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Boudreau v. Baughman
368 S.E.2d 849
N.C.
1988
Check Treatment

*1 IN THE SUPREME COURT HERBERT DEAN BOUDREAU MILO BAUGHMAN MILO BAUGHMAN and DESIGN, INC.

No. 409PA87 (Filed 1988) 2 June § governed by proce- 1. 21— rights Courts conflict of laws —substantial lex loci — rights governed by dural lex fori affecting rights parties by Matters of the substantial the are determined loci, claim, the procedural lex law of the situs of the by rights and remedial or fori, thus, forum; determined lex the North law under Carolina law injury giving liability the when rise to strict in claim occurs state, governs another the law of state resolution the substantive controversy. issues the 21.6; § products 2. liability § Courts Uniform Commercial Code 3— action —trans- bearing “appropriate “appropriate actions to relation” North rela- Carolina — injury occurring tion” applicable in Florida —Florida law defined — warranty products liability Plaintiffs breach of claims in this action are by governed provides the applied U.C.C. that North Carolina lаw will be State,” bearing appropriate to “ap- “transactions relation and propriate interpreted significant relationship”; relation” “most mean therefore, sale, distribution, place delivery, Florida—the and use of the question, place injury well chair as the the state with most the —was significant relationship warranty claims and thus state law whose 25-1-105(1)(1986). applied. N.C.G.S. § § 3. repose Limitation Actions 1— statutes limitation and statutes of —dis- tinction of limitation Statutes serve limit the time within which an action accrued, repose be commenced after the of action cause while statutes of beyond plaintiffs fixed recognized, set a time limit which a claim will not be repose and distinction between statutes of and cor- limitation statutes responds procedural to the distinction bеtween and substantive laws. 21.5; § § repose 4. Limitation of Courts Actions 4.1— statute of as substantive provision applicable law to tort claim —claim not time barred —Florida repose provisions Statutes of will be treated as substantive choice purposes, applicable statute of thus will be determined loci, claim; therefore, 12-year lex law of situs of the Florida statute sale, plaintiffs delivery repose applied claims where Florida, injury product place use of and the itself took filing years plaintiffs just purchase claims over six after the initial timely. design Negligence edge foreseeability- 29.3— on chrome chair — — intervening negligence summary judgment improper of manufacturer — injuries In to recover for sustained when he cut his foot action defendants, chrome-plаted tub-style designed chair record *2 Baughman breached genuine fact to whether defendants presented issues of material veneer, duty by specifying which is the use of chrome of reasonable care guard edge, failing type edge sharp to include some a but known have reasonably dangerously sharp edges design were a the chair and whether lacking edge guard consequence design that defendant’s of a an so foreseeable by negligence. design negligence not insulated the manufacturer’s in the was injury liability jury questions design 22— to user —strict 6. Sales 8 chair — — by injuries plaintiff when he cut his In an to recover sustained action for tub-style by chrome-plated designed chair defend- on of a swivel foot ants, the base jury questions on the of evidence was sufficient to raise forecast liability plaintiff required defendants’ where was to establish elements of strict chair, condition, relationship a causal con- its defective the existence of injuries, plaintiffs and and that nection between the chair’s condition injury product at the defect existed both at time of the and time the left seller; the hands of the manufacturer or the individual defendant admitted edge designing sharp that was the chair but on the chair a contended defect; design lapse purchase manufacturing rather than of time between the safety and the manufacturer’s were of the chair and the accident record of simply determining product to be considered whether the circumstances distributor; was when it left control of the manufacturer or and defective type alleged, was to infеr razor- it reasonable of defect a uniform edge, sharpness around the entire circumference of the tub would not have use of the chair. arisen from injury allegedly privity designer on defective 7. Sales 17.2— chair —no between —summary judgment implied warranty proper user on breach of claim by injured allegedly Under has de- Florida where been defendants, relationship fective but no contractual he liability pursue appropriate, privity action if strict cause of but absent him; therefore, warranty summary implied judg- vehicle of is not available to granted properly plaintiffs was ment implied for defendants on breach of claims for warranty merchantability warranty implied and breach of of fitness particular purpose. for dissenting. Justice Webb plaintiffs petition discretionary

ON for review a decision (1987), S.E. Appeals, of the Court summary affirming judgment favor of defendants entered DeRamus, J., Court, at the September 1986 session of Superior County. Heard Supreme February in the Court FORSYTH Faison, Brown, Faison, Fletcher & O. Brough, by William Barber, Poole, C. Timothy R. Gary plaintiff-appellant. Hutchins, Moore, & Tyndall, Doughton Tyndall Richard Jr., Davis, H. Lee defendant-appellees. MARTIN, Justice.

The sole issue for review on this appeal is the trial whether court properly granted summary defendants’ motion for judg- matter, however, As a preliminary ment. this case a choice poses lawof dilemma. We must determine which statute repose ap- Carolina, plies products liability action: that of North state, Florida, forum or that of the state where oc- curred. We hold that the Florida statute of rеpose applies and summary judgment inappropriately entered and strict claims.

