify it pursuant to the Policies. National Union responded by filing an answer and a new matter, raising numerous affirmative defenses. 2 The partiеs engaged in discovery and in September 2000 National Union filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that judgment must be entered in its favor because (1) the Policies only permitted coverage for allegations of “property damage” caused by an “occurrence,” which was defined by the Policies as an accident, and Bethlehem had not alleged that the Battery was damaged by such an occurrence, and (2) even if Bethlehem alleged property damage caused by an occurrence, such damages were excluded under various “business risk/ work product” exclusions in the Policies.
Kvaerner filed a brief in opposition to National Union’s motion for summary judgment as well as a cross-motion for summary judgment, asserting that National Union was responsible for defending and indemnifying it under the Policies because the Battery’s damages were caused by an occurrence, which it deemed to be an unintended and unexpected event. According to Kvaerner, the Battery was damaged because of “longitudinal movement of the roof,” which was caused be *325 cause the bricks in the Battery’s roof were “grouted” too early and because of heavy rains that occurred on October 31, 1994. Kvaerner’s Bf. in Opposition to National Union’s Motion for Summary Judgment, at 6, 24. In support of this claim, Kvaerner submitted a report from two experts in which they collectively opined that the damages to the Battery were caused from displacement and movement of the Battery’s roof, which occurred because Kvaerner grouted the bricks earlier than had been scheduled. See Expert Report of Mr. Chuck Beechan and Dr. Clayton Liu, Exh. 8 to Appendix to Kvaerner’s Responses in Opposition to the Motions for Summary Judgment of Commercial Union and National Union and in Support of its Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. The experts further opined, however, that “the heavy ‘monsoon-type’ rain which occurred on October 31 could have damaged the joints in the roof.” Id. at 3. Kvaerner then explained that because it did not intend or expect the early grouting of the Battery’s bricks or the October 31 rains to cause the movement in the Battery’s roof and thereby damage the Battery, the Battery’s damages were caused by an “accident” for purposes of the Policies. See Kvaerner’s Bf. in Opposition to National Union’s Motion for Summary Judgment, at 23-24.
Kvaerner further asserted that the Policies included “Completed Operations Coverage,” which, according to Kvaerner, meant that National Union would provide coverage for damages to Kvaerner’s completed work product in certain circumstances, such as where the damages were the result of improper work performed by its subcontractor, Thyssen Still Otto Anlagentecnick (“Thyssen”). According to Kvaerner, it was entitled to coverage under the above provisions because the damages to the Battery occurred after it was completed by Kvaerner and were the result of Thyssen’s decision to permit Kvaerner to grout the bricks on the Battery’s roof earlier than scheduled. Finally, Kvaerner claimed that National Union was not entitled to summary judgment based on the exclusions relied upon by National Union because they were inapplicable.
On February 9, 2001, the trial court entered an opinion and order granting National Union’s motion for summary judg
*326
ment and denying Kvaerner’s cross-motion.
3
The trial court initially reviewed the Policiеs and agreed with National Union that it was only required to provide coverage for property damage caused by an occurrence or accident. The trial court then found, relying largely on the Superior Court’s
en banc
decision in
Redevelopment Auth. of Cambria County v. International Ins. Co.,
After finding that Bethlehem was solely seeking damages for Kvaerner’s breach of the Contract, rather than damages caused by an accident, the trial court concluded that Bethlehem’s Complaint did not trigger coverage under the Policies. See Kvaerner Metals Division of Kvaerner U.S., Inc., et al. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., et al., Pa. C. Northampton, No. 1998-C-9531, at 11 (Feb. 9, 2001) (“The design specifications are duties imposed on Insured, not by public policy, but by the Contract; therefore, [Bethlehem’s] allegations lie in breach of contract.”). In spite of this conclusion, the trial court went on to consider Kvaerner’s clаim that it was entitled to coverage under the “Completed Operations Coverage” provisions in the Policies. While the trial court agreed with Kvaerner that these provisions provided coverage for property damage to an *327 insured’s completed work product when such damage was caused by the insured’s subcontractor, it found that these provisions did not “obviate the [Policies’] requirement ... that the property damage [be caused by an accident].” Id. at 14. Thus, as it had already found that Bethlehem was not seeking accidental damages, the trial court concluded that National Union did not have to defend or indemnify Kvaerner pursuant to the “Comрleted Operations Coverage” provisions. 5
Kvaerner appealed to the Superior Court, which entered an opinion and order on April 16, 2003, reversing the trial court’s order and remanding the case back to that court for further proceedings.
