Erica Y. Bryant v. United States, 768 F.3d 1378

Background

Multiple plaintiffs sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act alleging health harms from drinking water contamination at Camp Lejeune.
The Government moved to dismiss, arguing North Carolina’s 10-year statute of repose, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(16) (2010), barred the claims.
The district court held CERCLA (42 U.S.C. § 9658) preempted the state statute of repose and concluded the state statute contained no latent-disease exception; it certified questions for interlocutory appeal.
While the appeal was pending, North Carolina enacted Session Laws 2014-17 and 2014-44 adding an exception to § 1-52(16) for groundwater contamination claims and making the amendment retroactive to actions filed, arising, or pending on or after June 20, 2014.
The Fourth Circuit panel awaited the Supreme Court’s decision in CTS Corp. v. Waldburger and then held CERCLA does not preempt state statutes of repose; it then addressed whether the state statute originally included a latent-disease exception and whether the 2014 amendments apply retroactively.
The court concluded the original statute was unambiguous and contained no latent-disease exception; the 2014 session laws substantively created a new exception for groundwater contamination and therefore cannot revive claims barred by the repose period.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether CERCLA preempts N.C. statute of repose (§ 1-52(16))	CERCLA’s federally required commencement date displaces state repose timing in environmental cases	State repose governs; CERCLA does not displace repose	CERCLA does not preempt state statutes of repose (CTS Corp. v. Waldburger controls)
Whether N.C. § 1-52(16) included an exception for latent diseases	The statute was ambiguous as to "personal injury" and should be read to permit latent-disease claims	Statute’s plain text contains no latent-disease exception; courts must apply unambiguous text	The original statute was unambiguous and contained no latent-disease exception
Whether Session Laws 2014-17/2014-44 clarified or substantively amended § 1-52(16)	The 2014 enactments merely clarified legislative intent and thus apply retroactively to pending claims	The enactments created a new substantive exception and cannot revive expired claims	The amendments substantively created a new groundwater exception and are prospective only; they cannot revive claims barred by repose
Whether the amended statute applies to these plaintiffs (i.e., revives claims)	Because plaintiffs’ suits were pending (no final disposition by the U.S. Supreme Court), the retroactive law should apply	Retroactive application would divest the Government of vested rights; statute of repose limits are substantive and cannot be retroactively enlarged	The 2014 law cannot revive claims barred by the original repose because it substantively altered the statute; plaintiffs’ claims remain subject to the original repose

Key Cases Cited

CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175 (2014) (Supreme Court held CERCLA does not preempt state statutes of repose)
McCrater v. Stone & Webster Eng’g Corp., 248 N.C. 707 (1958) (statute extending filing period cannot revive expired substantive right; repose-like limits are part of substantive right)
Boudreau v. Baughman, 322 N.C. 331 (1988) (distinguishes statutes of limitation from statutes of repose; repose acts as condition precedent)
Ferrell v. Dep’t of Transp., 334 N.C. 650 (1993) (test for whether an amendment clarifies versus alters prior statute)
Ray v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 366 N.C. 1 (2012) (clarifying amendments apply retroactively; altering amendments do not)
Waldrop v. Hodges, 230 N.C. 370 (1949) (legislature may not revive rights once barred by statute of limitations)