Plaintiff brought on 5 action March naming as de- fendant in both an individual corporate and a capacity the North of designer Carolina a chrome-plated, tub-style chair designated model complaint number 1183. The alleged resi- plaintiff, Massachusetts, dent of injured had his foot on the metal surface of chair in while friends in visiting Florida. Plaintiff compensatory punitive claimed damages theories of based on negligent breach of design, implied warranty merchantability, implied warranty breach of particular of fitness for a purpose, liability and strict for injecting inherently dangerous product the stream commerce. into

Defendants’ answer denied the allegations material of the of, aliа, complaint and asserted contributory negli- defenses inter manufacturer, independent gence, negligence of the chair’s accord satisfaction, jurisdiction. and lack of 24On June personal defendants for summary judgment. July moved On 14 were permitted defendants to amend their answer include a on further defense based North of repose. Carolina statutes summary Thereafter the trial in judge granted judgment defend- favor. The Court Appeals ants’ affirmed.

Plaintiff contends applicable statute of 95.031(2), Statutes which provides Florida as follows: § 95.11(3) for products Actions and fraud under s. must begun period prescribed within the in this chapter, from period running the time the facts rise to the giving were cause action discovered or should have been discov- with the due diligence, running ered exercise of instеad 95.11(3), any any prescribed from date elsewhere s. but in com- delivery the date years event within after years or within 12 its original purchaser product

pleted fraud, regard- alleged commission the date after was or fraud in the or the product the defect less of date been discovered.1 should have added.)

(Emphasis hand, Defendants, 1- maintain that N.C.G.S. on the other 1-50(6) 50(6) provides: controls. Section recovery injury, damages personal for No for the action any arising or out upon based damage property death or any to a shall be defect relation alleged failure initial purchase the date six years more than brought after or consumption. use added.) (Emphasis design that defendants sold The record indicates Inc., a North fur- Thayer-Coggin, number 1183 to Carolina

model manufacturer, manufactured the Thayer-Coggin niture in 1967. Florida, store in turn sold chair and sold it to a furniture January on Plaintiffs in- it Floridian hosts and the was filed jury complaint occurred on March 1982 dates, *4 action plaintiff brought March 1985. these the Applying by twelve-year the Florida statute period prescribed within the six-year by 1- period prescribed but not within the 50(6). N.C.G.S. § is time- plaintiffs therefore contend that action Defendants law.2 barred under North Carolina see Battilla v. Allis constitutionality, response In to confusion about its 1980) (Fla. Mfg. (holding Chalmers unconstitu- 392 So. 2d statute 874 dismissed, (Fla. Cincinnati, Inc., tional); 1985), appeal Pullum v. So. 2d 657 475 476 (1986) 1114, reconstitutionalizing Battilla (overruling 2d U.S. 90 L.Ed. 174 95.031(2) recently to repose), amended delete the statute of Florida Statutes § liability twelve-year period prescribed actions. See 1986 Fla. Sess. Law (West). plaintiff dispute claim well within As there is no filed his Serv. 86-271 twelve-year implications period, we the need not concern ourselves with upon right to change the statute an affirmative defense. defendants’ assert by time-barred 2. Defendants also contend that action would be N.C.G.S. 1-52(16), injury provides personal property of action for or causes § bodily physical damage or to damage not until harm the claimant “shall accrue reasonably apparent apparent ought to have become property his becomes claimant, no accrue Provided that action shall whichever event first occurs. cause 335 v. Our analysis by choice of law complicated somewhat fact that four recovery raises distinct theories in four separate counts We complaint. plaintiffs first аddress liability. claims of strict [1] Our traditional conflict of laws rule is that matters affecting loci, rights the substantial the parties are determined lex claim, the law of the situs of the procedural remedial or fori, rights determined lex the law of the forum. Charnock (1943). 360, Taylor, v. 223 N.C. 26 S.E. 2d 911 For actions sounding tort, the state where the occurred is considered the Thus, law, situs of the claim. under North Carolina when the in jury giving rise to a negligence or strict claim occurs in state, another ‍​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌‌‍the law of that state governs resolution of the sub controversy. stantive issues in the Leonard v. Johns-Manville 91, (1983); Jurden, Sales 309 305 S.E. 528 N.C. 2d v. Bernick 435, (1982); Howard, 306 574, 293 S.E. 2d 405 N.C. Howard v. 200 N.C. (1931); 158 S.E. 101 Williams General Motors 19 Corp., N.C. 337, 766, denied, 258, 198 S.E. 2d 284 cert. 200 N.C. S.E. 2d (1973). 659 consistently This Court adhered lex loci rule in Smith, States, tort actions. Choice Law 38 United (1987); Wurfel, L.J. 1041 Hastings Law Choice Rules in North Carolina, (1970); see, 48 Rev. 243 N.C.L. 291 e.g., Henry Henry, 156, (1976); R.R., 458, 229 N.C. S.E. 2d 158 146 Young N.C. (1966); Lines, 230, S.E. 2d Petrea Tank 141 S.E. N.C. (1965); Wеst, Frisbee v. 132 S.E. 2d N.C. years giving than 10 more from the last act or omission defendant rise cause of action.” ten-year period prescribed by We need not consider the effect section 1-52(16). l-15(b) replaced (repealed by This section N.C.G.S. 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws § 1979) primary appears purpose ch. effective October and its to have Littlejohn, adoption “discovery” rule. Black v. been (1985); Note, Repose Statutory Bar Six Year S.E. 2d 469 for Manufacturers: Liability Upheld— Manufacturing Long Products Actions Tetterton v. is, apply *5 Rev. n.7 That with la- N.C.L. it intended to to Co., 488, Mfg. Corp. Cape v. injuries. Pembee Fear Constr. 313 tent N.C. 329 S.E. Co., (1985); (1976); 180, Raftery Construction see 350 291 N.C. 230 S.E. 2d 405 (4th 1984). Barwick v. also Celotex undisputed 736 F. 2d 946 Cir. It is inap- was aware of his as as it Thus is soon occurred. the statute analysis only plicable on the of this case. Our will facts deal with statute 1-50(6). in contained section 336 (1963). 609, Lee, We nоte that 288 S.E. 2d 258 N.C. 129