See Kvaerner Metals Division of Kvaerner U.S., Inc., et al. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., et al.,
The Superior Court next considered whether National Union was entitled to summary judgment based on the Policies’ “business risk/work product” exclusions, which National Union also relied upon in its summary judgment motion. The Superior Court found that these exclusions may have precluded coverage for the Bеthlehem lawsuit if an endorsement had not been added to the 1997 Policy, changing the effect of the exclusions. The court explained that while the “business risk/work product exclusions” generally barred coverage for damages caused by work performed by the insured or the insured’s subcontractor, endorsement 16, which was added to the 1997 Policy in March 1997, altered the exclusions by permitting coverage for property damage caused by the insured’s subcontractor. Given this endorsement, the Superior Court found that it could not conclude as a matter of law that the “business risk/work product” exclusions precluded coverage in the instant case until findings of fact were madе regarding the amount of work performed by Kvaerner’s subcontractors and whether any of that work caused the Battery’s damages. Thus, the Superior Court remanded the case to the trial court to make the necessary findings of fact to determine whether any of the Battery’s damages were covered because they were caused by the work of Kvaerner’s subcontractors.
National Union subsequently filed a petition for allowance of appeal with this Court and we granted allocatur to consider whether the Superior Court erred by, inter alia, (1) looking beyond Bethlehem’s Complaint to find that National Union may have a duty to defend Kvaerner, (2) finding that the Battery may have been damaged by an “occurrence,” and (3) finding that the “business risk/work product” exclusions did *329 not exclude coverage for Bethlehem’s claims. 6 We now conclude that the Superior Court did in fact err in looking beyond the allegations raised in Bethlehem’s complaint to determine whether National Union had a duty to defend Kvaerner and in finding that the Battery’s damages may have been the result of an “occurrence.”
In analyzing the order of the trial court that granted summary judgment to National Union, our scope of review is plenary.
Mountain Village v. Board of Supervisors,
It is well established that an insurer’s duties under an insurance policy are triggered by the language of the
*330
complaint against the insured.
7
In
Mutual Benefit Insurance Co. v. Haver,
A carrier’s duty to defend and indemnify an insured in a suit brought by a third party depends upon a determination of whether the third party’s complaint triggers coverage.
Id., citing General Accident Insurance Co. v. Allen,
[T]he rule everywhere is that the obligation of a casualty insurance company to defend an action brought against the insured is to be determined solely by the allegations of the complaint in the action ...
Id. (Emphasis supplied).
In this case, the Superior Court looked to information not contained in the underlying complaint in its determination that coverage might exist under the National Union policies. It claimed that it could do so because the Policies do not require that a Complaint be filed in order to trigger coverage. The Superior Court premised its coverage determination on reports submitted by two experts on behаlf of Kvaerner stating that torrential rains may have caused the damages complained of by Bethlehem. The court held that these reports create uncertainty as to the cause of the damage and perhaps set forth an “occurrence” as required by the policies to trigger coverage, thus making summary judgment improper.
*331
The Superior Court erred in looking beyond the allegations raised in Bethlehem’s Complaint to determine whether National Union had a duty to defend Kvaerner and in finding that the Battery’s damages may have been the result of an “occurrence.” In doing so, it departed from the well-established precedent of this Court requiring that an insurеr’s duty to defend and indemnify be determined solely from the language of the complaint against the insured.
Haver,
Thus, we hold that the Superior Court’s approach in looking beyond the Bethlehem complaint was in error. Instead, we will look to the language of the policies themselves to determine in which instances they will provide coverage, and then examine Bethlehem’s complaint to determine whether the allegations set forth therein constitute the type of instances that will trigger coverage.
