Eric Thurairajah v. Trooper Lagarian Cross, 3 F.4th 1017

Trooper Cross arrested Thurairajah for disorderly conduct after Thurairajah yelled an expletive at Cross from a moving vehicle; Cross believed the shout violated Arkansas noise statute.
Thurairajah sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (First Amendment retaliation and Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure) and under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act (ACRA) alleging violations of provisions of the Arkansas Constitution.
District court granted summary judgment to Cross on ACRA claims and dismissed Thurairajah’s claims for punitive damages, but denied qualified immunity on the individual-capacity § 1983 claims and entered partial summary judgment on liability for those federal claims.
Before trial the court excluded any punitive-damages argument to the jury; at trial the jury found Cross’s conduct did not proximately cause damages and awarded nothing; the court awarded nominal damages of $1.
Thurairajah’s motion for a new trial (based on alleged defense counsel misconduct) was denied; the district court awarded Thurairajah attorney’s fees of $15,100, and both sides appealed discrete rulings.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether ACRA claims survive Arkansas statutory immunity (need to show malice)	Thurairajah: malice aligns with federal ‘clearly established’ prong; no subjective-intent inquiry required	Cross: Arkansas law requires evidence of subjective malice to defeat statutory immunity	Affirmed dismissal of ACRA claims for lack of evidence of malice
Whether punitive damages on federal §1983 claims were available/instruction required	Thurairajah: entitled to punitive-damages instruction (especially if ACRA claims preserved)	Cross: no evidence of evil motive, intent, or callous indifference to justify punitive damages	Affirmed dismissal of federal punitive-damages claims and refusal to instruct jury on punitive damages
Whether district court abused discretion in denying new trial for alleged defense-counsel misconduct	Thurairajah: misconduct and breach of agreement prejudiced jury, warranting new trial	Cross: any questioning had little effect; plaintiff lacked credibility and harm was not proven	No abuse of discretion; new trial denied
Whether attorney’s fees were proper after only nominal ($1) damages	Thurairajah: as prevailing party under §1988 he should receive fees; this was more than a de minimis victory	Cross: Farrar requires denying or greatly reducing fees where recovery is only nominal	Affirmed attorney-fee award; district court reasonably applied circuit’s Farrar factors and reduced requested fees

Ark. State Med. Bd. v. Byers, 521 S.W.3d 459 (Ark. 2017) (statutory immunity under Ark. Code § 19-10-305 requires proof of malice to defeat immunity)
Fegans v. Norris, 89 S.W.3d 919 (Ark. 2002) (Arkansas immunity scheme is comparable to federal qualified-immunity framework)
Fuqua v. Flowers, 20 S.W.3d 388 (Ark. 2000) (plaintiff must plead facts supporting malicious conduct to overcome statutory immunity)
Thurairajah v. City of Fort Smith, 925 F.3d 979 (8th Cir. 2019) (prior panel on clearly established First Amendment law applied to this incident)
Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983) (punitive damages in §1983 require proof of evil motive or reckless indifference)
Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992) (nominal damages do not preclude prevailing-party status but bear on reasonableness of fee award)
Piper v. Oliver, 69 F.3d 875 (8th Cir. 1995) (circuit’s Farrar-framework application and factors for awarding fees in nominal-damages §1983 cases)
Coleman v. Rahija, 114 F.3d 778 (8th Cir. 1997) (punitive damages standard and focus on defendant's intent)
Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 (1998) (subjective intent is irrelevant to federal qualified-immunity defense)