Shaw Smith, States. rule in to United majority this continues 1041, States, at app. Hastings in the United 38 L.J. Law Choice of Courts, in the 1172-74; Law into Practice: Choice Theory Kay, (1983). 521, no rea- at We see 582 591-92 app. L. Rev. & 34 Mercer objec- It rule this time. an this well-settled at son to abandon certainty, to afford approach convenient continues tive and uniformity, in choice law deci- of outcome predictability law Florida applies substantive We hold that sions. liability claims. and strict plaintiffs plied, 355, [2] We next consider 117 is contractual S.E. 2d 21 breach warranty in the choice nature. Traditionally, claims. Wyatt law A warranty, Equipment under the with express lex loci Co., 253 respect or im rule, N.C. by controlled warranty claims were features substantive or, was made in certain of the state where the contract law instances, performance. Bernick v. law of state 435, However, Jurden, S.E. 2d 405. actions for 306 N.C. warranty now governed Uniform implied breach Code, in chapter in North adopted Carolina Commercial applies 25 of the Statutes. The Uniform Commercial Code General warranty actions. Morrison v. claims See 298, Sears, & Ber Roebuck 354 S.E. 2d 495 N.C. Jurden, 405; wick S.E. 2d v. Cessna Air 306 N.C. Smith (M.D.N.C. 1983); Freedman, F. Products Supp. craft Code, Liability under the Commercial Prac. Law Uniform (No. generally The Uniform Commercial Code accord subject North on the of warranties. prior N.C.G.S., Carolina law See Comment, North introduction to art. ch. 25 Carolina (1986). However, rule, its own provides Code choice modifying place-of-contract-or-performance the traditional rule Jurden, Bernick v. previously applied this state. that, 2d 405. The states in the provision S.E. Code absence parties,

an between the North law will be agreement ap Carolina to “transactions plied bearing appropriate relation 25-1-105(1)(1986). The State.” is silent on N.C.G.S. Code § relation,” of the term its meaning “appropriate leaving interpreta judicial tion to decision. See 25-1-105 N.C.G.S. Official Comment. *6 IN THE SUPREME COURT Baughman

Boudreau con- yet the term. We have therefore to define This Court guidance. jurisdictions sulted decisions other jurisdictions some have inter- Our research reveals ap- relation” the provision requiring the preted “appropriate itself has significant of forum law whenever forum plication Law: case. See The U.C.C. and Choice Siegel, contact with the Law?, 496 n.2 Am. U.L. Rev. Choice or Forum Forum (1972); Note, Relation” Laws and the “Appropriate Conflicts of Code, 40 Gеo. 1-105 Commercial Test Section Uniform (1971-72). L. 803 n.29 Rev. Wash. very reading of

This with a literal-minded approach comports Code, is outmoded. The but such an at best interpretation in- originally of law provision of the Code’s choice language juris- of forum law those encourage application tended Code, thereby assuring which had enacted dictions ju- at issue when a non-Code would the transaction govern Code Ramerman, & The involved. See Nordstrom risdiction was also Law, the Choice 1969 Duke L.J. Commercial Code and Uniform 623; Weintraub, Liability: Impact Choice Law Products Commercial Code and Recent Developments Uniform L. Rev. 1429 The drafters of the Tex. Analysis, Conflicts enactment of the Code widespread did not foresee the provision enacted the country. having With all but one statе throughout Code, strictly longer forum-oriented choice of law rule no in accordance with necessary application to ensure Code Moreover, Id. such an approach of the drafters. the intentions v. Ve- United Overseas Bank likely shopping. to foster forum (D. Inc., neers, reasons we 375 F. 596 Md. For these Supp. approach. forum-oriented reject relation test as jurisdictions appropriate interpret

