Eric Presley v. Jeff Premo
701 F. App'x 619
| 9th Cir. | 2017Background
- Eric Presley was indicted for separate robberies of the Thatcher Tavern and the Wilshire Tavern; he sought severance of the two cases but the trial judge initially denied the motion.
- Presley waived a jury for the Thatcher Tavern charges but requested a jury for the Wilshire Tavern charges.
- On the morning of the Wilshire jury trial Presley requested new counsel and the judge denied the request after a colloquy; the judge made comments about plea offers and the strength of DNA evidence.
- Counsel renewed the severance motion based on the judge’s statements; the judge then granted severance and another judge took the Thatcher case while the original judge presided over the Wilshire trial.
- A jury convicted Presley on the Wilshire charges; he pleaded no contest to two Thatcher counts and was sentenced to 340 months. State appeals and post-conviction relief were denied.
- Presley filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 claiming judicial bias/appearance of bias; a COA was granted on that issue and the Ninth Circuit affirmed denial of relief.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial judge’s statements created judicial bias requiring reversal | Presley: judge’s statements (plea-soliciting, referencing DNA and likely conviction) show fixed anticipatory judgment and loss of neutrality | State: statements did not show disqualifying bias; severance was granted and no structural error shown; AEDPA deference applies | Court: no entitlement to relief under AEDPA; statements insufficient to show unconstitutional judicial bias |
| Whether Bracy or other Supreme Court precedent required relief | Presley: Bracy recognizes due-process violation for a biased judge and supports reversal | State: Bracy does not control these facts (involving bribery) and AEDPA requires more than broad precedent | Court: Presley failed to show state decision was contrary to or unreasonable application of controlling Supreme Court law |
| Whether the claim was procedurally barred | Presley: (raised merits under COA) | State: procedural bars could apply | Court: assumed arguendo claim was not barred and reached merits; affirmed denial |
| Whether this case is distinguishable from more egregious bias cases (e.g., Crater) | Presley: judge’s comments amounted to bias similar to other cases | State: prior Ninth Circuit decisions rejected bias claims even on more egregious facts | Court: Crater had more extreme judicial comments; Presley’s record is less egregious and fails under AEDPA |
Key Cases Cited
- Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899 (Sup. Ct. 1997) (recognizes due-process violation where judicial bias deprives a defendant of a fair trial)
- Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518 (Sup. Ct. 1997) (discussion of procedural-bar considerations in habeas review)
- Hurles v. Ryan, 752 F.3d 768 (9th Cir. 2014) (summarizes AEDPA standard for federal habeas relief)
- Crater v. Galaza, 491 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2007) (rejecting a judicial-bias habeas claim based on more extreme judicial statements)