The interpretation of an insurance policy is a question of law that we will review
de novo. See 401 Fourth Street v. Investors Insurance Co.,
The pertinent portions of the National Union CGL policies under which Kvaerner claims coverage state;
*332 COVERAGE A. BODILY INJURY AND PROPERTY DAMAGE LIABILITY
1. Insuring Agreement
a. We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of “bodily injury” or “property damage” to which this insurance applies. We will have the right and duty to defend any “suit” seeking those damages....
b. This insurance applies to “bodily injury” or “property damage” only if:
(1) The “bodily injury” or “property damage” is caused by an “occurrence” that takes place in the “coverage territory;”
1996 Policy, National Union’s Bf., at E2; 1997 Policy, id. at F2 (emphasis added). The Policies defined “property damage” аs “[pjhysical injury to tangible property, including all resulting loss of use of that property.” 1996 Policy, id. at E9-E10; 1997 Policy, id. at F9. An “occurrence” was defined as “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same or general harmful conditions.” 1996 Policy, id. at E9; 1997 Policy, id. at F8. The Policies also defined' a “suit” as “a civil proceeding in which damages because of ‘bodily injury’, ‘property damage,’ ‘personal injury,’ or ‘advertising injury 5 to which this insurance applies are alleged.” 1996 Policy, id. at E10; 1997 Policy, id. at F9 (emphasis added).
Thus, National Union contracted to defend Kvaerner only when a “suit” or “proceeding” was brought against Kvaerner seeking or alleging damages for inter alia, property damage which is a result of an “occurrence.” An “occurrence,” in turn, is an accidеnt. It is necessary, then, to examine whether the damage that is the impetus of this suit was caused by an accident, so as to constitute an occurrence under the policy. We must, then, examine what constitutes an accident under the policy.
The National Union CGL policies do not provide a definition for “accident.” Words of common usage in an
*333
insurance policy are construed according to their natural, plain, and ordinary sense.
Madison Construction Co. v. Harleysmile Mutual Insurance Co.,
Other courts have reached similar conclusions in the construction of the word ‘accident’ for purposes of insurance coverage. In
Snyder Heating v. Pennsylvania Manufacturers’ Association Insurance Co.,
In
McAllister v. Peerless Ins. Co.,
The recent decision of the Supreme Court of South Carolina,
L-J, Inc. v. Bituminous Fire and Marine Ins. Co.,
On appeal, the Supreme Court of South Carolina reversed. It held that the deterioration of the road could not constitute an “occurrence” under the terms of the policy. The Court explained that all of the allegations raised in the complaint against L-J Inc., including the negligence claims, were based on faulty workmanship.
L-J, Inc.,
The Court stated that a CGL policy may provide coverage where faulty workmanship caused bodily injury or damage to another property, but not in cases where faulty workmanship damages the work product alone.
Id.
at 36 n. 4. To permit coverage in such instances would convert CGL policies into performance bonds, which guarantee the work, rather than like an insurance policy, which is intended to insure against accidents.
Id.
at 36-37. See also
Hotel Roanoke Conference Center Commission v. Cincinnati Insurance Co.,
303
*335
F.Supp.2d. 784, 788 (W.D.Va.2004), (“[T]he word ‘accident’ as used in the dеfinition of occurrence involves a degree of fortuity not present when the insured’s defective performance of a contract causes injury to the insured’s own work or product.”);
Norwalk Ready Mixed Concrete v. Travelers Insurance Companies,
We hold that the definition of “accident” required to establish an “occurrence” under the policies cannot be satisfied by claims based upon faulty workmanship. 10 Such claims simply do not present the degree of fortuity contemplated by *336 the ordinary definition of “accident” or its common judicial construction in this context. To hold otherwise would be to convert a policy for insurance into a performance bond. We are unwilling to do so, especially since such protections are already readily available for the protection of contractors. 11
The underlying suit in this case avers only property damage from poor workmanship to the work product itself. In its complaint, Bethlehem alleged that the construction of the coke battery “did not meet the contract specifications and warranties, or the applicable industry standards for construction, and accordingly was in breach of the Contract and its warranties.” Bethlehem Complaint at 8. Bethlehem incorporated by reference into its complaint a non-performance list, specifying the damages and breaches that it alleged. See Pages 322-23,
Notes
. "An ‘occurrence’ policy protects the policyholder from liability for any act done while the policy is in effect, whereas a ‘claims made’ policy protects the holder only against claims made during the life of the policy."