Other use its standard choice of for the forum state to an invitation Bros., F. Discount Bank Ltd. v. Barclays Bogharian rules. See (C.D. F. grounds, rev’d on other Cal. Supp. (9th 1984); Feedlot v. Great Western Sugar Golden Plains Cir. (W.D.S.D. 1984); Laboratories, Inc. v. Travenol 588 F. Supp. Ltd., Zotal, Siegel, 394 Mass. 474 N.E. 2d Law?, 21 Am. and Choice Law: Forum Choice Forum U.C.C. (1972);Note, 496 n.3 Laws and the “Ap Rev. U.L. Conflicts of 1-105 Commer- Relation” Test Sectiоn propriate Uniform *7 (1971-72). 797, We Code, 802-03 n.28 L. Rev. 40 Wash. dal Geo. to N.C.G.S. Comment The North Carolina this view. reject was intend- the section enactment of indicates that the 25-1-105 § respect law rules choice of rigid this state’s change ed to v. Bernick Code. Uniform Commercial under transactions 435, Jurden, 293 S.E. 2d 306 N.C. relation appropriate that the Finally, many hold jurisdictions analysis” or “interest same as modern essentially test contacts,” forum to determine which requires “grouping See, to the case. relationship significant has the most which state Co., F. Supp. 433 Liability Mut. Ins. v. American Simmons e.g., (5th (S.D. 1977); 1976), Landmark aff’d, 560 F. 2d 1021 Cir. Ala. 747 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev’d on 529 F. 971 Supp. v. Sprague, Land Co. (2d 1983); General Electric F. 2d 1065 Cir. 701 grounds, other (D. Co., F. 958 Or. 302 Supp. v. R.A. Heintz Const. Credit Corp. (M.D. Inc., 1969); Machine, 291 Pa. 307 F. Supp. v. Tucker Capitol America, 1969); Elec., F. Supp. 655 Utility Supply P & E Inc. (M.D. 1986); 52 Equipment Martin v. Julius Dierck 89 Tenn. 463, aff'd, 43 N.Y. 479 Div. 2d (App. A.D. 384 N.Y.S. 2d 2d (1978); N.Y.S. 185 Collins Radiо Co. 374 N.E. 2d 2d 2d (Okla. 1980); Bell, Land 623 P. 2d 1039 Dallas v. Baffin Inn, P. 70 Wash. 2d Motor Monticello Corp. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 133 N.W. 2d Wilcox v. 25-1-105 Official consistent with N.C.G.S. approach This most comparison “signifi which seems to contemplate Comment case, connected to the and the jurisdictions among cant contacts” ‍​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌‌‍Comment, away a shift from contemplates North Carolina analysis. We therefore inter rules toward a more flexible rigid relation significant relation” to mean “most “appropriate pret ship.” bar, we find analysis to the case at Applying sale, distribution, delivery, and use of the place

Florida —the injury be the state with the place as well as the product, —to warranty claim. relationship to the significant most place the law of the suggested have Commentators cases. products be supreme distribution should And, Incidentally, Kozyris, Facing Its Analysis Interest Critics — Law Products Liabili- Be Done About Choice What Should (1985). This is true with particularly St. ty?, Ohio L.J. THE COURT IN SUPREME warranty Owens-Corning See claims. to breach of respect 1982) (if (D. Kan. 546 F. Supp. Dev. v. Sonic Fiberglas existed, delivery and in state of it was breached warranty any use). protection warranties involves enforcing A interest state’s into goods movement of defective commercial its citizens from (D.R.I. 321 F. Supp. G.D. & Oresman v. Searle that state. 1971). has a contract is consummated in which a sales The state and economic policies the social applying interest significant Quadrini Air warranty. Sikorsky law of in its own embodied (D. Division, Etc., 425 F. Conn. Supp. craft sale state where the holding Cases and/or relationship significant had the most place took *8 Valley v. Tennessee following: Wayne liability action include the (5th 1984), denied, 469 U.S. cert. F. 392 Cir. 730 2d Authority, (state (1985) sale, 1159, delivery injury, and 922 of 83 L.Ed. 2d manufacture); v. General Bilancia of interested than state more 1976) (law (4th in state where F. 621 538 2d Cir. Motors Corp., relation as to control an appropriate has such jury occurred 351 F. Supp. Corporation, USM Company Gates Rubber ling); (7th (S.D. 1972), 603 508 F. 2d Cir. on other grounds, 329 Ill. rev’d 1975) (state more inter use of delivery, product and injury, manufacture); v. National Semi-Con Jackson state of ested than 1986) (state (S.D. Checker, Miss. 660 F. 65 Supp. ducter Data contacts); Armstrong Cork significant sale had most injury and 1977) (state (E.D. 413 Pa. Supp. 433 F. Mfg. Co. v. Drott ap and is most centered where contacts most delivery sale Dierck v. Julius warranty); Martin as to breach of propriate 463, Div. 2d (App. 384 N.Y.S. 2d 479 A.D. 2d 52 Equipment 1976) (state more interested than use of injury manufacture). state of [3] apply Having determined claims, that we now consider substantive law whether of Florida the statutes will in nature. or procedural are substantive at issue repose is deter is substance and what is procedure of what 56 N.C. Riley, forum state. Williams law of the mined 427, Laws 2d 16 Am. Jur. 289 S.E. 2d Conflict (1979). 3§ ordinary distinguish is used to repose” “statute term a time to run at begin from those of limitation statutes IN THE SUPREME COURT accrual of cause of action. Bolick unrelated to the traditional (1982). S.E. American Barmag Corp., N.C. We discussed distinction in Trustees Rowan Tech. v. Ham- Assoc.: mond generally running

