Eric Morillo v. Monmouth County Sheriff's
117 A.3d 1206
| N.J. | 2015Background
- In December 2010 Monmouth County sheriff’s officers executed a child‑support warrant and found Morillo seated in an idling car on property tied to his mother; he was smoking and admitted he had a loaded handgun tucked in his waistband.
- Officers seized the handgun, patted Morillo down, and arrested him on the child‑support warrant; en route to headquarters he said the gun was registered to him and he had “paperwork.”
- The officers did not ask at the scene whether the handgun paperwork was inside the house; the supervisor (Cooper) called the prosecutor, who advised charging second‑degree unlawful possession under N.J.S.A. 2C:39‑5(b)(1).
- Morillo was charged on the weapons count, detained until family posted bail on that charge, and the weapons charge was later administratively dismissed after state police confirmed the gun was registered and the prosecutor concluded the statutory residence exemption applied.
- Morillo sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act alleging unlawful arrest/charging; trial and Appellate Division denied defendants’ summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The New Jersey Supreme Court granted review on the qualified immunity question.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether charging Morillo with unlawful possession violated a clearly established right under §2C:39‑6(e) (residence exemption) | Morillo: the statute plainly exempts possession at one’s residence so there was no probable cause to charge him | Officers: statute ambiguous off the house; totality (wheels running car, concealed loaded gun, marijuana, gang statements) supported belief probable cause existed | Court: statute ambiguous as to carrying on property not owned/possessed; not clearly established law that no charge was permissible; qualified immunity applies |
| Whether officers’ reliance on prosecutor’s advice defeats liability | Morillo: reliance is not absolute; Cooper failed to tell prosecutor Morillo was at his residence, so advice was objectively unreasonable | Officers: seeking supervisor and prosecutor advice demonstrates prudence; good‑faith reliance supports qualified immunity | Court: prosecutors’ advice is a relevant factor but not dispositive; officers’ seeking guidance and surrounding facts support objective reasonableness |
| Proper procedure for resolving qualified immunity at summary judgment | Morillo: disputed facts exist so immunity denial was appropriate | Officers: immunity is a threshold question for the court and summary judgment is proper when no material factual dispute | Court: immunity should be decided pretrial when possible; where material foundational facts are disputed they go to a jury via special interrogatories, but here legal question resolved for officers on summary judgment |
Key Cases Cited
- Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (established modern qualified immunity standard)
- Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (two‑step qualified immunity analysis)
- Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (officers are not liable if reasonably competent officers could disagree on probable cause)
- Ashcroft v. al‑Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (qualified immunity gives officials breathing room for reasonable, mistaken judgments)
- Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765 (existing precedent must place the constitutional question beyond debate for a right to be clearly established)