See Consulting Engineers Inc., v. Ins. Co. of North America,
. National Union claimed that it did not have a duty to defend or indemnify Kvaerner under the Policies for numerous reasons, including the following: (1) Bethlehem’s claims against Kvaerner did not involve "property damage” arising from an "occurrеnce” as, required by the Policies; (2) the Battery's damages did not take place during the effective time periods of the Policies; (3) the Battery’s damages were a loss in progress or known loss when the Policies were issued; (4) the Battery’s damages were excluded under different "business risk/work product” exclusions in the Policies; and (5) the Battery’s damages were based on the rendering of or failure to render professional services and the Policies excluded coverage for such harm. See Answer of National Union with New Matter and New Matter Under Pa.R.C.P. 2252.
. Shortly after the trial court entered its decision, the Bethlehem lawsuit was settled and consequently, discontinued with prejudice.
. The Superior Court in
Redevelopment Auth.
сoncluded that a CGL insurer was not responsible for defending the Redevelopment Authority of Cambria County for a breach of contract action filed against it by Barr Township because the CGL policy did not cover such actions.
Erie correctly asserts that it has no duty to defend or indemnify the Authority since the underlying suit arises out of a breach of contract which is not an accident or occurrence contemplated or covered by the provisions of the general liability insurance policy.
Id. at 589.
. As the trial court concluded that National Union was entitled to summary judgment because Bethlehem had not alleged that the Battery’s damages were the result of аn accident, it did not consider whether coverage was precluded based on the Policies’ exclusions also relied on by National Union in its summary judgment motion.
. In our order granting allocatur, we also directed the parties to "address the appropriate test or inquiry in ascertaining whether an underlying claim sounds in contract or tort for purposes of insurance coverage.”
Kvaerner Metals Div. of Kvaerner U.S., Inc., et al. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., et al.,
. Kvaerner claims that National Union owed it a duty to defend as well as a duty to indemnify. As this Court has explained, a duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify.
General Accident Insurance Co. v. Allen,
. The school’s comрlaint specified the following alleged causes for its damages; (1) Failure to seal and close the boilers; (2) failure to properly test and inspect the boilers; (3) failure to timely inspect the boilers and report noted deficiencies; (4) failure to install new hardware as needed in the boilers; (5) failure to start the boilers in accordance with specifications; (6) failure to properly clean the boilers; (7) failure to properly secure the boiler doors; (8) failure to otherwise perform its obligations.
Snyder,
. While the majority of Courts have held that coverage under a CGL policy is not triggered by poor workmanship which causes injury to the work product itself, a minority of jurisdictions have held that faulty or negligent workmanship constitutes an accident so long as the insured did not intend for the damage to occur.
American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. American Girl, Inc., 268
Wis.2d 16,
. The application and limitations of CGL policies were aptly explained in a seminal law rеview article by Roger C. Henderson;
The risk intended to be insured is the possibility that the goods, products or work of the insured, once relinquished and completed, will cause bodily injury or damage to property other than to the completed work itself and for which the insured by be found liable. The insured, as a source of goods or services, may be liable as a matter of contract law to make good on products or work which is defective or otherwise unsuitable because it is lacking in some capacity. This may even extend to an obligation to completely replace or rebuild the deficient work or product. This liability, however, is not what the coverаges in question are designed to protect against. The coverage is for tort liability for physical damages to others and not for contractual liability of the insured for economic loss because the *336 product or completed work is not that for which the damaged person bargained.
Insurance Protection for Products Liability and Completed Operations; What Every Lawyer Should Know, 50 Neb. L.Rev. 415, 441 (1971).
. In this case Kvaerner was covered by a Builder’s Risk Policy, providing coverage for property constructed by Kvaerner under the Contract, and a Professional Liability Policy, covering alleged negligent acts, errors, or omissions by Kvaerner or its subcontractors. Kvaerner has recovered monies under both policies.