Statutes of limitation are seen as from the discovery injury, time of or in cases where that They is difficult to detect. serve to limit the time within may which an action be commenced of action after the cause hand, has accrued. Statutes of on the other create repose, time which are in- limitations not measured from the date of jury. These time limitations often run from defendant’s last act rise to the claim or giving completion from substantial some service rendered defendant. n.3, 328 S.E. 2d 276-77 n.3 N.C. 1-50(6) Statutes such as N.C.G.S. and Florida Statutes § 95.031(2) have been denominated statutes because manufacture,

they set a fixed limit after the time of the product’s sale, delivery beyond which a plaintiffs claim will recog not be nized. Bolick v. American Barmag 293 S.E. 2d 415; Lamb v. Volkswagenwerk 631 F. Aktiengesellschaft, Supp. (S.D. (11th aff'd, Fla. 835 F. Cir. “[T]he repose serves as an unyielding absolute barrier prevents s of action even right before his cause of action ac 626, 633, Littlejohn, crue.” Black v. (1985). 312 N.C. 325 S.E. 2d

The distinction between statutes of limitation and statutes of repose corresponds to the distinction between procedural (4th substantive laws. 1987). v. Gоad Celotex 831 F. Corp., 2d 508 Cir.

Ordinary clearly statutes of limitation are procedural, affect- only remedy ing directly and not right to recover. See 166, (1947); v. Williams 227 41 S.E. Thompson, N.C. 2d 359 Sayer (1945). Henderson, 642, v. 225 35 S.E. N.C. 2d 875 The statute hand, repose, on the other acts as a condition precedent to the ac- 364, tion Bolick v. itself. American 306 Barmag 293 N.C. S.E. 2d 415. Unlike a limitation provision merely makes a unenforceable, claim precedent condition establishes a time in which period suit must be brought order for the cause of ac- 341 v. tion to If action not within the recognized. brought no “literally specified cause action. period, injuria wrong harm been damnum absque that has done is —& North Rosenberg which the affords no v. Town law redress.” (1972). 190, 199, 662, Bergen, A. reason 61 N.J. 293 2d For this 667 we have as a previously repose characterized stаtute substantive definition of rather than a limita- rights procedural tion on Lamb remedy Wedgewood to enforce rights. used (1983); 419, South Bolick Ameri- Corp., 308 N.C. 302 S.E. 2d 868 can Barmag Corp., 2d 293 S.E.

This holds true in characterization the context of choice of law. When commencement of an action within a specified period is relief, precedent condition “the limitation is consid- period ered be so tied with the up right that for choice of underlying law purposes, limitation clause is treated as a ‘substantive’ (E.D.N.Y. Rice, rule of law.” Chartener v. Supp. F. 1967). authority overwhelming weight other jurisdictions accepts the characterization of repose statutes of as substantive See, in a provisions choice of Goad e.g., law context. v. Celotex (4th 1987); 2d Corp., 831 F. v. Tennessee Wayne Valley Cir. (5th denied, F. Authority, 730 2d 392 cert. Cir. 469 U.S. 2d 922 President and George L.Ed. Directors of (4th Madden, 1981); Davis, town v. 660 F. 2d Cir. Pottratz (D. 1984); 588 F. Nieman v. Press Supp. Md. & Equipment (S.D. Co., 1984); Sales 588 F. Clinton Supp. 650 Ohio Harris v. (Iowa Corn Processing N.W. But see Regents, Etc. Acc. Idem. Cal. Hartford P. 2d 147 Cal. Rptr. 486 provisions [4] We hold that choice of statutes of repose purposes. are treated as This rule mandates the ap substantive plication of Florida’s statute plaintiffs claims.3 Upon so doing, we hold these claims are not time-barred. conclusion,

In reaching the opposite the Court Appeals relied on “public policy” exception. It is true we have held that *10 plaintiffs 3. Because we rule in favor applicability as to the of the Florida repose, we plaintiffs statute of need not assignments address of regarding error the pleadings. amendment of defendants’ IN THE 342 SUPREME COURT or not be given law thereon will effect or еn- foreign rights based to the of the Davis opposed public policy forced if settled forum. (1967). 120, However, Davis, 152 S.E. the mere N.C. the of the from that of the other juris- fact that law forum differs contrary diction does not mean that statute is to foreign Electric Co. v. public policy Light Clapper, of the forum. Bradford (1932). L.Ed. To render law foreign 286 U.S. unen- contrary to some policy, as it must violate public preva- forceable or conception good principle lent morals fundamental natural injustice of the forum justice people involve state. S.E. 2d 884 Howard Hunsinger, Ellison N.C. Howard, public This policy excep- 158 S.E. 101. N.C. such those generally involving tion has been cases as applied lotteries, racing, prohibited marriages, wagers, gaming, and Howard, 574, 158 Howard v. 200 N.C. ‍​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌‌‍S.E. liquor. sale injustice no to say, to this is not suсh case. We discern Needless in the of Florida’s application North Carolina statute people of repose.

Having determined that substantive Florida plaintiffs to action not time- claims and applies to by the we now turn repose, barred Florida statute ques- summary tion whether would otherwise survive plaintiff’s case judgment. Procedure, North of Civil lex Carolina Rules as case, procedural provide that sum- govern aspects

fori depositions, will be mary judgment granted pleadings, “if file, interrogatories, together and admissions answers affidavits, any, no as genuine if show that there is issue any judgment is entitled to a party fact and that any material 56(c). By P. a motion making N.C.R. matter law.” Civ. may plaintiff produce force a summary a defendant judgment, will demonstrating able a forecast evidence Pur- at trial. Dickens v. facie case prima to make out at least (1981). party moving year, 302 N.C. S.E. any the lack of summary establishing judgment the burden Deese, 218 S.E. 2d issue. Caldwell v. triable that an proving The movant meet burden nonexistent, or party’s claim is element opposing essential cannot pro- discovery opposing party that the by showing through of his claim or can- element support an essential duce evidence *11 IN THE SUPREME COURT Baughman Boudreau not an defense claim. surmount affirmative which would bar the Jurden, 405; Bernick 293 S.E. 2d v. Pur N.C. Dickens year, 302 276 S.E. 2d 325. All N.C. inferences of fact from the proofs hearing offered at the must be against drawn the movant Sloan, and in of the party favor the opposing Page motion. S.E.

The reveals model record that number is a bent ply- wood designed by swivel-tilt tub-chair in 1967. defendants The chair has a chrome about veneer one-sixteenth of an inch thick which is bonded to its shell. base of plywood upon The the chair recessed; which the and portion “tub” tilts swivels somewhat the diameter of the base is about two less inches than the diame- ter of the tub. bottom of the tub is three off about inches the floor. defendant,

Milo Baughman, the individual testified in his dep- osition chair designed that the was for residential use and that it is a assumption people natural that walk homes. barefoot their Nonetheless, he anticipated never his might put that someone foot in the area between back of chair floor. He and the was with the of clear plastic “edge familiar use welts known guards.” edge are used to of the guards protect These bottom metal on chrome-trimmed furniture. Model numbеr 1183 was not designed edge guard necessary. because not seem it did feasible, technically was would alien Although it it have been trim, chair concept placed the visual to have a wood welt around the veneer. If molding, edge cloth chrome the chair with the extending were manufactured chrome veneer beyond the it would create a surface that would cut plywood, dangerous bare skin. This would be a condition. Number designed so that would be specifically plywood chrome it is design drawing flush. This was not noted on the because so “I in all drawings put obvious. The do not include all details: don’t screws, dowels, I I in the in the put put don’t don’t I things my mechanisms. ... don’t are not specify problems. These are engineers plant.” done sketch, A role is make designer’s conceptual provide skеtch, supervise making working full-sized detail purpose supervision of a model. The to assure responsibilities looks right. designer’s finished inspectors The manufacturer’s engineering.” and not “aesthetic exactly right.” isn’t through that occasionally something go “let than the through. Other problems get quality In all factories some *12 action, single complaint a have not received defendants present any designs. furniture of their injury involving Inc., testi- Thayer-Coggin, Thayer president Coggin, Julius generally Milo Baughman that defendant in his deposition fied furniture a sketch of the pencil Thayer-Coggin furnished actual di- sketch which included the working well as a design, to be the exterior material specified piece mensions of the edge so that the veneer designed was used. The chair of the veneer edges and the plywood bе flush with the would it is thin. sharp veneer is because be sanded down. Chrome would However, A sharp edges. to have designed chair was not defect, defect, and design not a manufacturing is a sharp edge Thayer-Coggin. Nothing prevented responsibility would be the number a welt the bottom of protective along placement have similar tub-chairs in 1183. Plastic been added to edge guards years. the last few testi- Ray plant supervisor Thayer-Coggin,

Luther at Cooper, pro- of an is to purpose edge guard fied in his deposition injury. furniture rather than to Model prevent tect the metal on sanded, have the flush and designed edges number was always will “a edges. sharp edge not to have There little sharp you’re with metal in this thickness.” A any dealing sharp time a defect. edge manufacturing deposition

Plaintiff testifiеd his that he cut his bare foot of the chair where base meets edge on the “outside bottom sides,” resulting required surgery in severe lacerations which Plaintiff later examined the chair and hospitalization. deter- you “razor if edge sharp, sharp enough mined that was across your finger edge were to rub chair, the bottom outside your you finger.” would shave skin off The chrome was edge sharp way flush with the but all the plywood degrees around the 360 of the tub. evidence,

We now whether the forecast of viewed in consider favorable to light plaintiff, genuine most raised issues of ma- fact with to the elements of each claim as respect terial defined law. by Florida

[5] Under Florida law, the elements (1) ex duty istence of a recognized by law requiring the defendant to conform to a certain standаrd of conduct for protection (2) others, (3) including plaintiff; duty; breach of that in jury as a proximate sustained cause of the breach. Tieder v. Lit (Fla. tle, 1987), denied, So. 2d Dist. App. Ct. review (Fla. 1987); (Fla. 2d So. Clark v. Boeing 395 So. 2d 1226 1981); Dist. Ct. App. Welsh Metropolitan Dade Cty., So. 2d (Fla. (Fla. denied, 518 1979). Dist. Ct. cert. App. So. A duty designer under a to use reasonable care design product reasonably that is safe for its intended use and other Black, uses reasonably which are foreseeable. Industries v. Husky (Fla. 434 So. 2d 988 Dist. Ct. design *13 structure, materials, includes plan, choice of and specifica- availability Id. tions. design alternative does not duty liability. translate into a legal An action is not merely maintainable because the design used was not the safest Nevertheless, Id. possible. evidence of alternate designs bears question of a upon defеndant’s reasonable care. Id. summary

Courts should be cautious in granting judgment Co., Disney cases. McCabe v. Walt negligence 814 World 350 So. 2d (Fla. 1977). Dist. App. Ct. Where questions negligence are close, any always doubt should be resolved in jury favor a trial. by If the Id. circumstances established susceptible record are of a reasonable inference which recovery would allow and also of an capable equally reasonable inference to the contrary, jury a America, is Voelker presented. v. Combined Ins. Co. of (Fla. 1954). So. 2d In favorable light plaintiff, most the record a presents issue of material fact as to genuine whether defendants breached duty care reasonable the use of specifying chrome veneer, which is a sharp known to have but in- edge, failing to edge some type guard clude in the chair design. also presents genuine record issue of material fact as cause. Defendants proximate make much of the distinction be- and manufacturing

tween defects defects. A design defect Resign hazard injury-producing accompanying prod- is an normal use of a intentionally design. that was according uct manufactured Cas- SUPREME COURT IN THE 1981). (Fla. Co., A App. Dist. Ct. Maytag v. 396 So. 2d sisi hand, defect, a miscar- caused the other manufacturing an unintended produces manufacturing process in the riage on chrome edge sharp Id. contend result. Defendants con- in this case manufacturing defect and solely veneer Thayer-Coggin. on the intervening negligence part stituted party negligent a third but defendant and Where both proximate injury, is the sole cause party’s the third Pinero, v. Dе la Concha recover from defendant. cannot (Fla. (Fla. dismissed, appeal 109 So. 104 So. 2d 1959); Bros. 474 So. 2d Development & Pearce v. Kroh Pearce (Fla. App. Dist. Ct. foreseeable, However, it reasonably if an cause is intervening liability. Bryant, Rupp from ‍​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌‌‍all insulate a defendant cannot (Fla. 1982); see, Goode v. Walt World e.g., Disney So. 2d 658 (Fla. denied, 1982), review 436 So. App. 425 So. 2d 1151 Dist. Ct. 1983) (mother’s (Fla. of her did negligent supervision child liability); facilities from Leib designer park not shield theme 1976) (reckless (Fla. City Tampa, App. 326 So. 2d 52 Dist. Ct. not designer motorist did shield of intersection speeding ness Inc. liability). Detroit Marine Engineering, Maloy, from Cf. 1982) (boat (Fla. in Dist. not App. So. 2d 687 manufacturer Ct. liability it relied on another simply company sulated from because issue); Raleigh steering Caporale to manufacture the wheel at (Fla. 1980) America, Industries 382 So. 2d Dist. Ct. not (bicycle injuries manufacturer could disclaim *14 it because relied on dealer to purchaser simply ultimate assemble product). jury

Proximate cause is an issue for determination generally it is so reasonable men not differ. Helman unless clear that could (Fla. 1977). Co., v. Coast Line R. 349 So. 2d We Seaboard used, of the of the coupled believe that evidence nature material acknowledgment individual with the defendant’s manufac- lapses to quality, jury turer’s occasional raised a dangerously sharp edges reasonably whether were a foreseeable design edge guard. a consequence lacking [6] Similarly we find that the forecast evidence was sufficient liability. to on the elements of strict A jury questions plain raise to strictly hold a defendant liable in a liabili- seeking tiff (1) ty case must establish: the defendant’s relationship (2) product question; the defective condition of product; (3) the existence of causal connection between the product’s con dition injuries. West Tractor Com Caterpillar (Fla. 1976); Co., 336 So. 2d 80 pany, Clark Boeing 395 So. 2d (Fla. 1981); App. Dist. Ct. Sansing v. Firestone &Tire Rub (Fla. Co., 1978), denied, ber 354 So. 2d Dist. App. Ct. cert. (Fla. 1978). elements, So. 2d 1250 In to addition the above plaintiff must also establish that defect existed both at the injury time of the and at the time the product left the hands of Faxon, or seller. manufacturer Products Corp. Diversified (Fla. 1987); 514 So. 2d 1161 Dist. App. Ct. Cassisi v. Maytag (Fla. 1981). 396 So. 2d 1140 Dist. App. Ct. many Defendants reiterate of the contentions previously con- rejected sidered and to respect the negligence They claim. also contend that plaintiff presented no evidence raising reason- able inference that the chair was defective when it left the manu- facturer. Defendants note their spotless record with respect complaints and theorize any defect the chair many years arose after of wear and tear.

We nonetheless find forecast of evidence was suffi- cient support an inference in plaintiffs favor. Mere lapse of time between the purchase the accident does not foreclose lia- bility as a matter of law. Marrillia v. Lyn Boat Company, Craft (Fla. 1973). 271 So. 2d 204 App. Dist. Ct. Nor does evidence safe Harter, for a period use of time. Advance Chemical Co. v. 478 So. (Fla. denied, Dist. Ct. review So. 2d 829 (Fla. 1986). products liability Defendants in rely cases not history their fortune good exempt themselves from liability. Lapse safety Id. of time and a simply record circumstances to be considered in determining whether was defec- tive when it left the control of the manufacturer or distributor. weight of such evidence for the trier of fact. Cassisi (Fla. Moreover, Maytag So. 2d Dist. Ct. App. it reasonable to infer type that the alleged, defect uniform razor-sharpness around entire circumference of edge, the tub would not have arisen from use of the chair. defenses, respect

With defendants’ affirmative we note *15 contributory negligence does not a bar constitute to strict SUPREME COURT IN THE Florida, negligence a comparative in liability or actions negligence n.26; Martinez 396 So. 2d v. Maytag state. Cassisi (Fla. 1980). App. 2d 878 Ct. 382 So. Dist. Clark Equipment of the manu- already intervening negligence We addressed have present not ade- record does repose. facturer and statutes we the other defеnses. judge information upon quate of this that defendants purpose opinion we for the Therefore find inability affirm- to surmount plaintiffs have not demonstrated ative defenses.

[7] ing the Lastly we consider the breach of strict liability cause action, the Florida warranty claims. Supreme By creat Court 336 So. 2d abolished Company, Tractor in West Caterpillar liability warranty cases cause of action implied 520 So. Kramer Piper Corp., where no exists. privity Aircraft 1988). (Fla. here, Where, injured has been 2d 37 relationship defective but has no contractual allegedly defendants, if may pursue he strict cause of action but, warranty the vehicle of privity, implied absent appropriate Id; v. Viasyn no available to him. Evaluation longer Affiliates for (Fla. Dist. Ct. So. Thus, summary judgment properly granted we hold рlaintiffs claims for breach of war- implied for defendants as ranty merchantability implied warranty and breach of of fit- but was particular purpose inappropriate ness for liability. for and strict claims Appeals The result The decision of the Court of is af- is: implied to the claims for firmed different reasons as breach of warranty. liability, for negligence As to the claims and strict Appeals is reversed and the cause re- decision Court Court, Forsyth to that remand to the Superior manded court for not County, opinion. inconsistent with this proceedings further part, Reversed and remanded modified and affirmed part. Webb dissenting.

Justice In majority. I from the determining dissent the choice of the statute of application repose, majority for the relies on

State v. Locklear previоus statements of this Court that statutes of repose are sub- stantive rights. definitions of Lamb Wedgewood South Corp., 308 N.C. 302 S.E. 2d 868 Bolick v. American Barmag S.E. It necessary is not validity these statements to see we should not have a different treatment statutes of limitation and statutes choice of law determinations.

Whatever differences we find in statutes of limitation and statutes of repose, purpose of both of them bar claims which are not filed within certain majority times. The why not said there should be a different treatment them be- cause we call one statute substantive and procedural. the other I why see we do not ‍​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌‌‍should. The law of the forum when applies Henderson, statute of pled. limitations is Sayer v. 225 N.C. (1945). By S.E. 2d 875 a different using choice of law for a statute I believe repose, giving we are different treаtment statutes adopted were the same I purpose. do not believe we do should so.

I agree opinion with the written Parker Judge for the majority says Appeals. Court that the Court of Appeals reaching its decision “relied on ‘public policy’ exception.” The only time the Court of Appeals public policy mentioned was in Court, an opinion from of this quoting v. Flannery, Tieffenbrun (1930), 198 N.C. S.E. A.L.R. 210 which held that although time limitation on the wrongful death action had action, been held precedent a condition the limitation applied also to an action in this brought state when the action was based aon death that occurred in Florida. comes Tieffenbrun governing close to this case.

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. BRANTLEY LOCKLEAR

No. 492A87 (Filed 1988) 2 June investigator private 31— 1. Constitutional Law error —denied—no murder — prosecution degree court trial did not err for first murder de- nying investigator appointment defendant’s motion for the where defend-

Case Details

Case Name: Boudreau v. Baughman
Court Name: Supreme Court of North Carolina
Date Published: Jun 2, 1988
Citation: 368 S.E.2d 849
Docket Number: 409PA87
Court Abbreviation: N.C.
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